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CREATING INSECURITY: REALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM, AND U.S. SECURITY POLICY

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Graduate School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

---

by

Anthony David Lott

August 2002

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

at

THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER

Upon the recommendation of the Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, this dissertation is hereby accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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CREATING INSECURITY: REALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM, AND U.S. SECURITY POLICY

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This project is intended to bring together a rhetorical form of realism and a political form of constructivism in an effort to better analyze U.S. security concerns. Traditional security studies, espousing realist principles, insist on a military and strategic emphasis. Conversely, studies drawing on a broadly-defined constructivism often eschew state security concerns in favor of an emphasis on culture and identity. This work seeks to employ both schools under an epistemological constructivism that allows realism and political constructivism to be seen as rhetorical tools for influencing the state. The first half of the text investigates previous works in realism and constructivism. This investigation is intended to demonstrate how a rhetorical realism and a political constructivism can be brought together to provide a better understanding of the sources of insecurity. The second half of the text contains applications of this approach to security studies. The first application demonstrates how realism and constructivism might be used to critique the decision to deploy a ballistic missile defense system. It is shown that a BMD system leads to a diminished state of security. The second application demonstrates how realism and constructivism might be used to critique U.S. policy towards Colombia. It is shown that the tactics of the Drug War lead to a diminished state of national security for the United States. Both applications suggest that a more robust understanding of the sources of insecurity that balances the requirements of realism with the cultural insights of constructivism can lead to a state of enhanced national security.

Dedicated to

Helen Sorum Craddick

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Chapter One: Introduction

What is security? It has long been the dominant issue in international politics. Every successful theoretical approach to the study of the relations between states is prefaced on a commitment to understanding the concept. But while this can be stated with a high level of assurance, it is also the case that the subject of security and the sources of perceived insecurity are varied and problematic. During the Cold War, the concept was linked to the protection of the state and issues were framed as 'national security' concerns. Accordingly, security was associated with territorial integrity and the preservation of sovereignty. The physical base of the state required the vigilance of a *national security apparatus* dedicated to recognizing the capabilities and intentions of others. This version of security further rests on a subjective core that manages perceptions of threat and the enemy. However, the constraints of the Cold War mandated that these perceptions be left unproblematic in order to manage the policy relevant and immediate problems of securing the state.

But as the Cold War came to an end, alternative voices could be heard advocating versions of security that seem to contradict the focus and energy of the Cold War studies. Recognizing that emphasis on the state as the primary referent of security marginalized much of the human condition, more recent works focus on

human security concerns. These works note the often deleterious effect that a state may have on human welfare.[1] In addition to this negative effect of the state on individual security, founding the concept of security on the state amounts to making a category error. The individual can be the only true referent of security, and the state, simply an instrument for the protection of that primary referent.[2]

These two interpretations of security appear incommensurable. At the same time, neither interpretation invalidates the other. Even before the events of September 11, 2001, the physical integrity of the state remained a central concern for the policy maker and realist scholar. The concept of *national security* still resonates with IR theorists as the state continues to be the primary political unit in world politics. Yet, developments in human rights, global ecology, and economic development strategies, as well as the success of transnational civil society in constructing action networks for the promotion of disparate political issues,[3] make the logic of human security more acceptable to mainstream security scholars. Recognizing the importance of both approaches to security, however, only returns us to our initial question: *what is security*?

This project is intended to bring together these seemingly contradictory approaches to the study of security. I begin with the premise that there is something fundamentally important about *national* security matters. At this point in human history, the state plays a necessary role in mitigating the uncertainties of international anarchy for its citizens.[4] While this may not hold true for all states in the system, it

does hold for citizens living in 'reasonably decent polities.'[5] Where states have accepted the responsibility for protecting their citizens, the security of the state is a prerequisite for the security of the individual. To this interpretation, however, we must inquire as to what those studies that question the emphasis on the state can contribute to our understanding of security. Even if the state can be incorporated into an account of security such that it becomes a tool for the betterment of the human condition, it may also be the case that traditional or mainstream studies of security, rooted in the events of the Cold War, rest on faulty epistemological premises—these studies may not adequately conceptualize security. If this is the case, then it is our responsibility to reflect on the current state of security studies and offer an understanding of the sources of insecurity that reflects both the earlier realist focus on national security and the more recent focus by constructivists on epistemological coherence and cultural influence.

Before turning to an outline of the chapters that follow, the discussion below explores the historical roots of the security crisis that now confronts the field. The growing schism within security studies suggests further conceptual thinking is necessary. Traditional studies, espousing realist principles, insist on a military and strategic emphasis. These studies seem wedded to a particular interpretation of international politics and its study. Conversely, studies drawing on a broadly-defined constructivism often eschew state security concerns and focus on problematizing identity constructs in order to render secondary military and strategic matters. Both

approaches undermine the development of a more comprehensive study of security. Traditional concerns resting on a faulty epistemology, while focused on the policy-relevant topic of national security, collapse in incoherence. Just the same, constructivist renderings of identity and culture that do not address state policy concerns collapse in irrelevance. As the study of security bridges the divide between theory and policy, it is imperative that a concept of security emerge that is both philosophically coherent and policy relevant. In what follows, the historical origins of the current crisis are explored in an attempt to understand the task that lies before us in the subsequent chapters.

The Historical Origins of the Current Crisis

The origins of IR as a distinct field of study and the pursuit of international peace by scholars and statesmen must be seen as more than mere coincidence. The concurrent desire for both national and international security lies at the heart of the Anglo-American IR community formed at the beginning of the Twentieth Century.[6] Recognizing the limitations of human nature and the constraints of the international system, scholars sought either to mitigate or transcend the sources of insecurity. Historically, these early works pitted idealists who advocated legal and moral mechanisms that would transcend insecurity against realists who sought to mitigate the dangerous excesses of insecurity.

While both approaches desired the same end- *peace and security*- the events of World War II demonstrated the ineffective and dangerous policies advocated by legal and moral idealists.[7] The texts of post-war realists like Carr,[8] Morgenthau,[9] Herz,[10] and Kennan[11] became required material for those attempting to understand international relations and construct a more stable and secure international system. Realism quickly became synonymous with the study of security, and as the politics of the Cold War constrained the actions of states and the theoretical investigation of those actions, an inseparable link between realism and strategic studies was forged.[12] Realism quickly took on an aire of theoretical invulnerability. Its precepts and premises were taken to be governing laws of the behavior between states and realism was considered a general theory of international relations.[13]

Realism's apparent success at explaining the behavior of states, however, masked two substantive flaws that would later confront both the theory and the field of security studies. At a general epistemological level, realism's commitment to positivism resulted in truth claims about the world that suggested an opportunity to understand the world from an objective perspective. These claims sought to describe the world as it existed- objectifying threats and reducing the explanatory role of particular cultural constructs.[14] Realism became a strategic science- reducing the likelihood of war by more accurately maintaining a balance between states. A second flaw in the logic of realism followed from the first. Because a close association between realism and strategic studies made high political issues salient, security

became synonymous with military matters.[15] Thus, while a close inspection of realist texts finds that security is not explicitly limited to military and strategic concerns,[16] the corpus of security works could not help but be limited to the overriding issues of the Cold War.[17]

The end of hostilities between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and the rise of constructivism as an alternative approach to the study of world politics presented a challenge to the realist-dominated field. Following Wittgenstein, it became clear that the limits of our language were the limits of our world.[18] Language, in other words, allows us to make sense of our world. What we take to be threats represent linguistic claims rather than objective facts.[19] Rather than describing the world as it is, the post-positivist approach to epistemology explored in this study, and loosely termed *constructivism*, demonstrates that realism is actually a sophisticated interpretation of a particular world-view. Realism's force comes not from understanding it as a theory of international politics but rather its application as a rhetorical tool to influence the policy maker.

The question soon arises, however, that if realism is mere rhetoric, then no matter how sophisticated it is, why should its precepts and premises be judged any more important than those of other approaches? Drawing further on constructivist principles, scholars have re-examined the importance of *identity* and *culture* and demonstrated how entrenched cultural constructs and embedded identities result in specific interpretations of enemies and threats. Moreover, these studies suggest that

conscious *reflection* can adjust the ideational construct of the enemy. Therefore, the negative and pessimistic world-view of the realists may be both incomplete and exaggerated. The search for security may lie in a group's collective critique of its own enemy perception rather than its defense by material means.

In addition to this concern for both epistemological coherence and the inclusion of culture and identity, alternative approaches to security studies also demand a re-interpretation of the concept in the aftermath of the Cold War. Closer examination of the state's role in protecting citizens and a heightened concern for human (individual) welfare requires that realism answer for its state-centric bias and infrequent discussion of complex welfare issues. Alternative approaches seek to demonstrate how many states in the system represent a hazard to individual security rather than a means to its promotion.[20] In addition, complex environmental, economic, and societal issues have recently been labeled *security concerns* in an attempt to jettison studies of security from the constraints of the Cold War paradigm.[21]

The effect on national security discourse could not be sharper. A growing schism now appears in the field. Committed to a traditional emphasis on national security issues and a reliance on a negative view of human relations, realist works dismiss the constructivist challenge as policy-irrelevant and esoteric in principle. Similarly, committed to raising new questions that have been subsumed by realism's dominance, alternative approaches demonstrate the incoherence of realist tenets and the marginalization of pressing welfare matters. Intransigence on both sides leaves the

study of security in a rather schizophrenic state.[22] More to the point, the theoretical pursuit of security risks being marginalized by bureaucratic agencies that consider the concept apolitical, requiring little more than policy implementation.[23]

It is during this moment of crisis that a re-evaluation of the concept of security becomes necessary. There can be little doubt that a limited conceptual understanding of *national* security, accepting the state as the central focus of study, is an attractive feature of realism. When the low countries were devastated by the *Blitzkrieg* or the jetliners crashed into the World Trade Towers, it is the physical integrity of the state that has been compromised. At these moments, individual security requires a sufficient national security apparatus for enhancement. This offered, however, it is also the case that the rather uncontroversial account of language as representing the limits of our world offers a much more coherent epistemological base than the positivism recurring in realist thought. In addition, what role culture and identity might play in the development of a robust security policy seems to require further study.

To this debate between realism and constructivism, we must also introduce more practical political problems that require attention. Any useful study of security must not only be theoretically sound, it must be applicable to the relations between states. This commitment to practical political matters was true before September 11, but now takes on added urgency. If the concept of security is to resonate, then it must be applicable to the political units capable of producing system-wide effects because of their policies. In today's international climate, this means that the concept of security

must make sense to and remain cogent for the United States. Power and influence still matter in an environment defined by the anarchical relations between states. In sympathy with constructivist concerns for language, we might recognize the role that the hegemon plays in the articulation and promotion of specific speech-acts. The actions of the U.S. have a profound influence on the way states relate to each other. Our ability to reflect on and interpret U.S. security issues is a necessary addition to our more comprehensive understanding of security.

Chapter Outline

In the chapters that follow, I will explore the requirements of both realism and constructivism in developing a robust understanding of security that can be used to implement successful policy. Chapter two explores the use of realism as a rhetorical tool for understanding the necessities of power and the limitations of moral and legal mechanisms to achieving security ends. I seek to demonstrate that while realism does not succeed as a general theory of international politics, it does provide a necessary understanding of the relationship between national security and human welfare in 'reasonably decent polities.'[24]

Chapter three will explore the ways in which constructivism can be used to build a linguistic framework for the analysis of security concerns. I will begin this chapter with a discussion of language, interpretation, and the social construction of threats. It is then necessary to outline the success of previous constructivist texts in

better conceptualizing security. However, the major drawback for all constructivist studies is their collective lack of a policy-oriented focus which allows the state to implement their findings. This shortcoming will be discussed as one of the primary problems confronting security studies today.

In chapter four I attempt to move beyond the limitations of the current constructivist texts by re-introducing realism into our constructivist framework. After demonstrating the importance of an epistemological constructivism, I will bring together a *rhetorical realism* and a *political constructivism* in order to provide a measure of theoretical focus and policy relevance. It will be demonstrated that these components are both complementary and necessary to a more comprehensive understanding of the sources of insecurity.

Having articulated the theoretical apparatus that moves this study forward, chapters five and six contain applications of this approach to U.S. security issues. In chapter five, I will focus on a central security theme that has engaged analysts during and after the Cold War. Debate surrounding a national missile defense system provides an interesting instance of created insecurity and suggests how this approach to security analysis can function to improve policy development.

In chapter six, a smaller example is explored that demonstrates the regional applicability of this approach. Studying the current war on drugs in the Andean region provides another instance of policy development during and after the Cold War. Here again, the point is to examine how the United States may in fact be undermining its

security interests and creating its own insecurity. By analyzing how instances of security are interpreted and formed by the language employed, we can develop an understanding of the particular threats envisioned. Then, recourse to realist tenets allows us to recognize whether particular policies do indeed enhance state security.

The seventh and final chapter is intended to provide a brief review of the theoretical approach taken in this thesis and to explore avenues for further study. I will suggest that subsequent works employing this approach to security might proceed in one of two general ways. First, studies can explore the extent to which other, minor players in international affairs develop sub-optimal policies in the pursuit of security. Second, I argue that more work in the analysis of U.S. security affairs is both appropriate and necessary. As the *sine qua non* power in international policies, the influence of the United States cannot be underestimated and requires consistent and committed analysis and critique.

Chapter Two: Realism on Security

This chapter investigates the interpretation of the state and international relations by traditional security scholars. Here the connection between realism and security is made clear. By analyzing the writings of five realist scholars we will be able to recognize key features present in each text. In order to recognize these features, each author will be examined using a similar format. First, I will explore each writer's concept of security. While some of the authors below resist defining such a contestable term, each does offer insight into its scope and limits. Then, I will examine how each seeks to advise the policy maker so as to bring about enhanced security. In the remaining sections, I will summarize the similarities and differences that animate these realist texts and then discuss the successes and failures inherent in the current understanding of realism and national security studies. Doing so, it is hoped, we will come to see realism as a rhetorical device used to influence the state rather than a general theory of international politics.

Morgenthau

The writings of Hans Morgenthau engage our first discussion of realism and security. His concern, specifically, is with defense of the national interest and the

pursuit and containment of power. Yet in his observations concerning both the national interest and power, we can make certain inferences concerning his understanding of the importance of security. Indeed, in the past, if realism has been confused with national security studies, it is unlikely that Morgenthau will provide us with a means to differentiate the two issues.

For Morgenthau, the concept of security ultimately rests on a subjective or psychological base. In discussing the requirements of a state to arm itself against others, he writes, "[t]he generally professed and most frequent actual motive for armaments is *fear* of attack; that is, a *feeling of insecurity*."[1] However, Morgenthau is committed to recognizing that a feeling of security results from material conditions that bring about the subsequent psychological condition.[2] Understanding the relationship to material conditions allows us to find a link between Morgenthau's concept of the national interest and his concern with security. Speaking of the United States, Morgenthau writes that it "pursued a policy seeking to maintain at first its security and very soon its predominance of the Western Hemisphere."[3] This is the primary (national) interest in U.S. foreign policy during its formative years- and remains so into the mid-Twentieth Century. Thus, Morgenthau links the concept of security to physical integrity and sovereignty.

Here we recognize a further component of Morgenthau's understanding of security. The state represents the primary referent. This component to his work is a given and does not require further analysis. In addition, although the concept of

security may rest on subjective feelings, it is the collective feelings represented in the state that informs Morgenthau's understanding. To this psychological component, Morgenthau makes clear that no state can survive where there remains an external threat to its integrity, i.e., its physical safety.[4]

These two components make up Morgenthau's elementary understanding of security. *Feeling* secure allows a state to stop arming. From an existential viewpoint, *being* secure means a state is not in physical danger of attack from beyond its borders. Finally, security lies at the heart of the national interest. And, achieving the national interest requires that states counter-balance the pursuit of power with the possibilities of diplomacy. In one attempt to explicate his understanding of the national interest, Morgenthau writes, "it assumes continuous conflict and threat of war, to be minimized through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action."[5] Leaving aside the problematic nature of Morgenthau's use of this term, it is clear that he centers his concept around the psychological components of security discussed above.

The bulk of Morgenthau's writings are not dedicated to explaining terms but seem rather to be written as advice to statesmen and the broader polity. Therefore, while Morgenthau's concept of security may lack clarity, his desire to see it achieved through particular policy recommendations expands our understanding of his view of the state and international relations. Two policy recommendations, in particular, seem central to Morgenthau's quest for security. First, like many realists, Morgenthau

recognizes the practical limits of goodwill in international politics and the requirements incumbent on each state actor to ensure a proper defense.[6] Second, the ability to balance power with power represents one of the finer arts of diplomacy and a requirement for good state management.[7]

Minimizing the level of uncertainty (i.e., managing insecurity) represents the logical limit of international politics for Morgenthau. This need to limit uncertainty manifests itself in the requirements for an effective foreign policy.

> To minimize these hazards is the first task of a foreign policy which seeks the defense of the national interest by peaceful means. Its second task is the defense of the national interest, restrictively and rationally defined, against the national interests of other nations which may or may not be thus defined. If they are not, it becomes the task of armed diplomacy to convince the nations concerned that their legitimate interests have nothing to fear from a restrictive and rational foreign policy and that their illegitimate interests have nothing to gain in the face of armed might rationally employed.[8]

Beyond the advocacy of strategies that first seek peaceful solutions and then insist on force, statesmen are also admonished to seek policies that balance against the powers of other states. Morgenthau insists on making the balance of power a central part of any foreign policy strategy that attempts to defend the national interest. Speaking of U.S. policy in particular, Morgenthau notes that the creation or restoration of a balance of power in the international system has been at the core of U.S. diplomatic and military strategy since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century.[9] A consistent policy of balancing strengthens the position of the U.S. and enhances national security.

Absolute security appears as a utopian ideal in Morgenthau's writings. But while absolute security cannot be achieved, insecurity can be mitigated through the careful application of strategies that signal to others the power possessed by a state and the intent to defend that state against hostile actions by another state or the accumulation of power by any state in the system.

Herz

While Morgenthau's treatment of security suggests that it is assumed to be a necessary value, John Herz considers the concept central to his understanding of world politics. For Herz, insecurity is an environmental effect of anarchy. "Wherever such anarchic society has existed... there has arisen what might be called a 'security dilemma."[10] This condition occurs no matter the nature of particular actors. Indeed, social cooperation and pacific feelings only enhance the consequences of anarchy as these elements invigorate particular identities thereby strengthening inter-group competition.[11] At some point, whether it is at the individual, group, or state level, all units living in anarchy confront the requirement of security and the constraints of the security dilemma. Mirroring Morgenthau's concept, it is first a psychological condition (Herz calls it an urge)[12] and second a physical necessity (linked to power defined by capabilities).[13] Founding realism on a preeminent desire to seek security as an ultimate end, Herz finds realism and security fundamentally linked and often indistinguishable. "Realist thought is determined by an overpowering impact of the security factor."[14]

With the rise of the state system, Herz, again like Morgenthau, is drawn to link power and security to the state and recognize that while other actors participate in world politics, it is the state that becomes the primacy referent for the pursuit of security.[15]

But while the pursuit of security is an inevitable requirement for those existing in anarchy, Herz demands that a successful strategy for achieving national security requires that policy makers go beyond the realist pursuit of power. This is a striking component of Herz's advice to statesmen and parallels Morgenthau's desire to see policies of peace balanced with policies of force.[16] In his advocacy, Herz seeks to balance the inevitable pursuit of power with pacific strategies. He calls his policy advice 'realist liberalism' and grounds it in the following remark by Huxley, which should remain intact for our purposes.

> The practices of that which is ethically best involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion, it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence.... The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.[17]

The logic of the security dilemma and the need to pursue power strategies remain a central feature for Herz. However, "in international relations the mitigation, channeling, balancing, or control of power has prevailed perhaps more often than the inevitability of power politics would lead one to believe."[18] While the challenge of

balancing these strategies complicates foreign policy making, Herz recognizes it as essential to state survival. This is not an easy task. For Herz, realist liberalism is "the most difficult of arts, and to formulate its principles the most difficult of sciences. But if successful, Realist Liberalism will prove to be more lastingly rewarding than utopian idealism or crude power-realism."[19] In relatively simple language, Herz is able to develop a sophisticated understanding of the need for security in the current international environment and outline the general requirements for achieving that end.

Wolfers

The broad strokes of the 'security dilemma' painted by John Herz are further refined by Arnold Wolfers. Noting the connection between the national interest and security, he argues that "it would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, although used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford."[20] While not specifically mentioning the problems that Morgenthau encounters when defining the national interest, Wolfers seems to require further conceptual thinking on the matter of security. Toward that end, Wolfers is first committed to seeing the normative character of national security policies. Citing Walter Lippmann's early work on the subject, Wolfers demonstrates the connection between a sense (or feeling) of security and the preservation of certain core societal values. "[A] nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to

sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."[21] This leads Wolfers to argue that security "in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[22] As with earlier definitions, security is considered both the psychological absence of fear and the existential lack of physical threat.

The assumption that security is best considered in relation to the state is clear when we look to Wolfers's advice to statesmen. Beginning with the rhetorical question "[is] not insecurity of any kind an evil from which the rational policy-maker would want to rescue his country?,"[23] Wolfers offers two compelling reasons why the state should moderate its (necessary) thirst for security. First, "every increment of security must be paid for by additional sacrifices of other values usually of a kind more exacting than the mere expenditure of precious time... by something of a law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it."[24]

Second, in a further explication of Herz's security dilemma, Wolfers argues that, "national security policies when based on the accumulation of power have a way of defeating themselves if the target level is set too high because 'power of resistance' cannot be unmistakably distinguished from 'power of aggression."[25] Therefore, "[what] a country does to bolster its own security through power can be interpreted by others... as a threat to their security."[26] Security, then, requires that a state balance

between the need for an adequate defense and the appearance of moderation in that defense. Wolfers's comments on the ideal security policy speak to this delicate strategy.

> It should be kept in mind that the ideal security policy is one that would lead to a distribution of values so satisfactory to all nations that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimized. While this is a utopian goal, policy-makers and particularly peace-makers would do well to remember that there are occasions when greater approximation to such a goal can be effected.[27]

Here we see Wolfers echoing the argument of Morgenthau and Herz. A balanced foreign policy that tempers the accumulation of power with pacific intentions leads to a more secure environment than would a policy based on brute power accumulation. However, Wolfers also recognizes the complexities of such a strategy. In noting the near 'utopian goal' of pursuing a balanced strategy, Wolfers accepts the realities of international life.

Waltz

Kenneth Waltz continues many of the themes put forth by the realists above in an attempt to build a *scientific* theory of international politics. Beginning with the state as the primary locus for security considerations, Waltz articulates what security entails. The condition of anarchy means that a general atmosphere of insecurity exists for all states in the system. Waltz claims that, "states... do not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their security unless they set out to provide it for themselves."[28] At the

heart of this argument is Waltz's claim that all states wish for survival,[29] making the pursuit of survival and that of security synonymous.

If security requires that states engage in self-help tactics in order to survive, then what can Waltz offer the policy maker by way of practical advice? First, we need to look to his general theory of international politics. Beyond the primary requirement of maintaining adequate military capabilities, the logic of balance-of-power represents the most important strategy for ensuring the security of the state. Assuming a competitive system, Waltz finds that the logic of balance of power is reproduced over and over again. As long as states seek survival, then we need not assume rationality or constancy of will in order to see the presence of balance of power tendencies.[30] While the tendency to seek a balance in international politics does not ensure survival, Waltz is insistent that it is a consistent remedy to the potential destruction of the state system. "Safety for all states... depends on the maintenance of a balance among them."[31]

Second, although Waltz insists that IR theory is not foreign policy,[32] the logic of balance of power does provide the security manager with specific policy consequences. This understanding is most important for the policy consequences of the United States. Following the balancing logic articulated in *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz argues that the current unipolar moment will not last.[33] The United States will be unable to maintain its unchallenged position in world politics into the indefinite future. This is a rather standard (neorealist) treatment of power and

balancing in international relations and provides a study of security very little in the way of prescriptive direction. The claim, however, becomes interesting when Waltz begins to explore how unilateral activities on the part of the United States will hasten the end of unipolarity and initiate great power balancing. "In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it. With benign intent, the United States has behaved and, until its power is brought into balance, will continue to behave in ways that sometimes frighten others."[34] Thus, it is the *behavior* of the United States that causes others to seek balancing and not simply the material capabilities of the hegemon (the United States). Waltz's disdain for unreflective American unilateralism demonstrates a need to examine the earlier warnings of Morgenthau, Herz, and Wolfers. Speaking to a need to balance power considerations with cooperative ones, Waltz argues that, "[r]ather than learning from history, The United States is repeating past errors by extending its influence over what used to be the province of the vanquished. This alienates Russia and nudges it toward China instead of drawing it toward Europe and the United States."[35] It appears that it might be possible, even recognizing Wolfers's claim to the most difficult of arts, to draw a potential balancer into alignment with a hegemon. U.S. foreign policy would seem to have a powerful effect on the direction that Russia (and China) takes in the future. In a telling reading of the U.S. propensity to create insecurity, Waltz cogently argues that to

> alienate Russia by expanding NATO, and to alienate China by lecturing its leaders on how to rule their country, are policies that only an

> overwhelmingly powerful country could afford, and only a foolish one be tempted, to follow. The United States cannot prevent a new balance of power from forming. It can hasten its coming as it has been earnestly doing.[36]

Although Waltz is committed to differentiating between theories of international politics and those of foreign policy, his desire to understand 'balancing tendencies' informs both areas of study. For our purposes, it is clear from much of his later work that a thoughtful security manager can draw policy-relevant conclusions from Waltz's theoretical approach to international politics.

Buzan

Barry Buzan's *People, States, and Fear* represents a further explication of realism with specific attention paid to matters of security. As with the earlier realists, the issue of the state is central to Buzan's work. "As a form of political organization, the state has transcended, and often crushed, all other political units to the extent that it has become the universal standard of political legitimacy."[37] Buzan continues, arguing that in theory, "the state dominates both in terms of political allegiance and authority, and in terms of its command over instruments of force, particularly the major military machines required for modern warfare."[38] In language that demonstrates some affinity with Waltz's structural realism, Buzan further elaborates his understanding of world politics; "[this] theory is close to reality in a large minority of states, and enables the biggest and best organized of them to exert powerful system-

wide influence."[39] Moreover, "the protection of territory and population must count as fundamental security concerns" because "the state ultimately rests on its physical base."[40] Buzan seeks to link security with the physical safety of the state.

This understanding of the concept of security revolves around how we come to understand two distinct terms- *threat* and *vulnerability*. In a discussion of these terms, Barry Buzan offers a moderate realist version of international affairs. Agreeing with the writers above, he argues that state insecurity "reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities."[41] These threats and vulnerabilities possess a material component. Threats require a vigilant state apparatus. Because threats are external to the state, they may be "impossible to measure, may not be perceived" or their perception "may not have much substantive reality."[42] Moreover, it may be difficult to distinguish "threats serious enough to constitute a threat to national security, from those that arise as normal day-to-day consequences of life in a competitive international environment."[43]

Recognizing the material base of external threats leads Buzan to construct an interesting analogy. He writes that "[each] state exists, in a sense, at the hub of a whole universe of threats."[44] Adding that, "because international threats are so ambiguous, and because knowledge of them is limited, national security policy-making is necessarily a highly imperfect art," Buzan demonstrates that states are required to engage in "constant monitoring and assessment, and the development of criteria for deciding when threats become of sufficient intensity to warrant action."[45] It is

important to note the material component of threats as they are acknowledged by Buzan. If the state is the hub, then threats exist 'out there' on the rim of the international relations wheel. This picture of international life is a demonstrably negative vision where other all other states are potential enemies. These threats are calculated in terms of the physical capabilities that might be harnessed in an attack on the state. The mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for the state.

Vulnerabilities, on the other hand, are internal problems (but nonetheless material) that demonstrate a deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs. Buzan argues that vulnerabilities "can be reduced by increasing self-reliance, or by building up countervailing forces to deal with specific threats."[46] Such a rendering of both *threat* and *vulnerability* can be interpreted by the state policy establishment and used to construct monitoring and information assessment that allows for a calculation concerning the relative level of state security. Intelligence gathering and processing becomes integral to the maintenance of state security.[47] It follows, since security is tied to both physical capabilities (Wolfers's objective clause) and the interpretation of those capabilities (Wolfers's subjective clause), that it is possible to *measure* the level of 'security' one possesses relative to another. Weapons systems, both offensive and defensive, can be quantified and measured against the systems of other states.

Finally, Buzan argues that anarchy tends to impose three conditions on our understanding of security.[48] First, as discussed above, states are "the principal referent object of security because they are both the framework of order and the highest source of governing authority."[49] For this reason it is entirely appropriate to confine discussions of security to matters of national importance and speak of a specific (and narrow) security problematique. But focusing simply on the state does not tell us much about the international consequences of insecurity.

Anarchy's second condition suggests an answer to this problem. Buzan notes that, "the dynamics of national security are highly relational and interdependent between states."[50] For this reason, "[i]ndividual national securities can only be fully understood when considered in relation both to each other and to larger patterns of relations in the system as a whole."[51] In language that appears to foreshadow the argument of his later collaborative effort, *The Logic of Anarchy*, Buzan recognizes that international security issues are best understood in systemic terms in that they have powerful effects on how secure individual states feel.[52] Incorporating the critical school's concern for the 'insecurity dilemma',[53] Buzan writes that while domestic insecurities may remain an issue for some states, attention needs to be paid to external threats, as these "will almost always comprise a major element of the national security problem."[54] Mirroring the classic security dilemma, anarchy mandates that insecurity is an environmental condition that must be managed by states through signaling, posturing, and the appropriation of capabilities, but can never be overcome.

Finally, the third condition demonstrates that anarchy is a necessary condition for understanding security matters and that its enduring nature severely constrains what states can do. Here, Buzan articulates a position quite close to that of Wendt, noting that "the practical meaning of security can only be constructed sensibly if it can be made operational within an environment in which competitive relations are inescapable."[55] When considered so, security becomes a relative condition. Only if anarchy ceases to be the defining structural attribute of international politics will our understanding of security be re-considered.

Realism and the Traditional Study of Security

The writers discussed above are self-defined realists. They work in a tradition that situates the state in a hostile environment and mandates that the search for security is central to their theoretical endeavor. In doing so, realist principles and national security policies become strikingly similar. Exactly what this means for the development of a more robust concept of security is unclear. While it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to locate an essential core of realist thought running through each of the writers above,[56] we are able to recognize a certain family resemblance that makes the study of security similar among them. In this section I will outline the similarities present in the concept of security discussed by the five realists explored above. Realism and national security studies became synonymous during the

Cold War and recognizing their principle components will allow us to undertake a critique of traditional security studies in the final section of this chapter.

Three issues in particular animate the realist concern for security. First, the state plays a (the) central role in mitigating insecurity on behalf of the individual. Second, power is inextricably linked to national security. Third, due to the condition of anarchy, security is always relative and requires consistent re-evaluation due to the shifting fortunes brought about by attempts to balance power. Therefore, the mitigation of insecurity rather than its transcendence is the appropriate focus of realist thought. Each of these issues might be discussed in further detail.

First, the assumption of state preeminence in world affairs quite often means that its investigation is not undertaken but rather assumed. This is true for each of the realists above who recognize the importance of the state in matters of security but assume its relevance rather than explicating it. While Buzan is most explicit in recognizing that the primary referent for security must remain the individual,[57] all of the writers suggest the state is the necessary locus of political investigation as the state represents the political unit charged with protecting that individual. That the state is necessary for individual security does not mean that the state is a *given* in international politics. It is quite possible that other political forms could manage the uncertainties of global politics for the individual. However, it is often recognized that the state has been and will continue to be that indispensable institution charged with specific duties in the security realm.

Upon investigation, however, the realist placement of the state at the center of the security problematique does not rely solely on existential consideration of its dominance in world politics. There is a second, ethical component that animates the realist reading of the state. The state, it should be remembered, *incurs the obligation* to manage international uncertainty on behalf of its citizenry.[58] States, in the words of Scott and Carr, are "organizations to which people look to perform functions of the first importance that they cannot perform for themselves."[59] In the realm of security, Kal Holsti summarizes the importance of this function, "in the implicit contract between individuals and the state... the most fundamental service purchased... is security."[60] This contract is taken seriously by both state and citizen alike. The citizen grants a measure of authority to the state in exchange for the obligation incurred by the state to protect and defend.[61] The implication, then, for the traditional approach is that the state might be taken *as if* it were a given in international relations for the purposes of security studies. This understanding of the state and its role in international politics is further outlined by Scott and Carr.

> Let us characterize the responsibility the state owes to its citizenry as the obligation to manage international uncertainty in the best interest of the citizenry. The obligation, of course, is owed to the state's citizenry, but it gives purpose and direction to the state's foreign policy. It seems appropriate, then, to describe the state as the advocate of its citizen's interests in the international world. Inter-state relationships correspondingly should be regarded as relationships between advocates charged with pursuing the interests of their respective clients; their citizenry.[62]

The obligation argument is continued in the work of Robert Jackson, who notes that the "[s]ecurity provided by independent governments to their citizens within the confines of international borders is the basic (although by no means the only) point of the state. Indeed,... the security afforded by the state is the essential means for developing the good life."[63] Matters of security do not rest with a discussion of the sources of insecurity but require consideration of the position of the state in mitigating whatever sources of insecurity are thought to exist.

Whether explicit or not, each of the realists above centers the study of security around the state and considers *national security* a limiting factor in the scope of issues that present themselves to the theorist. At their core, issues of security rest on the physical integrity of the state. This statement, however, requires more than a strategic or military emphasis. While the particularities of the Cold War often linked security with military or strategic matters, none of the security definitions used during the Cold War limit security considerations to military strategy.[64] Moreover, this limiting factor, when considered in relation to the second and third issues, suggests both the success and failure of the traditional approach to security studies.

A fascination with power, its central place in a study of international politics, represents a second issue shared by the realists above. For each, power seems to be a prerequisite for security. Morgenthau, Herz, and Wolfers consider power the necessary complement to pacific intentions. Waltz and Buzan, committed to a scientific approach to international politics, equate power with military capabilities and

suggest their fundamental role in the protection of the state. State capabilities can be measured against one another and the relative level of security for each state in the system can be calculated.[65] While any discussion of power in realist thought tends to become problematic, it is useful to recognize the rhetorical force of their claim more than the accuracy of their concept. The overriding concern with power points to a view of the world as imperfect and dangerous, one that may require force as a tool of state. In a frank discussion of its necessity, John Mearsheimer provides a concise example of this realist concern. "Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go to war with their offensive military capabilities."[66] This 'offensive capability' is something that each state must consider when assessing other states in the system. Again, Mearsheimer presents a standard realist response to concern with offensive capabilities, "states inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly to destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other."[67] Continuing, he argues, "[a] state's military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals of a state could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state."[68] In language more direct than the realists above, Mearsheimer articulates a common theme to each. As Donnelly notes, "realists are unanimous in holding that human nature contains an ineradicable core of egoistic passions; that these passions define the central problem of politics; and

that statesmanship is dominated by the need to control this side of human nature."[69] It is in the need to control the dark side of human nature that power becomes a requirement for the state.

What makes power a tool of such importance for the realist is also what makes it such a problem. For, while the realist insists that states are required to possess power in order to survive, each also realizes that unbalanced power signals to others a danger that must be overcome. This places the state in an environment that requires it to balance its own power with that of others. As each of the realists discussed above makes clear, this is a dangerous game of equilibrium, but one that must be played in order to ensure national security. In an interesting variation on this theme, Charles Glaser expands on the writings of the security dilemma and the need to choose between strategies of conflict and those of cooperation.

> A security-seeking state that is comparing competition and cooperation must confront two fundamental questions. First, which will contribute more to its military capabilities for deterring attack, and for defending if deterrence fails? Second, appreciating the pressure created by anarchy and insecurity, the state should ask which approach is best for avoiding capabilities that threaten others' abilities to defend and deter, while not undermining its military capabilities? The tension that can exist between these two objectives lies at the core of the security dilemma.[70]

Glaser articulates a consistent theme in realist thought and one that is often overlooked by its detractors. Power, for realists, is a necessary but insufficient component to an overall security plan. States cannot rely solely on power to enhance security, but each state must possess a certain level in the event that it becomes

necessary for maintaining security. In addition, Glaser's comments on the security dilemma point to the third issue we will discuss. His remarks are paradigmatic of realist thought in not seeking to transcend the presence of insecurity in international relations, but in attempting to manage it.

This mitigation of insecurity rather than its transcendence represents a third key feature of realism. The historical writings of Morgenthau, Herz, Kennan, Wolfers, Carr, and others, are as much a critique of inter-war legalism and moralism that sought transcendence over conflict[71] as they are explanations of world affairs. These inter-war idealists sought to transcend violence, war, and conflict. In the aftermath of the first world war, idealists attempted to construct legal norms against the use of war.[72] It was argued that individual national securities could be guaranteed if all states entered into collective security arrangements and outlawed war as an institution for deciding political disagreements.[73] This approach reaches its apogee, perhaps, in the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing the use of war.[74]

Jaded by a darker sense of history and a pessimistic vision of human potential, realists responded by arguing the futility and naiveté of the idealist approach to international peace and security. When attempting to provide an answer for the horrors of war, realists argue that legal mechanisms cannot eliminate its potential and might very likely exacerbate national insecurity. States are required to demonstrate their potential for waging an effective war in order to deter the potential aggression of others. In this way, states can minimize the use of war as a policy instrument and

achieve a modicum of national security. Their collective message, if one were to attempt to locate a common theoretical focus in these disparate works, is a rhetorical attack on "utopian idealism, with its chiliastic approach and its failure in practice."[75] Morgenthau, in a rather frank discussion of idealist interpretations of history, is perhaps a spokesperson for the realist cause.

> If anybody should be bold enough to write a history of world politics with so uncritical a method he would easily and well-nigh inevitably be driven to the conclusion that from Timur to Hitler and Stalin the foreign policies of all nations were inspired by the ideals of humanitarianism and pacifism. The absurdity of the result is commensurable with the defects of the method.[76]

The concept of world peace through world law[77] seems imprudent to realist scholars interested in what they see as an imperfect and *imperfectable* international system. And, while utopian liberalism no longer plays a major role in theoretical discussions of international politics, later realists like Waltz, Mearsheimer, Buzan, and Glaser demonstrate a similar tendency to counter the thinking of interdependence writers of the 1970s[78] and democratic peace scholars of the 1980s.[79] Waltz, for instance, consistently claims that anarchy reduces the possibility of cooperation because self-help systems require states to act to ensure that their survival is not dependent on the survival of others.

Security for the realist is quite different from that for the idealist. Summing up the focus of realist security concerns, Donnelly argues, "[s]ecurity' thus means a somewhat less dangerous and less violent world, rather than a safe, just, or peaceful

one. Statesmanship involves mitigating and managing, not eliminating, conflict."[80] The management of conflict, rather than its transcendence, becomes the obligation of each state in the system.

The Success and Failure of the Traditional Approach

The realist tradition has had some success in understanding the problems of national security and advocating policy proposals for its enhancement.[81] Perhaps most importantly, realism presents the negative or pessimistic side of interstate relations to state actors. (Herbert Butterfield was said to have remarked that realism is more a boast than a political philosophy.[82] Such a claim fits our attempt to envision realism as a rhetorical device that presents the dangerous environment in which states operate rather than a general theory of international politics). Even when pacific relations dominate the interactions between states, the potential for interstate violence requires that states manage Herz's dilemma. For this, the state needs the input of a particular approach to politics that presents the view of the 'cautious paranoid'. In a world of potential dangers and unseen threats, realists advocate a strategy of low-risk. In the words of Morgenthau, Herz, and Wolfers, this means balancing the 'power of resistance' with that of the 'power of aggression'. For Waltz, this means a consistent desire to promote survival through the enhancement of capabilities while seeking to dissuade others from similar enhancements. For Glaser, this appears as a series of

contingencies between policies of conflict and those of cooperation. But no matter the how the topic is put, a similar pessimism bordering on paranoia engages the realist.

In addition to providing the state a negative view of the world, realism also offers an approach to politics that does not problematize the very assumptions upon which the state exists. Security become something that capable actors can manage by paying close attention to 1) the activities of other states, 2) the cooperative schemes being considered at any given time, and 3) the logical constraints on those cooperative schemes because of our intersubjective understanding of anarchy. Choices concerning specific policy options can be understood in terms of a rationality assumption present in realist thought.[83] Assuming self-interest, there is a standard argument to be made concerning why particular options have been chosen over others.

By attempting to solve the problems that the state sees, realists enter the policy debate at a point that the state can accept. Once threats have been sufficiently demarcated, there can be little doubt that emphasis on rational actors and balancing behavior coheres well with the bureaucratic policies of the modern state.[84] In the words of Ferguson and Mansbach, realism represents a clear example of the 'Zeitgeist of their age,' commensurable with and complementary to the world view of the national security state.[85]

But herein lies the problem with realism. Only after threats have been sufficiently understood can realism participate in the policy debate to overcome those threats. This, however, begs the question, *how does a state come to recognize a*

threat? What consideration is made prior to something being labeled a threat in order for that label to apply? If realism is to function in the security calculus, then answers to these questions should be forthcoming. Yet realism seems incapable of understanding how threats are constructed.

Dangers in international relations take on importance as security considerations only when they have been interpreted as threats. It is the particular (social) world in which actors live that is a necessary component of this security calculus. It is the social world that lends meaning to danger and threat. This represents a marked departure from the general tenets of realist philosophy. The social world is contingent and discursively constituted, it changes and will continue to do so through time. Words and social practices take on different meanings and we need to recognize this in our attempt to understand the construction of security threats.

In the following chapter we will examine how security considerations are informed by language, interpretation, and the social construction of threats. Recent work in the field of security studies demonstrates the influence and importance of *constructivism* in an effort to understand how insecurity is imagined. Scholars in the constructivist tradition seek answers to those questions left unanswered by the realists of this chapter.

Chapter Three: Constructivism on Security

Against the traditional approach to security studies explored in the previous chapter, a complex and broad challenge has recently emerged. This challenge to realism and the policy-oriented study of national security does not lend itself to a simply label. Furthermore, unlike realism, this alternative approach does not espouse to be a theory of international politics. Rather, *constructivism* is a philosophical approach to making sense of the world. Speaking to the philosophical foundations of human understanding, those employing constructivism present those interested in matters of national security with an altogether different interpretation of the sources of insecurity as well as the means to overcome it. Beginning with those important 'first questions' left unanswered by realists, constructivists ask how threats are recognized, how enemies are labeled, and how groups come to imagine danger. The resulting shift in the issues to be studied could not be sharper. In a telling example of this re-direction, Bartelson argues against the traditional focus. "Security is not primarily an object of foreign policy; before security can be brought to function as such, it requires a prior differentiation of what is alien, other or simply outside the state and therefore threatens it."[1]

In the following discussion, four leading constructivist security texts will be analyzed. While the term *constructivism* is employed differently in each text, recognition of the fact that language and human discourse define the world is a similar feature among them. Rather than attempting to transcend the political world and look back upon it as objective scientists, the constructivists below are insistent that the scholar must remain within the world in order to understand it. Invoking Wittgenstein, constructivists will argue that the limits of our language represent the limits of our world.[2]

The discussion below follows the pattern set by our discussion of realism in the previous chapter. First, I will examine how each work characterizes security. Second, I will discuss how constructivism is employed to understand this version of security. Again, the term constructivism is used by a variety of scholars in a number of different and often competing ways. Third, I will explore what a study of security looks like according to the author(s) of the specific work in question. This section is intended to emphasize the general approach to the idea of security. After analyzing each of the texts, the subsequent section summarizes the similarities and differences in these constructivist security texts. In the remaining section, I attempt to outline the successes and failures of these alternative approaches to the study of security loosely grouped under the rubric 'constructivism.'

Writing Security

The post-modern version of constructivism exemplified in Campbell's work, *Writing Security*, seeks to deconstruct traditional security texts and raise anew the foundations upon which political discourse functions. At the heart of Campbell's work is a need to understand how identity is constituted in relation to difference and then how that difference engenders insecurity which maintains and perpetuates identity.[3] A version of the state as a stable, fixed entity that requires a policy of national security in order to minimize external threats is eschewed for a reflexive approach which sees the state as a manifestation of identity performances, "and their inescapable indebtedness to difference, through which politics occurs."[4] The change in both the questions being asked and the understanding of the state has a profound influence on what security is taken to be.

Rather than providing a fixed definition, Campbell insists that we look to how security is used within a particular discourse at a particular moment in time. Security cannot be provided a fixed definition because it is a process rather than an end. The process of securing citizens is something that the state does by drawing boundaries around that which is considered foreign. According to Campbell, national security policies are not simply about protecting the physical integrity of the state. The process of securing the citizen against external dangers is also a means to legitimizing the state project and perpetuating particular identities. Security becomes a way to mark "the ethical boundaries of identity rather than the territorial borders of the state."[5]

Compared to the external focus on insecurity emphasized in traditional texts, Campbell articulates an understanding of security that is as much concerned about providing meaning to identity at home as understanding difference abroad.

> The need to discipline and contain the ambiguity and contingency of the 'domestic' realm is a vital source of the externalization and totalization of threats to that realm through the discourses of danger. But the achievements of foreign policy for the state are not due to any inherent characteristic of the state existing in an endangered world. The effectiveness of foreign policy as one political practice among many that serves to discipline ambiguity and construct identity is made possible because it is one instance of a series of cultural practices central to modernity operating within its own specific domain.[6]

This alternative understanding of security and its importance for the state comes from embracing a post-structural epistemology. By not committing the epistemological errors common to the realist tradition, where 'facts' and 'truth' are taken to be independently verifiable, Campbell focuses on how a specific discursive setting establishes what are taken to be 'facts' and 'truth'.[7] Access to a position where independent insight into the world exists is eschewed for an interpretive version of contingent human discourse. "What is denied is not that... objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence."[8] Placing importance on specific speech-acts, Campbell asserts, "these events and not others have to be interpreted as threats, and the process of interpretation through which they are figured as threats employs some modes of representation and not others."[9]

How a culture constructs certain threats through repeated acts of expression is what drives Campbell's study forward. Note that these questions are the 'first questions,' the questions that come before policies can be implemented to counter imagined threats. These concerns mark a divide for Campbell between an *ethos of political criticism* and the *rigors of social science*. Those "pursuing the ethos of political criticism are not much troubled by where their research leaves them in relation to the site of international relations."[10] Against this ethos, Campbell sees traditional security studies (rooted in the social sciences) as "constantly concerned about positioning their argument in such a way as to maximize their disciplinary audience and impact."[11] For Campbell, the policy-making apparatus of the social scientific endeavor ignores the reflective moments of the interpretive approach which considers how insecurity is a creation of discursive practices that reflect the construction of boundaries around particular identity. The contribution of *Writing Security*, "is to recognize the way such limits establish both the possibility and the insufficiency of particular policy resolutions, to appreciate that despite such deficiencies decisions must be taken only to be simultaneously criticized and taken again."[12]

Since we have previously sought to argue that the academic study of security bridges the divide between theoretical undertakings and state policy making, we need to inquire as to how Campbell would envision a study of security. How, using Campbell's approach to security, might we construct a study of security to assist a state in overcoming insecurity? The answer to this question requires that we

investigate cultural practices that give rise to identity constructs. It is through a constant process of critique and re-examination that insecurity can be mitigated.[13] Often evasive in providing an answer to the policy relevance of his study, Campbell seems most clear when critiquing practices that label certain concerns 'domestic' and others, 'foreign'. It is during the process whereby borders are drawn and re-drawn that Campbell finds his study useful to the state/society. "[The] central theme of *Writing Security* concerns the needs to rethink those practices and their representations so as to appreciate the role they play in bringing into being the very domains of inside/outside and domestic/foreign, with their associated figurations."[14] It is in the process of *re-thinking* the boundaries that are created and perpetuated that Campbell seeks to engage the policy community. Accordingly, his approach does not "advocate one fixed position."[15] Rather, through constant critique, a polity might better come to understand how their own identity is tied to their sense of security.

> Its contribution is to recognize the way such limits establish both the possibility and the insufficiency of particular policy resolutions, to appreciate that despite such deficiencies decisions must be taken only to be simultaneously criticized and taken again, and to enact the Enlightenment attitude by a persistent and relentless questioning in specific contexts of the identity performances, and their inescapable indebtedness to difference, through which politics occurs... only by pursuing the agonism between closure and disturbance, naturalization and denaturalization, can a democratic ethos be lived.[16]

As these remarks make clear, Campbell's approach requires that the state policy apparatus radically alter the questions it asks and the policy assumptions it makes. Rather than accepting the premise that a security apparatus of the state should

contemplate an existential issue of insecurity and find the means to overcome it, Campbell requires the state to contemplate how the initial issue of insecurity was formulated and recognize how such an instance is intimately tied to the equation of identity and difference through which the state operates. A similar approach to the study of security is formulated in *Security, Identity and Interests*.

Security, Identity, and Interests

In *Security, Identity and Interests*, Bill McSweeney offers a reflexive model of social order in an attempt to understand the human need for security.[17] By doing so, his work mirrors many of the concerns raised by Campbell. As another alternative approach to traditional security texts, his first move, like that of Campbell, is to separate his approach from realism. As McSweeney puts it, "how actors construct their relations and theorizing is chronically implicated in creating and recreating the world which theorists observe. Security and insecurity are a relational quality, not a material distribution of capabilities, threats and vulnerabilities independent of such relations."[18] Security cannot be defined independent of the social milieu of which it is a part. Putting it succinctly, he argues, "[we] learn to know the meaning of security through the practices which embody a particular interpretation of it."[19] This understanding of security recognizes its "common 'soft' meaning, referring to intersubjective relations and covering a bewildering array of values which acquire a degree of authenticity and imperviousness to challenge, similar to that associated with

the concept of identity."[20] In this way, security "embraces all the areas of personal relations in everyday life which are subject to anxiety."[21] The theorist is challenged to consider how a deeper understanding of security incorporates issues relating to our particular identities and interests. "Identity, interests and moral choice... appear to be inseparably linked in any adequate account of security and security policy."[22]

Key to understanding McSweeney's concern with security is recognizing its implications for the human in question rather than the state. "Ontologically, the state is an instrument of security, and human individuals are its subjects."[23] This shift in the focus of security studies is striking.

> In the alternative ontology..., the state is not the subject. It is an instrument, as are military forces, weapons, bank vaults, guard dogs and alarm systems. They cannot be considered a primary referent, or subject, or security. Their significance, and our assessment of their ranking in a hierarchy of security instruments, rests on a moral judgment in respect of the human individual, who is the proper focus, and can be the only subject, of security policy.[24]

While McSweeney does not leave the state out of his analysis, he recognizes that it cannot be the focus of study either. This is why an appropriate study of security requires ontological consideration. "The idea of 'ontological security' or existential trust is grounded in the secure or trusting relationships which respond to the fundamental want or interest from which other needs - such as the need for sociability - are derived."[25] In this reading, interest in security "arises from unconscious, organic, needs."[26] It is common to all humans and manifests itself in complex social relations. Understanding the organic nature of security, it then follows that the basic unit of

security is the individual. However, recognizing the human-centered nature of security requires more than a methodological reductionism from the collective (state) to the individual level of analysis. "A human security policy... cannot be derived by aggregating individual needs, on the one hand or by attributing such needs to the state *a priori*, on the other."[27] As simply an instrument for the enhancement of human security, the state plays a limited role in the study of security. Drawing on a variety of sociological literature,[28] his concern is with a proper epistemological account of social order that gives rise to an understanding of the complexities of achieving security at any given time. McSweeney's argument becomes more transparent when he analyzes the shortcomings of the Cold War approach to security.

> [A] definition of security which restricts its meaning to the management of external threats to the state ignores much that is relevant to a policy designed to achieve security. Much of the concern driving the criticism of the narrow definition in the 'national security' tradition, stems from moral opposition to the policy prescriptions derived from it, as much as intellectual disagreement with the contents of the concept. A concept which dictated nuclear deterrence, arms escalation, the subordination of individual and collective rights to the needs of the state, and which gave primacy to the allocation of resources to the management of interstate rivalry during the Cold War, must be redefined in terms yielding more acceptable policy implications.[29]

Those, like McSweeney, who are interested in re-defining the term are frustrated at the traditional, narrow focus on military and strategic matters. But, McSweeney is not simply concerned with widening the definition.[30] His concern is more fundamental. Following his 'ontological' understanding of security, it is clear that McSweeney is interested in basic human needs that exist at the most organic level.

> This is a normative argument, implying that security is a choice we make, which is contingent upon a moral judgment about human *needs*, not just human fears; it is not simply an intellectual discovery based on objective observation of facts. Human needs encompass more than physical survival and the threats to it, and they raise the question of the positive dimension of security and security policy.[31]

McSweeney's declaration that security is a choice we make points to an alternative epistemological focus. His reflexive model of social order suggests a particular use of constructivism that shares much in common with other constructivists while maintaining some intellectual distance from many that fall in the constructivist camp.

At times in his assessment of the security literature, McSweeney is as antagonistic to fellow constructivists as he is to traditional security scholars. Understanding how he positions his study in relation to other constructivist critiques of traditional texts enables us to make sense of his reflexive model of social order. McSweeney explains his model by outlining his differences with both traditional security studies (neorealism in this instance) and neo-liberal constructivism (a term employed by McSweeney to describe those replacing a cultural or ideational structure for a material one).

> What is entailed in a reflexive model of the social order can be summarized as follows in propositional form. Identity and interests are mutually constituted by knowledgeable agents, monitoring, managing, and manipulating the narrative of one in respect to the other. To say that both are chosen by human individuals is, firstly, to make a claim - with constructivism, but against neorealism - that the behaviour of states is an effect of cognitive *and* material structures, of the distribution of power informed by ideas. Secondly, the choice is made in context of interaction with other states in the international arena, and

> with sub-state groups within the domestic. Thirdly - and against constructivism - states choices are not only constrained by structure; they effect the progressive transformation of structure within a reflexive structure-agent relationship which can never be dissolved in favour of the deterministic role of the actor or of the structure of action. This implies, fourthly, that the concept of structure and the conception of causality in the social sciences must be radically distinguished from the ideas applicable to our understanding of the natural order. To affirm the co-constitution of behaviour by agent and structure is to affirm causality in the social order, but it is not to affirm what we mean by 'cause' in respect to the natural order. In the real world, in contrast to that conjured as such by mainstream security analysts, there is no objective structural entity which can function as an independent cause of social relations. There is nothing out there in social behaviour which can stand as an effect of conditions which are independent of the human agent. This is simply a different kind of world.[32]

Put simply, humans construct their worlds. Our language, a point we shall return to below, represents the limits of these worlds. And, the language that we use is part of the environment that humans reflect on and react to. As McSweeney argues, "human beings could not communicate at all except in the context of common meanings and practices structured by repetitive action and routinely reaffirmed norms and rules."[33] However, it is a mistake to see these normative routines and common meanings as independent structures imposing themselves on human actors. It is equally incorrect to view these structures as *causing* human action. Of the distinction between causal laws and generalizations, McSweeney writes,

> *generalizations are not laws*; they are resources which actors draw upon to make action possible, to give reasons for action, and thus to appropriate as an element of action itself. Generalizations circulate through the framework of the social order, from observer to agent, from agent-as-observer to behaviour, making it impossible to conceive of a social law which functions for social action like the law of gravity.[34]

Accordingly, McSweeney is able to make a generalization about human social order from the analysis he undertakes in *Security, Identity, and Interests*. Namely, "we choose who we are and who we want to be."[35] Repeating a familiar refrain, McSweeney argues that neither the competitive and universal structure of anarchy as defined by neorealists, nor the cooperative and particular structure of a peace process put forth by the international community, determine the result for individuals and local communities.[36] Structures, whether material or ideational, influence but do not determine, behavior. But, to this common understanding, we need to add one further point in order to appreciate McSweeney's argument. Recourse to structural investigations leaves something out of a comprehensive security analysis. Security is both a negative and a positive good. Traditional studies, and constructivists who merely replace an ideational structure for a material one, focus on issues involving *negative* security. They worry about the need to secure *from* something or someone. It is equally important to consider the positive aspect of security - those issues that give meaning to the human experience. Order and stability are positive requirements of human existence and allow us to speak of a secure condition in which to live.

If we accept McSweeney's requirements for the proper investigation of security, the questions then becomes what does a study of security look like using his approach? Not surprisingly, the twin issues of identity and interest play the central part in individual and collective security. Since identity and interest are "analytically

separate elements of all collective action,"[37] it is possible to manipulate both in the creation and maintenance of a successful security programme. The process by which this is done represents the *practice* of security. Specifically, the conscious manipulation of material interests represents a *seductive* activity that brings about a subsequent shift in identity constructs. When this occurs, the practice of security can be enhanced. Alternatively, the conscious shift in identity constructs might bring about a re-calculation of desired interests.

The Culture of National Security

The remaining constructivist approaches discussed here do not challenge the state-centered approach to security studies emphasized in traditional scholarship. Accepting the distinct character of the security problematique as it has been discussed in the previous chapter, Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein work within a "traditional, narrow definition of security studies."[38] While these scholars appear willing to accept the traditional definition of security as discussed by realists, they also recognize the need to problematize the "sources and content of national security interests that states and governments pursue."[39] This points to a return to those 'first questions' that consistently engage constructivists. As Katzenstein makes clear, "[the] state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors."[40] A coherent understanding of security, then, requires that we look to the social structures in which states find themselves

embedded. Investigating the social environment allows the theorist to understand why particular issues are labeled 'security issues.' Emphasis on the social structures (rather than the realist emphasis on material structures) represents a common concern for those contributors to *The Culture of National Security*. In language that clearly summarizes the perceived shortcomings of mainstream thinking on security matters, Katzenstein states,

> Neorealist and neoliberal theories adhere to relatively sparse views of the international system. Neorealism assumes that the international system has virtually no normative content. The international system constrains national security policies directly without affecting conceptions of state interest. Neoliberalism takes as given actor identities and views ideas and beliefs as intervening variables between assumed interests and behavioral outcomes. In this view states operate in environments that create constraints and opportunities.[41]

What Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein seem most concerned about when critiquing traditional approaches is the tendency to remove what is most interesting and informative (namely, social structures) from an analysis of national security. Offering a brief assessment of this tendency, they write, "[m]aterialists need not ignore cultural factors altogether. But they treat them as epiphenomenal or at least secondary, as a 'superstructure' determined in the last instance by a material 'base'."[42] "[C]ulture and identity are, at best, derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power" according to traditional security studies. However, these concepts are key to the vision of security studies outlined by these constructivists. In order to develop a more robust understanding of security,

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein insist on treating "norms, rules, and institutions" as more than mere "process".[43] "We require an approach to security that does not assume that actors deploy culture and identity strategically, like any other resource, simply to further their own self-interests."[44] Interests are treated as contingent upon the social environments from which they derive meaning. The study of security requires that we look to these interests through the cultural lens. To achieve this, the authors insist that "security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material."[45]

How can we characterize the meaning of security that emerges in this work? Katzenstein is frank in his analysis of why the authors have chosen to accept the narrow definition of security that focuses on material capabilities and the use and control of military force by states. His answer is grounded in "a healthy respect for the sociology of knowledge."[46] While new security issues (including the human security emphasized above) represent important topics for consideration, the authors of *The Culture of National Security* insist that widening the meaning of security would only result in a charge of "skirting the hard task of addressing the tough political issues in traditional security studies."[47] Instead, these authors are concerned with grafting a constructivist understanding of security onto the traditional parameters of security studies. They represent a structural approach to security studies - but seek to develop their structural approach by recourse to culture and identity. An ideational structure replaces the neorealist structure defined by material issues.

In an attempt to provide some coherence to the myriad studies that make up the volume, Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein argue that they are building

> an orienting framework that highlights a set of effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies. As such, this framework tells us about as much about the substance of world politics as does a materialist view of the international system or a choice theoretic assumption of exogenous interests. It offers a partial perspective, but one important for orienting our thinking about more specific phenomena.[48]

This 'orienting framework' requires that we take the issues of culture and identity as central to any study of security. In the words of Katzenstein, the authors seek "to incorporate into the analysis of national security both the cultural-institutional context of the political environment and the political construction of identity."[49] Attempting to bring together the disparate empirical studies that make up their work, Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein contend there are five main lines of argument that result from the collection. First, "cultural or institutional elements of states' environments... shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states."[50] Second, "cultural or institutional elements of states' global or domestic environments... shape state identity."[51] These propositions suggest an ideational structure is key to understanding the security considerations of states. Culture and identity constrain behavior and give meaning to interests. Third, "variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states."[52] Fourth, "configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities."[53] These propositions suggest

that material conditions may have little to do with the issue of security. Fifth, "state policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure."[54] This fifth proposition argues, with Wendt, that anarchy is what states make of it.[55] The actions of states are both a reaction to ideational constraints and a reproduction of these structures.

While the emphasis on identity and interests suggests these authors have little in common with traditional security studies, the issues discussed and their approach to the study demonstrates some common ground between the contributors to *The Culture of National Security* and the studies of the previous chapter. Beyond a similar, narrow definition of security, both approaches suggest that we can use empirical techniques to guide a study of security. What is deemed important, however, is quite different. While traditional scholars are interested in the material capabilities of states, these studies "illuminate how empirical analysis of cultural content and constructed identities can contribute to the study of national security."[56]

Security: A New Framework for Analysis

A similar approach to understanding national insecurity is explored by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Accepting the traditional, narrow definition of security offered by realist texts, these authors argue that national security studies require the analyst to "reject reductionism (giving priority to the individual as the ultimate referent object of security) as an unsound approach to

international security."[57] In language that sounds similar to subsequent versions of Waltzian neorealism, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde note that this rejection of the individual is required, because in terms of national security, the individual plays at best a marginal role. As with traditional studies, these constructivists recognize the specific nature of international security as meaning the "relations between collective units and how those are reflected upward into the system."[58]

Although the meaning of security employed here may look similar to traditional texts, the authors' use of a constructivist epistemology suggests deep divisions with mainstream approaches. *Securitizing* some event in international politics "is essentially an intersubjective process. The senses of threat, vulnerability, and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent."[59] The very idea of what it is that we study in national security studies requires interpretation. As Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde suggest, "security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them."[60] Theorists learn to "underline the responsibility of talking security, the responsibility of actors as well as of analysts who choose to frame an issue as a security issue."[61]

Of course, it does not follow that anything becomes a security issue simply by uttering the relevant words. Security actors must have legitimate standing and be accepted by the broader polity. Language is an intersubjective phenomenon; it is not possible for a single actor to give voice to a particular security problem without the

participation of multiple actors. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde offer a telling reading of the scope and dimension of constructed security threats.

> Securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed: Does a referent object hold legitimacy as something that should survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, point to something as a threat, and thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? This quality is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm. For individuals or groups to speak security does not guarantee success. Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus, security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects.[62]

While the social construction of security demonstrates little in common with traditional studies, the focus of the study that emerges looks very much like earlier realist works. The similarities between traditional scholarship and conventional constructivism can be understood by the fact that conventional constructivists see social relations, while discursively constituted, as petrified, inert, and sedimented.[63] Even when state agents are granted constitutive roles in the development of the discourse of international relations, language can be found to be as constraining as objective structures. Language is an *intersubjective* practice and actors are unable to promote change without the consent and acceptance of others.

Explicating conventional constructivism, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde demonstrate its similarities with traditional security studies as well as its differences.

> Our approach links itself more closely to existing actors, tries to understand their modus operandi, and assumes that future management of security will have to include handling these actors – as, for instance,

> in strategies aimed at mitigating security dilemmas and fostering mutual awareness in security complexes. Although our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is, in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions.[64]

In an examination of existential factors in the military sector, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde recognize that in the process of securitization, "[it] is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters."[65] This approach to security studies suggests how material factors play an intervening role in the construction of a security issue; "objects never make for necessary securitization, but they are definitely facilitating conditions."[66] This version of constructivism demonstrates a desire to recognize and accept the security problems that the state and its policy makers find central.

As the discussion of securitization turns to the requirements of state policy makers in times of international uncertainty, the relationship between ideational and material factors do not warrant a re-assessment of the policy making apparatus. Consider, for instance, how these authors examine international situations requiring state involvement: "[w]hen securitization is focused on external threats, military security is primarily about the two-level interplay between the actual armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states on the one hand and their perceptions of each other's capabilities and intentions on the other."[67] Once securitization has occurred,

the traditional approach is recognized as necessary to the successful management of security.

In the construction of pertinent security policies, states begin to examine issues in fairly standard ways. In a rather common interpretation of the security dilemma, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde require of the state sufficient perceptive qualities and rational cognitive functions necessary to perform a security calculus. In a more representative example, the authors demonstrate their concession to traditional studies once the initial construction of a security threat has been made. "[Other] things being equal, historical and material facilitating conditions affect processes of securitization and desecuritization in a fairly systematic way."[68] This acknowledgment recognizes not only the near constancy of international social relations but the enduring quality of the 'security dilemma' story as told by the realists. Continuing, they write, "[once] military securitization has occurred, issues such as balance and technology development take a more autonomous role."[69]

Constructivism and the Study of Security

The studies of security examined in this chapter are more diverse in both their theoretical assumptions and policy recommendations. Unlike the traditional security texts of the previous chapter, these authors do not enter the study of security espousing a particular theoretical focus. Constructivism is best understood, initially, as an epistemological approach. Those working within its general parameters need not

envision the *practice* of politics in a similar way. As Jorgensen correctly notes, "constructivism is empty as far as assumptions, propositions, or hypotheses about international relations are concerned."[70] On the issue of security, the disparate concerns that are manifested in the studies above point to the variety of policies that might follow from adherence to epistemological constructivism. In this section, I will emphasize the similarities that engage these constructivists and the differences that separate them. In particular, the authors above converge around 1) a challenge to the positivist approach to the study of world politics and 2) a concern for the importance of identity and culture in the investigation of the sources of insecurity. However, on two issues, the authors are substantially divided. For example, while Campbell and McSweeney make post-structural analysis central to their studies, the authors of *The Culture of National Security* emphasize their structural allegiance. Similarly, as to whether security should be studied using its traditional, narrow definition or should be widened to incorporate issues previously subsumed by security studies, these authors are divided. These differences influence whether the scholars advocate engagement with the state in its conceptualization of security or whether a more austere academic approach becomes appropriate.

Beginning with their similarities, each of the constructivists above is committed to challenging the materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology common to realism. Each recognizes the limits of our language as the limits of our world. Unlike many in the social science tradition, there is no attempt to transcend the 'existing'

world and achieve a measure of scientific objectivity with which one can evaluate policy and explain political phenomena. The positivist need to generalize and regularize political life comes from a belief that the theorist can construct an empirical social science capable of explaining the activities of actors in international politics.[71] 'To explain', in this sense, implies the construction of causal models. At their core, such theories employ a *correspondence* theory of truth that envisions an external reality to that of social actors.[72] Prior to Wittgenstein, it was common to consider how words referred to things in the extra-linguistic world. The philosopher's job was to match words to these things as they existed. Prevailing theories of language stressed "reference, correspondence, representation."[73] Theorists seeking correspondence could make sense of attempts to objectify social relations and 'see' threats existing in the material world.[74]

Against this approach, the constructivists above re-introduce the importance of the intersubjective world. As David Copeland writes, while attempting to draw the disparate groupings of constructivism together, "global politics is said to be guided by the intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, and values held by actors."[75] Therefore, national security concerns must be interpreted at particular moments in history within a social milieu open to change and re-interpretation. This version of social study is not interested in objectively explaining behavior and modeling state activities. Rather, constructivists are involved in interpreting specific actions within a particular social discourse. In lieu of correspondence to truth, constructivists are involved in analyzing

the *coherence* of specific speech-acts. A great deal of what follows from the constructivist use of language is a recognition that words do not stand for things in an external (objective) world but are a part of a complex social fabric that provides the rules for the use of that language. Hanna Pitkin gives voice to this approach, "[in] mastering a language, we take on a culture; our native language becomes a part of ourselves, of the very structure of the self."[76] When taken seriously, we recognize quickly that Wittgenstein offers something of profound import when he claims that "the limits of language... signify the limits of my world."[77] If language is considered to represent the limits of the world, then we cannot make a metaphysical claim about 'objective threats.' There is no position at which one can rise above social discourse in order to look back at the discursive world and match it up with an external reality. Here, then, positivist influences on traditional security studies become a common problem requiring attention by each of our constructivists.[78]

The constructivist requirement that we emphasize the intersubjective world translates further into a similar need to recognize the importance of identity and culture on interests. While there are differences in how much to emphasize the issues of culture and identity, it is clear that the cultural milieu in which identities are perpetuated and challenged is a necessary component to a robust understanding of the sources of insecurity. For example, consider how *identity* and *interest* are understood to matter in the work of Martha Finnemore, "[we] cannot understand what states want without understanding the international social structure of which they are a part."[79]

Similarly, Hopf argues that the "identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions."[80] Therefore, what counts as a security concern (and a reasoned policy option to manage that concern) is intimately tied to a state's sense of self. This is a matter of historical contingency and requires we examine specific cultural identities. Returning to Finnemore, "the international system can change what states want. It is constitutive and generative, creating new interests and values for actors."[81] Each of the constructivists above recognizes the importance placed on identity and culture in understanding security.

On two issues, however, constructivists are engaged in serious debate. Campbell and McSweeney are committed to a post-structural analysis. Their works demonstrate as much hostility to the 'ideational structures' of certain constructivists as the 'materialist structures' of neorealists. Structures cannot *cause* behavior. As McSweeney writes, "[in] the real world... there is no objective structural entity which can function as an independent cause of social relations."[82] For this reason, McSweeney is drawn to Wendt's earlier work on the agent structure debate[83] but finds his more recent work to reflect philosophical affinity with rationalism. McSweeney's concern with the focus of Wendt's later work represents a paradigmatic example of the ongoing debate between post-structural constructivism and neo-liberal constructivism. As he suggests,

> Wendt appears to have abandoned the recursiveness of the agent-structure relationship which earlier characterized his break with the mainstream approach, in favour of a social constructionist one permitting causal explanation of social events according to the model of

> natural science. 'Neo-liberal constructivism' is a more accurate label for a school which has far more in common with the liberal-rationalist emphasis on transnational cooperation, institutions and norms, and on the unproblematic primacy of the state than with a research agenda based on reflexivist principles of the continuity of the collective and individual actor and of the co-constitution of agency and structure.[84]

McSweeney wishes to distinguish between a more radical form of constructivism that re-conceptualizes agency, structure, and causality in the social sciences and a neo-liberal constructivism that suggests "an eirenic endeavor capable of bringing intellectual harmony to a discipline threatened by dissident critics of its positivist mainstream."[85]

Similarly, we see a need for Campbell to separate his work from the same 'neo-liberal constructivists' that haunt McSweeney. His strongest criticism is saved for the contributors to *The Culture of National Security*. He argues that in their work, culture and identity become essentialist variables that are "inserted into already existing theoretical commitments."[86] These theoretical commitments, of course, rest on the positivist principles that Campbell finds suspect. Campbell sees in the effort of *The Culture of National Security* a similar need to treat culture and identity as variables in a causal model of actor behavior. Substituting these variables for the material capabilities of traditional texts, the contributors simply locate the policy maker "outside the domain of constitution"[87] and able to manipulate these new variables. We see in Campbell's criticism a need to distinguish between an earlier

Wendt that recognized mutual constitution and co-determination and a later Wendt that finds much in common with the rationalist research agenda.[88]

The post-structural emphasis by McSweeney and Campbell is tempered in both *The Culture of National Security* and *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. While the above critique suggests the position of the former, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde require more attention. These authors "*do* take identities as socially constituted but not radically moreso than other social structures."[89] More specifically, these authors recognize how

> Identities as other social constructions can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with. At specific points, this 'inert constructivism' enables modes of analysis very close to objectivist—for example, Waltzian neorealism, as long as one remembers that in the final instance the ontology is not Waltz's naturalism and atomism but some form of constructivism or even, in line with classical realism, rhetorical foundations.[90]

Although Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde emphasize how "radically constructivist"[91] their approach is, it is the attempt to implement an objectivist mode-of-analysis that concerns writers like McSweeney and Campbell. This places the state (as an unproblematic unit) at the center of a research agenda that attempts to manage relations between like units.[92] Furthermore, the divide that begins at a meta-theoretical level between Campbell/McSweeney and the writers of *The Culture of National Security* and *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* extends to their theoretical positions.

The traditional, narrow definition of security is employed by Katzenstein, et. al., and Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde. These authors recognize a need understand the *particular* security issues envisioned by actors involved in shaping state policy. Their goal is not a refutation of current security programmes but rather a deeper understanding of these issues. Contrary to this approach, Campbell and McSweeney seek to problematize the very issues that are labeled as national *security* concerns. Campbell sees such a need arising from the requirements of fulfilling a *democratic ethos*. McSweeney articulates a new form of security studies arising from the ontological requirements of individual human needs.

As chapter four will discuss, this divide in the constructivist literature points to a distinct political stance arising out of the post-structural constructivism espoused by Campbell and McSweeney. Their commitment to improving the human condition through investigation and reflection of security problems speaks to a desire to transcend the sources of insecurity envisioned by traditional security studies and those working in what McSweeney calls the tradition of 'neo-liberal constructivism'. Before we turn to a discussion of the sources of insecurity and how to understand them, the following section considers the successes and failures of the overall constructivist project.

The Successes and Failures of Constructivism

Writers employing some form of constructivism in an attempt to more deeply understand matters of security demonstrate a concern for both a coherent epistemology and an interest in the use of language. Concerned by the limitations inherent in realism's attempt to provide a general theory of international politics, each of the contributors to constructivist security studies challenges the focus and foundation of traditional works. Recognizing how traditional studies often make truth-claims that cannot withstand critical investigation, these constructivists more accurately demonstrate how traditional security studies are particular interpretations of world politics rather than universally-applicable theories of generalized behavior. It is the alternative epistemological account of human understanding exemplified in constructivism that allows us to more accurately characterize realism as a rhetorical tool rather than general theory.

Of course, the knowledge claims useful to constructivists rest on their coherence. It is a reliance on language and its use in making sense of the world that lies at the heart of the constructivist project. Yet language plays a more specific role than as general epistemological tool. Most clearly expressed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, how specific situations are *securitized*[93] tells us much about the social milieu in which specific actors maneuver. The label *security* is an important one. It differentiates average events in international life from those deemed so important to relevant actors that they require extra-ordinary political decisions. Even where

constructivists may disagree as to the use of the term *security*, there is agreement that once that specific speech-act is made, the political stakes have been raised and a highly specialized discourse has been entered into.

But the constructivist project has not been without its problems. Specifically, constructivism has been considered policy-irrelevant. It offers us a way to understand and reflect on our world but does nothing to tell us how to navigate that world. As a policy tool, constructivism would require a moral component. The ability to construct a coherent understanding of world politics requires moral teachings that assist in making political choices from that understanding. While some constructivists have demonstrated how reflection and critique can be used to influence the political process, political constructivism seems to complicate the policy making process rather than assist it. As noted, security studies bridges the divide between theoretical investigation and policy relevance. In order to offer something useful to the state, studies must accept many of the assumptions upon which the state exists. The inability to provide policy direction makes the constructivist project as incomplete an approach to security studies as realist thought, albeit for remarkably different reasons.

In the following chapter, I seek to engage both realists and constructivists in a more rigorous discussion of national security studies. While neither realism nor constructivism presents a comprehensive approach to national security studies, I hope to demonstrate that both are necessary components of a more sophisticated understanding of the sources of insecurity.

Chapter Four: Understanding the Sources of Insecurity

In this chapter I intend to bring together the seemingly contradictory approaches to understanding insecurity that have been investigated in the two previous chapters. As noted in the introductory remarks a growing schism within the field suggests a crisis in the analysis of security. Traditional studies, drawing on realist premises, insist on a link to military and strategic concerns. These studies present a decidedly negative vision of international politics. Conversely, studies drawing on a broadly-defined constructivism often eschew pressing state security concerns and instead focus on problematizing identity constructs in order to investigate alternative political issues. I wish to argue that in their current condition, both approaches undermine the potential for a more successful study of security. Neither approach is a complete rendering of the security problematique. Traditional concerns resting on positivist principles, while focused on the policy-relevant topic of *national* security, collapse in epistemological incoherence while attempting to articulate *real* security threats. Those constructivist works emphasizing constant critique of identity and culture neglect state policy concerns and collapse in irrelevance. What is necessary is an approach to security that is both philosophically coherent and policy relevant. Toward that end, this chapter brings together conceptual thinking from both

approaches in an attempt to construct a more robust analytical framework for the study of security.

Specifically, I propose we come to understand constructivism by differentiating two aspects of the approach. First, we might consider a general *constructivist* epistemology as a necessary prerequisite to a coherent analysis of security. This portion of the security process has been suggested to us in the framework outlined by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde. Their understanding of constructivism suggests its role in recognizing how language defines the world in which actors live. Accepting this point, we can envision a 'constructivist umbrella' making up the framework of the study that follows. It is important to recognize how this umbrella challenges our ability to understand security issues. Unlike realists, we are unable to speak of *real* security threats. Securitization is a practice that brings about broad recognition of a threat. The specific act of labeling something a threat makes it real- but we have no 'god's eye' position, as analysts, to critique the existential merit of that specific speech-act.

Under this general umbrella two rhetorical visions of politics currently play opposing roles in the investigation of insecurity. We might consider these visions as competing positions along a continuum. These positions are not the logical limits of thought on security politics. Rather, they are best understood as the most prevalent political positions engaged in discourse at this time.[1] The first perspective, realism, acts as a rhetorical device to influence state policy makers. It presents a grossly negative vision of international politics—maintaining that dangers (threats) exist

outside the state in the international environment. Management of conflict and the mitigation of insecurity are the rational limits of a realist foreign policy. Realism's policy proposals are best articulated by the 'cautious paranoid' seeking to secure the state against a potential enemy. They are reticent to trust other actors in the system and consistently examine the most dire possible consequences of policy options.

The second rhetorical perspective suggests the possibility of overcoming this negative vision and improving the human condition. Adherents suggest it is theoretically possible to transcend the current condition of insecurity. However, this political perspective should not be confused as the philosophical progeny of inter-war political idealism. Early forms of idealism recognized the power of the humanist spirit and sought to transcend insecurity by proposing peace through law, collective security arrangements, democratization, trade, and the success of international peace movements. The rhetorical perspective that is of interest to this study represents a practical (political) application of post-structural constructivism. *Political constructivism* requires policy makers, analysts, and other actors to reflect on and consistently critique their pre-given assumptions concerning identities and interests. A deep investigation of culture is a required component in the process of overcoming insecurity. Political constructivists are a sub-set of the larger community of epistemological constructivists. While all constructivists recognize the importance of general epistemological points, not all constructivists adhere to the reflective critiques engaged in by political constructivists. Moreover, as discussed below, it is not

necessarily the case that constructivism leads to the set of political values emphasized in this chapter. But, there are significant reasons to recognize a distinct community of scholars engaged in understanding the importance of reflection and constant criticism in an effort to transcend the sources of insecurity.

The divergent political visions and policy proposals that confront us when examining the realist and political constructivist world views is striking. If realists are inclined to ask whether the relative difference in material capabilities (power) favors the state in question, political constructivists are inclined to ask how cultural constraints and identity performances reproduce the interests and security dynamics of that state. These divergent perspectives can be set against each other in the analysis of national security. Representing the competing security perspectives largely responsible for the growing schism in the field, each perspective has been treated as a larger theoretical enterprise capable of understanding insecurity and prescribing policy to counter it.[2] In this chapter, I argue that both are necessary components of a deeper process that requires further analysis in order to offer the state a comprehensive and robust security analysis.

As rhetorical devices for understanding international politics, realism and political constructivism are not the last step in the security framework but the first. Insight from both must be filtered through subsequent analytic processes. For instance, after a security issue has been articulated by both perspectives, a security calculation can further refine the specific understanding of the threat. Because neither realism nor

political constructivism seems capable of providing the state with a comprehensive vision of threats and the means to overcome them, this subsequent analysis is necessary in order to construct policy options that balance the requirements of both perspectives. Rather than seeking commensurability or truth from the opposing political visions, this subsequent security calculus attempts to balance the tension between the two. Realism and political constructivism are complementary forces that ask different questions and elicit different answers. Each provides a partial response to the state's concern with insecurity.

In the discussion that follows, I outline each of the components of this approach to analyzing insecurity. Beginning with the most general epistemological umbrella, I will proceed through a description of each rhetorical vision of politics, and conclude with the security calculus that attempts to construct an understanding of the security issue envisioned by each perspective.

Constructivism as Epistemology

At the most general level of a security analysis it is necessary to recognize the role that language plays in the process of threat construction and the collective feelings of insecurity. Applying the term 'constructivism' to this segment of our framework is recognition of the fact that the 'objectivist' features of traditional security studies rest on shaky epistemological foundations. The materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology that pervade neorealism seek to understand *real* threats and dangers that

exist in an extra-linguistic universe. Against this approach, we can agree with Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde that security issues are made so "by acts of securitization."[3] While the language they employ is somewhat difficult, their understanding of the importance of 'speech-acts' is central to the development of a coherent security analysis. Emphasizing the constructed nature of our world, these authors do much to influence the direction of security studies. They articulate an understanding of security threats that recognizes the central role played by human interpretation in their creation.

> We do not try to peek behind this to decide whether it is *really* a threat (which would reduce the entire securitization approach to a theory of perceptions and misperceptions). Security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political arena... and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves.[4]

Here, we can be even more direct. It is not simply that we do not *try* to peek behind particular threats to decide whether they warrant such a label, it is the impossibility of such an endeavor that sets for us the parameters of our security framework. Here, Nicholas Onuf is most clear, "[we] are always within our constructions, even as we choose to stand apart from them, condemn them, reconstruct them."[5] Similarly, Karin Fierke writes, "we cannot get behind our language to compare it with that which it describes."[6] In a very real and meaningful way the limits of our language define the limits of our threats. Threats do not 'exist' in any objective and measurable sense beyond the speech-acts that create them. In Milliken's words, "things do not mean (the material world does not convey meaning); rather,

people construct the meaning of things."[7] Therefore, there is no access to a pre-discursive world because such a world cannot be envisioned without using language. "Our interpretations are based on a shared system of codes and symbols, of languages, life-worlds, social practices. The knowledge of reality is socially constructed."[8] This is an important point that often causes a great deal of confusion in the philosophy of social science.[9] The form of epistemological constructivism advocated here is not involved in the ongoing philosophical debate between (philosophical) realists and anti-realists. Indeed, it is quite possible to envision a 'constructive realism,' "according to which the agent has an epistemic but not an ontological influence, that is, knowledge is constructive in nature, but the existence of the world does not depend on the existence of the agent."[10] Guzzini makes this point.

> Constructivism does not deny the existence of a phenomenal world, external to thought. This is the world of brute (mainly natural) facts. It does oppose, and this is something different, that phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independently of discursive practices. It does not challenge the possible thought-independent existence of (in particular natural) phenomena, but it challenges their language-independent observation. What counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there.[11]

Returning to writings on national security, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde recognize how material factors contribute to the process of securitization. "It is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening—be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters."[12] Continuing, they argue, "these objects never make for necessary

securitization, but they are facilitating conditions."[13] Constructivism, as a general epistemological approach, demonstrates how language defines the world in which we live. This understanding of constructivism might be differentiated from the political constructivism that seeks political change through a consistent, reflexive critique of cultural constructs and identity performances (to be discussed in the following section). Conscious recognition of these parameters allows us to place the rhetorical visions of politics (elevated to the status of general theories of international relations by earlier writers) within a broadly constructivist framework so as to more accurately and rigorously analyze the sources of state insecurity.

But we should be clear as to exactly what a constructivist epistemology does and does not do for the study of security. By advocating a constructivist epistemology we have removed the tendency to see threats to security as existing in the material or phenomenal world. Threats become so when relevant actors label them so. Accepting this position, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde "abstain from attempts to talk about what 'real security' would be for people, what are 'actual' security problems larger than those propagated by elites."[14]

Adopting this epistemological approach does nothing to change the focus of security studies. It remains possible to locate the state at the center of analysis and limit discussions to *national* security issues. Material capabilities, once securitized, are still an important locus of concern for the analyst and policy maker. But, an epistemological constuctivism does not confine

discussions of security to material factors. The positivist influence on realism required that security analysis be limited to material issues amenable to empirical research. Our constructivist umbrella accepts these issues in an analysis of security, yet remains open to the possibility of exploring further the socially constituted, and therefore socially alterable, world. Karin Fierke puts the point nicely. "The point of departure for constructivism is that the world is changeable, that the past, present, and future are constructed through our practices and interactions with others."[15] Taking this point of departure seriously, we are able to envelop multiple political visions within a constructivist epistemology that treats language as central to the theoretical endeavor.

For reasons examined below, we might consider two different visions of politics—realism and political constructivism—within our constructivist epistemology. Unlike previous security texts, I take these visions as partial answers to questions concerning the sources of insecurity. In the following section, I demonstrate how both political visions are required in order to more fully understand security threats.

Interpreting Politics

If we accept the constructivist epistemology outlined above, we are able to subsume realism and political constructivism into our security framework. Once

subsumed, both are treated as rhetorical devices rather than general theories of international politics. Below, I will examine how each political vision informs a discussion of security. Each discussion will proceed in a similar manner. First, I will explore why each interpretation is better understood as a rhetorical device rather than a general theory. Second, I will explore what each offers a study of security. Finally, I will discuss specifically how we can use the interpretation in a robust security analysis.

Realism, Cautious Paranoia, and Material Capabilities

As our discussion in chapter two suggests, realism is best understood as a rhetorical tool for influencing the policy maker rather than a general theory of international politics. Understanding the normative core of realism is necessary in that it allows us to recognize a particular vision of world politics that emphasizes the dangerous side of relations between states. Michael C. Williams articulates the realist attempt to 'objectify' politics by implementing a materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology. He argues that instead of using these ontological and empirical positions to study security issues, neorealists were more likely to have been engaged in *constructing* "a material and objective foundation for political practice."[16] Williams insists that we view neorealism as a form of politics seeking to convince others of the merits of treating security issues in a material way. By so doing, he argues that recent attempts to contrast realist and constructivist security studies are misleading. "These debates should not ... be structured as a contrast between objectivist or 'positivist'

theoretical foundations [and constructivist foundations], but as historically located disputes about the politics of theorizing security and the practical implications of doing so in different ways."[17]

Speaking to the realist programme in general, Ferguson and Mansbach demonstrate how the ascendance of realism after WWII perpetuated a consideration of realism as a scientific theory of international politics.

> in successfully setting the agenda, realists also succeeded in perpetuating a false dichotomy; that is, that they were hard-headed empiricists—in contrast to their quixotic adversaries—whose close reading of history enabled them to discern general laws of politics by means of induction. In fact, the general laws that realists propounded were value-laden assumptions buttressed by a ransacking of history. And those assumptions reflect normative commitments antithetical to the beliefs of idealists.[18]

It is necessary to re-orient thinking on this matter in order to employ realism as an important interpretation of international politics. Realism "is not the heir to a neutral, non-political orientation toward the world, but the (frequently unconscious) result of an attempt to transform theory in order to transform practice."[19] It represents the voice of the cautious paranoid, the individual wary of acting in any manner that might cause harm or potentially endanger the state. It gains force from investigating and calling attention to potential sources of insecurity. Threats based on the material capabilities of others must be seen as such because of their linguistic claim rather than their existential presence. Material capabilities alone do not make the threat, it is the political imagination that constructs a scenario whereby a threat is said to exist.

Realism's reliance on material considerations and empirical research to understand those considerations presents the analyst with a particular set of threat potentials. Recourse to a constructivist epistemology allows us to analyze the security claims made by political actors employing a realist understanding of international politics.

A current example might help articulate this point. At present, the United States national security apparatus is attempting to root out international *terrorists* in a host of countries because it is believed that they represent a threat to U.S. interests. Potentially hostile actors exist 'out there.' "Reality, on this basis, is a world of tangible, palpable, perceptible things or objects.... It is material and concrete."[20] Accordingly, empirical evidence is required in order to counter the potential threats posed by terrorists abroad. "Valid knowledge claims must refer to materially existing, observable objects."[21] In this way, U.S. security agencies can point to weapons systems, hide-outs, e-mails, and bank accounts as palpable clues in the investigation of state insecurity. This contribution to national security policy making should not be underestimated. Pragmatic responses to the perception of immediate dangers is a necessary component of an effective state. As Williams notes, "materialism and empiricism can be considered epistemic ethical practices, justified not only in terms of knowledge but also in terms of their practical contributions and consequences."[22] One of the advantages to realism as an approach to understanding national security issues is that it coheres well with the technical and bureaucratic orientation of the state.

However, we need to recognize exactly what this means for a comprehensive approach to security. In our example above, it is necessary to ask whether the state security apparatus has discovered a source of insecurity by locating empirical evidence. More generally, do security threats exist 'out there' waiting to be discovered by analysts and state actors? This can only be answered in the affirmative if we accept that a process of securitization has occurred prior to or as a result of the discovery of evidence. Potential sources of existential danger can be discovered to be in existence at any given time. What makes them sources of insecurity, *i.e.* threats to national security, is the specific speech-act by pertinent actors within the state. It is the construction of just how such a 'threat' will endanger the state that makes an existential object a national security concern. Realism's importance in the security calculus comes not from its reliance on positivist principles or its claim to being a general theory but from its persuasive force in articulating the potential dangers resulting from a specific set of concerns—*exemplified by material objects*. Yet a comprehensive understanding of the sources of insecurity would be incomplete if we relied only on realism's material emphasis. Our constructivist epistemology allows us to recognize other sources of insecurity as well.

Political Constructivism, Identity, and Cultural Reflection

In *The Elusive Quest*, Ferguson and Mansbach suggest that "ideas emerge and compete in international relations scholarship in ... response to... the normative

temper of the times. Schools of thought in international relations reflect the Zeitgeist of their age as much as do ideas in art and literature."[23] If their assertion is correct, and there is good reason to believe it is, then what is competing with realism during this particular period of history? If realism provides our study with a negative vision of international relations, is there a political interpretation that outlines a potentially positive vision?

In retrospect, the ascendance of realism during the Cold War seems appropriate. Its negative view of inter-state relations and its emphasis on hostile intent and material capabilities was well-suited for a discussion of the relations between two superpowers possessing large nuclear arsenals and competing ideological postures. It only seems natural, then, that in the aftermath of the Cold War we should see a challenge to realism that is better suited to a different normative temper. In an age increasingly defined by post-modern art, architecture, literature, and performance, the current challenge might best be expressed in post-modern/post-structural terms. Or, drawing on developments in critical studies, this challenge might be expressed as a need to challenge dominant power structures in the work place, at home, and in national and international politics. We might speak of a critical constructivist approach that challenges dominant realist tenets.[24] In what follows, I will outline a version of political constructivism that draws on the post-structural variant of constructivism outlined in chapter three as well as constructivist scholars drawn to critique and reconstitution in an attempt to understand political phenomena. Here, we are

interested in the *politics* of a particular set of constructivist scholars rather than the epistemological practices that engage their work. As such, we can locate a *political constructivism* that offers quite a different interpretation of politics from that of realism.[25]

Political constructivism seeks to investigate how identity performances and cultural boundaries define the sources of insecurity by differentiating self and other.[26] In these instances, the other is 'threatening', 'dangerous', and 'destructive' of the self which is defined in opposing terms. It is the image of the other that creates the sense of insecurity. Cultural ideas rather than material capabilities represent the sources of insecurity.

Before a full investigation of this form of constructivism is undertaken, however, it is necessary to consider why political constructivism is appropriately juxtaposed to realism as the most promising alternative to the negative vision of international politics. This discussion revolves around the debate as to where realism and political constructivism are located on the general political continuum. Returning to a standard view of IR theory, it is often noted that realism and neoliberalism represent the two main contending theoretical approaches in the discipline. Furthermore, realism is recognized to reside "on the right side of the general political spectrum."[27] "Adding concerns over human welfare and dignity to the agenda, liberal institutionalists stand to the left of realists."[28] When the debate between realism and neoliberalism achieved a rapprochement of sorts in the early 1990s, "[b]eleaguered

liberal institutionalists found a fresh voice in constructivism."[29] Moreover, as work in constructivism grew, other left-leaning scholars not associated with neoliberal institutionalism were drawn to constructivism. "Scholars from across the left turned to constructivism, finding in it renewed hope for social understanding, a framework for programs of social and political reconstruction, or a critical instrument for political emancipation."[30]

As our discussion above suggests, a particular political stance does not logically follow from constructivism's epistemological and ontological positions. Yet, scholars studying the political aspects of constructivist literature were quick to make the neoliberal-constructivist link. Mearsheimer, for instance, argues that constructivists are really "naïve political utopians."[31] Their works suggest that constructivism is merely a cover for traditional (and according to Mearsheimer, discredited) liberal values. Steve Smith goes so far as to say that "social constructivism... is very close to the neoliberalist wing of the rationalist paradigm."[32] Walt, more generally, considers three theoretical approaches involved in current debates within IR—realism, liberalism, and constructivism.[33] He, too, notes the connection between liberal values and constructivism.

The question, however, is *why*? While it may be a curious "sociology of science fact that for some reason liberal scholars have been more active than realists or globalists in promoting the constructivist turn,"[34] there is no *a priori* reason why conservative political principles could not be espoused by constructivists.[35] If the

world is as we make it, then why have conservative scholars not demanded a return to conditions more suitable to their political values? While a full investigation of these questions takes us beyond the scope of the current discussion, it is important to consider what a number of left or liberal scholars have procured from constructivism in order to develop a not insignificant set of political works that demands a reconsideration of the concept of security. In order to do so, it is necessary to differentiate an epistemological constructivism from a sub-set of constructivist scholars that use reflection and critique to challenge the traditional (dominant) view of security issues.

If the realist approach seeks to remove security issues from the political arena so that they can be analyzed in the light of positivist social science, political constructivists are involved in the act of hyper-politicization. Huysmans provides a succinct understanding of this view when arguing that specific security policies are "neither innocent nor neutral nor inevitable, and therefore [they are] political."[36] In a more general discussion of the potential for constructivists to engage in political critique, Ralph Pettman outlines what he terms 'commonsense constructivism'. He argues for scholars to not only get close in order to understand the issues they investigate, but also to take part in the political process. "Commonsense constructivists stand back and look, stand close and listen, take part, then stand back and look again. They objectify, subjectify in the most radical way possible, then objectify again."[37]

This approach to constructivism places Pettman somewhere between the rule-oriented constructivists like Onuf and the Miami group and the ideas of postmodern constructivists like Campbell. In agreement with rule-oriented constructivists, Pettman argues that a moderate form of rule-oriented rationalism is an appropriate tool for investigating social phenomena, but he does not endorse a positivist epistemology. Also like rule-oriented constructivists, commonsense constructivists recognize the importance of 'getting close' to their objects of study. Against the rule-oriented scholars, however, Pettman claims that it is also necessary to take part in the political world. In the case of foreign or security policy making, this "means learning to speak the language used in the foreign policy making process itself, the better to take part."[38] While Pettman finds postmodern constructivists to be too radical in their anti-rational zeal, he argues that they provide a valuable addition to scholarship. Because postmodernists question the validity of claims made by modernists, they "provide thinking and speaking spaces for those who get put on modernity's margins, and those who must suffer the injustices that modernity creates."[39]

Understanding Pettman's concerns, we begin to recognize 1) why political constructivists have tended to come from the left and 2) how the issue of security as it is investigated by political constructivists is opposed to the negative interpretation of politics offered by realists. The participation of the scholar in a "deeply reflexive"[40] understanding of national security radically alters the form and content of the study that follows. In addition, the constant presence of criticism as a theoretical tool and

political activity runs counter to the universal (foundational) claims of many conservative writers. What is left to be conserved if everything is open to reflection and reconstitution? If critique has no end-point, then is it possible to build a coherent version of conservative international politics?

Politics and scholarly investigation are an inseparable duo for the political constructivist. This challenges the traditional perspective of realism and its policy-oriented study of security. In an attempt to explicate a 'thick signifier' approach to security studies, Huysmans argues that

> interpreting security as a thick signifier also moves the research agenda away from its techno-instrumental or managerial orientation. The main question is not to help the political administration in its job of identifying and explaining threats in the hope of improving formulation of effective counter-measures. Rather, the purpose of the thick signifier approach is to lay bare the political work of the signifier security, that is, what it does, how it determines social relations.[41]

Huysmans's 'thick signifier' account of security necessarily changes the analytic focus of the study. Contrasting his account of security with more mainstream 'conceptual' accounts, Huysmans writes, "[while] conceptual analyses of security in IR assume an external reality to which security refers – an (in)security condition – in a thick signifier approach 'security' becomes self-referential."[42] This is an important component to what I have termed political constructivism and it follows from the epistemological turn that we have made above. But, it is important to note the political implications of this turn. Continuing, Huysmans writes "[it] does not refer to an external, objective reality but establishes a security situation by itself."[43] The manner

with which political constructivism might be differentiated from its epistemological focus is really one of degree rather than kind. The political constructivist takes seriously the *political* content of specific speech-acts. Instead of limiting the discussion of specific utterances to epistemologically significant 'knowledge claims', political constructivists maintain an interest in understanding the larger consequences of these utterances. Again, Huysmans articulates a way to differentiate the two forms of constructivism. "Why do we call this political? Is this not epistemology? Yes, it is the epistemology of security but this epistemology is political in the sense that it embodies a specific ethico-political position."[44]

In addition, and this is the point I wish to emphasize, the post-structurally inspired thick signifier approach "reintroduces ontological insecurity into International Relations, not as an obstacle to be overcome but as a positive force making it possible to re-articulate world politics, to move away from the status quo."[45] Understanding the sources of insecurity and the means to overcome them requires that policy makers (and larger social groups) reflect on identity constructs in an effort to re-interpret what is foreign, other, and dangerous. "It is a (plea for the) search for new life strategies... It looks for a way of life which recognizes that accumulating security with the hope of postponing insecurity is doomed to fail."[46] The questions asked by political constructivists allow for an "on going activity of representing, reminding, remembering, revising, reciprocating, recycling, reversing, recuperating, regouping,

recollecting, returning – that is, a politics of reviving whatever is deadened by the machinery of modernity."[47]

The question that often plagues scholars employing post-positivist techniques is, how can an emphasis on reflection and revision be applied to policy relevant topics like national security? How is political constructivism brought into the policy-side of the security problematique? In order to begin answering these questions, I will return to our example above. To repeat, U.S. security agencies are currently engaged in rooting out *terrorists* in other countries because it is believed these terrorists threaten U.S. national security. While realist scholars accepted the state interpretation of outside 'dangers' and proceeded to ask what material evidence there was for this insecurity, a different set of questions will be asked by the political constructivists. Specifically, how has the state come to interpret certain groups as terrorist threats? Although an answer to this question might seem obvious in light of the events of September 11, a comprehensive critique of identity performances suggests how both American and Foreign cultural practices are inculcated in the ideational sources of insecurity.

This argument assumes that insecurity is a result of self/other dynamics that play out at the boundaries of identities. How have U.S. foreign policy practices influenced and threatened other groups? How have other groups influenced and threatened the United States? How is the 'terrorist' label an American device to provide purpose and direction for a wide-ranging foreign policy espousing 'liberal-

democratic' considerations,[48] market-oriented economies,[49] and hegemonic leadership? How does the terrorist label function to re-produce its own logic in the groups so labeled? These questions move the study of insecurity in a different direction from that of the realists. But, this direction is no less important than the questions asked and the studies performed by traditional security scholars. Critiquing the once 'unencumbered self', an investigation of these questions points to a radically different understanding of the sources of insecurity. Rather than locating threats in the material collection of weapons, bank accounts, terrorist networks, etc., political constructivists argue that insecurity is a result of cultural practices that create enemies. In a very real way, states (or perhaps better, social groups) create their own insecurity.

This discussion should not be read as an attempt to do away with particular identities. Such identities are necessary components to the ability of any social group—and its individual members—to make sense of the world. Badredine Arfi provides a recent understanding of this condition. "Social identity endows interactions with predictability around a set of expectations, a necessary ingredient to sustain social life."[50] In the context of our example, the identity performances that perpetuate an image of a terrorist-other threatening the U.S., sustain and give direction to American social life. The question that concerns the political constructivist is whether Antagonistic-Other constructs are required for a sustainable U.S. political culture. Ted Hopf articulates an understanding of the self/other dynamic that points a way through this problem.

> Actors develop their relations with, and understanding of, others through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately.[51]

Using the political constructivist approach to interpreting security issues, the problem that concerns us is what the 'appropriate response' by the other is when confronted by a self-identity that treats that other as hostile or threatening. If the conscious interpretation and re-interpretation of the self—defined in opposition to the other—insists on treating the other as a *security* threat, then political constructivists seem to have located a source of insecurity inaccessible to those involved in traditional security studies. What is at stake here should be made clear. There is no doubt about the requirements of identity constructs for the perpetuation of the 'self' concept and a specific (particular) way of life. The argument being put forth is not a suggestion that the social construction of a specifically American 'self' should be eliminated. Arfi, Hopf, and others, recognize the necessity of identity constructs in making life meaningful and providing direction to individual lives.[52] The question that concerns us is whether it is necessary to define the other as a source of insecurity. While the divide between self and other may be necessary, it does not follow that this differentiation need be defined in (*in*)security terms. More to the point, when assessing the issue from a political constructivist understanding, if such a differentiation is made on security

grounds, it is ultimately alterable. The fact that we construct our worlds allows us to investigate, critique, and re-construct any security construct.

Returning to the post-structural works of Campbell, McSweeney, and others, it is possible to demonstrate how a reflexive critique of state identity performances can assist in the construction of a more comprehensive security analysis. In much of Campbell's work, including his discussion of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, the Gulf War, and U.S. intervention in the Balkans, he is involved in illuminating " the political consequences that follow from the officially scripted version, and how [this version] legitimizes and produces the conditions of its own acceptance and thus the justification and enactment of war itself."[53] Reflecting on state activity thus challenges the issues of security that are defined by state actors. But more importantly, recognizing the intersubjective nature of human relations, it is possible to alter state considerations of insecurity by engaging in a consistent critique of identity performances. When *reflective* actions are taken, the process whereby identity constructs are altered is set in motion. Here, then, we come to understand Campbell's claim that his form of inquiry "embodies an ethos that considers critique to be a form of intervention."[54] In addition, we come to understand the interpretive vision that is put forth by political constructivists. The world is contingent and malleable. Most importantly, the structures and constraints envisioned by realists and other traditional security scholars are simply manifestations of power-politics that discipline and dissuade actors from recognizing this malleable and contingent nature. Change is not

only theoretically possible, it is an active component of the reflective process. The necessarily negative vision of international politics emphasized by realists is eschewed for an approach recognizing the possibility for a positive change.

Balancing Security Considerations

The differing interpretations of international politics discussed above lead us to consider two types of questions when analyzing any security issue. First, in response to the realist concern with aspects of material power and the constancy of the security dilemma, how do the capabilities of a state enhance or diminish from its overall security? Second, in response to the concerns of the political constructivists, how are cultural constructs and identity performances reproduced in the security interests of a state? Both questions require answers if we are to better understand the sources of insecurity that influence state conduct. However, as I hope to have made clear, the focus of each interpretation is quite different. Each provides a partial answer for the presence of insecurity. In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding, it remains for us to discuss both approaches within the context of a single security calculus.

In a variety of ways, this single security calculus has been alluded to by earlier security scholars but has never been examined directly. Herz's attempt to balance realist and idealist principles and create a 'realist liberalism' is one such example. Yet, Herz does so by embracing a realist understanding of existential threats. Similarly,

Wolfers balances an 'objective' approach to security (the absence of existential threats) with a 'subjective' approach to security (the absence of fear).[55] However, he, too, remains wedded to realism and treats the latter as mere feelings and perceptions and the former as an environmental constant. Alternatively, Campbell articulates a post-structural approach that examines the 'texts' of foreign policy discourse while maintaining the possibility that existential threats may indeed harm the state.[56]

Each of these writers recognizes the tension between existential danger and the construction of threat. Understanding the sources of insecurity requires that we balance ideational considerations with material or existential ones. However, this tension remains unresolved because each treats its 'rhetorical tools' as something more. In the case of Herz and Wolfers, realism is regarded as a general theory of international relations requiring that *idealist* and *subjective* factors be incorporated into its framework of understanding. For Campbell, existential threats are caveats in a larger textual analysis of identity constructs.

In this section, I take realism and political constructivism to be two interpretations of international politics capable of providing partial answers to an investigation of the sources of insecurity. Under an epistemological constructivist umbrella, we can treat each interpretation as a rhetorical device that attempts to give meaning to the social world. Each interpretation examines and emphasizes a specific part of this social world. Realism's negative vision and its focus on material aspects of power speak to the 'cautious paranoid' and demand that state actors consider the

dangerous consequences of their actions. Political constructivism's intersubjective emphasis recognizes the possibility of ideational changes in constructed threats and enemy images. The reflexive posture present in political constructivism recognizes the potential for embracing a richer and more ethical political framework.

In this security calculus, both approaches are deemed necessary in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of security. This discussion examines how a simultaneous investigation of material capabilities and identity performances might proceed. The purpose is not to demonstrate how one approach is more useful in the analysis of a particular security issue but rather to examine how both positions might co-exist beneath a constructivist umbrella in the development of a policy-relevant *and* theoretically rigorous account of national security studies.

By way of example, we might return to our earlier example concerning the current U.S. war against terrorism. Our discussion above suggests that realists and political constructivists develop quite different interpretations of this war. The question that concerns us is whether it is possible to balance the interpretations that each approach provides in the hope of offering a more robust analysis of this particular security issue. To begin, Paul Kowert notes correctly that "constructivists intent on demonstrating the proposition that the world can be constructed in different ways have been loathe to explore material constraints on its construction."[57] Clearly, the events of September 11, demonstrated significant material constraints on the U.S. construction of its security. Returning to a realist critique of these events, an external enemy had

inflicted physical harm on the state. Responding to this danger, realists and state policy makers demonstrate how the capabilities of the United States can be brought to bear not only on those responsible, but on those that might harness similar resources for a future attack. In the assessment of threat, realists take seriously the requirements of the obligation owed by the state to its citizens. Protection from physical danger is a requirement for individual pursuit of the good life. Of course, political constructivists take this discussion as yet another example of the fact that "the very idea of 'national security' (which scholars help transmit, after all) serves state interests."[58] No doubt, but realists are drawn to the fact that basic ontological security remains a prerequisite for the success of daily life. If this notion holds prior to the events of September 11, the ability to conceive of 'national security' issues makes its construction all the more important after that date. Constructing national security matters within a realist vision of international politics demonstrates the central position of the state in securing individual security. Moreover, and this is a point which needs to be emphasized, when analyzing security issues from within our constructivist epistemology, "[there] is nothing inherently 'un-constructivist' in believing... that some constructions make more sense in a given environment than do others."[59] The realist construction of and repetitive emphasis on the classic security dilemma, the importance of self-help, and the presence of external threats, continues to make a great deal of sense in the present international context.

However, these realist constructs do not provide us with a complete picture of this particular security matter. The simple assertion that absolute security is a chimera places limits on what realists can offer to the state. A security program based on an ever-increasing number of material capabilities in a continuously expanding field of security is both impractical and dangerous. Founding a security policy on the eradication of material capabilities existing outside the state does not demonstrate a terribly sophisticated understanding of the sources of insecurity. Simultaneous to a realist picture of the global terrorist threat, we need to investigate the issue as it is understood by scholars working within the political constructivist tradition. An investigation of identity performances (those of the United States and the perceived 'other') can be undertaken in an effort to more accurately assess the success of the realist interpretation.

The critique provided by political constructivists is not simply a negative critique offering a deconstruction of the realist interpretation. Political constructivists are also involved in reflection, reconstruction, reconceptualization. "Among other things, reconceptualization implies that well known, neglected, or apparently irrelevant materials can be looked at from a different perspective and sometimes gain new relevance for our attempts at making sense of world politics."[60] As Campbell makes clear, "the deconstruction of identity widens the domain of the political to include the ways in which identity is constituted and contains an affirmative moment through which existing identity formations are denaturalized and alternative articulations of

identity and the political are made possible."[61] For instance, when Edward Said undertook an examination of the social construction of 'orientalism' in the west, "he also managed to reduce the power of the socially constructed image of orientalism, thus having an impact on one world of our making."[62] When political constructivists challenge socially constructed images of 'others,' they are challenging the political policies that result from those constructed images. As this occurs, actors involved in the political process are induced to reconsider those policies in order to render them more coherent.

In the context of the U.S. fight against international terrorism, political constructivists might investigate two related issues. First, how are U.S. cultural constructs and identity performances reproduced in the tactics to eradicate terrorist organizations? Second, how are U.S. cultural constructs and identity performances of the 'other' interpreted by this 'other'? If the first question examines how the international politics of U.S. hegemony are a reflection of a particular American understanding of self, the second question examines how others react to and interpret America's sense of self in their own construction of security themes. A sophisticated study that interrogates both questions affects the realist interpretation of material capabilities. When material capabilities are claimed by realists to enhance or detract from a state's security and these capabilities are demonstrated by political constructivists to be out of line with or antagonize self/other images a degree of imbalance has appeared in the study of national security. This imbalance requires

further study—it requires reflection, reconceptualization, and reconstruction if Wolfers' ideal security policy is to be approached.

In the following two chapters, the security framework outlined in this chapter will be applied to pressing U.S. security concerns. I seek to demonstrate that a robust and coherent security strategy can only be developed by incorporating and balancing the concerns of realists and political constructivists within an epistemological constructivist umbrella. The current development of a national missile defense system and the war on drugs in the Andean region provide intriguing examples of how the United States might be creating its own insecurity while attempting to manage security concerns.

Chapter Five: Creating Insecurity I: Unilateral BMD Development and U.S. Security

The theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter suggests the need to balance between the negative vision of realism and the positive vision of political constructivism in order to provide a more robust understanding of national security. Doing so, a security study recognizes the sources of insecurity in existential dangers as well as in cultural boundaries. In this chapter, I will apply this framework to the first of two policy debates currently engaging the United States. The unilateral creation of a ballistic missile defense system has been a policy consideration since the early days of the Cold War. Basic systems were devised and constructed only to be shut-down and dismantled. More elaborate systems have been theorized but have been beyond the technological capabilities and political will of the country. The idea of a 'missile shield' defending the United States resonates with an important segment of decision makers in Washington and has re-emerged during successive administrations in one form or another.

The current Bush administration has made 'national missile defense' a cornerstone of its 'new strategic vision'. However, this policy could have deleterious effects on U.S. national security, undermining the post-Cold War rapprochement with

Russia, souring relations with China, and hastening an international political climate detrimental to U.S. interests. Far from enhancing security, the unilateral research and development of a national missile defense shield, or a more modest forward-based boost-phase system, might actually create insecurity.

In the following discussion, I examine the ballistic missile defense (BMD)[1] debate. First, I will explore the historic development of BMD systems. This discussion details the policy debate during various periods of the Cold War as military technology improved and strategic thinking on the meaning of nuclear arsenals developed. Of particular importance, this discussion focuses on the re-emergence of the BMD debate in the post-Cold War. Second, a realist interpretation of BMD will be examined. The purpose of this section is to analyze the issue from the position of the 'cautious paranoid'. Because the BMD issue involves a 'high politics' military/strategic matter, realism is well-suited to providing a theoretical understanding of the potential international implications of BMD. Third, a political constructivist interpretation of the BMD debate will be undertaken. As we would expect, the questions asked and the analysis offered by political constructivists are of a different nature from those of the realists. Pointing to how American identity affects U.S. interests, political constructivists challenge the official state rationale for a BMD system. Moreover, political constructivists suggest how alternative strategies for enhancing national security might evolve from the realist critique of BMD. In the final section, I attempt to balance the interpretations put forth by realists and political constructivists in an

effort to provide the state a more comprehensive analysis of BMD and nuclear security.

The History of BMD Development

The idea of BMD emerged soon after the twin developments of the missile and the atom bomb. While an exact date for the idea cannot be given, research into defending against a missile attack had begun within months of the September 1944 German V-2 rocket attack on a suburb of Paris.[2] As early as 1945, U.S. officials recognized the need to defend against the possibility of missiles carrying atomic weapons.[3] By the early 1950s, private industry, universities, and the U.S. military were developing systems to detect and destroy incoming missiles.[4] Even before the construction and successful launch of the first ICBM, theorists had envisioned the need to defend against these weapons and, as early as 1952, had considered the possibility of a missile interceptor rocket paired with early-warning radar systems.[5] Much of the available anti-aircraft technology, it was theorized, could be adapted to ensure rudimentary defenses against incoming ballistic missiles.[6] "In November 1955 serious efforts at developing a missile defense system began when Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL) undertook a feasibility study for the Army (even before the first ICBM ever flew) on the problems and practicality of missile defense."[7] As a consensus emerged in the United States that rapid advances in missile technology would make ICBMs a major delivery system for nuclear devices, and with the successful Soviet test

of an ICBM in August of 1957, followed by a successful U.S. test later that year, full-scale development of the Army's NIKE-ZEUS system was authorized.

The technological problems and deployment controversy that plagued the NIKE-ZEUS project, ultimately leading to its demise, provide an early lesson in U.S. Cold War nuclear strategy. First, it was recognized early in ICBM development that decoys and penetration aids could by developed and integrated into the terminal stage of an ICBM's trajectory. Even though the Soviets had yet to develop such decoys, their theoretical possibility made the NIKE-ZEUS system less attractive. Second, nuclear strategists also recognized that an increase in offensive capabilities could always overwhelm a ballistic missile defense system. Third, and a related point, the United States was moving to a nuclear strategy that favored the overwhelming potential of offensive weapons. These weapons cost less to build and maintain than BMD and any money spent on defense would be mean less for these offensive weapons. Fourth, advocates of BMD were unable to counter the growing 'logic' of deterrence. As Adams notes,

> ICBMs (made invulnerable) properly deployed by both sides, it was believed, could bring about a stable international environment. The most important task confronting the world was to slow down the arms race, allow both sides to acquire equalized invulnerable strategic deterrents based primarily on hardened or submarine-launched ballistic missiles and then eliminate the danger of nuclear war by de-emphasizing advanced technology which might upset the stable situation.[8]

Thus, while NIKE-ZEUS was demonstrated to be effective in the initial stages of testing,[9] and while the USSR was building a BMD system similar to ZEUS,[10] the first U.S. effort at BMD was never deployed.

The demise of NIKE-ZEUS and the increasing rhetoric of the MAD doctrine are not coincidental and further discussion of their connection seems warranted. During the 1960s, the United States consistently attempted to articulate an offensive-oriented 'saturation parity' or 'mutual assured destruction'[11] as the most stable bilateral strategic policy available to the United States and USSR. Increasingly, this doctrine was viewed as an incontestable point in strategic thinking. It became imperative to 'teach' Soviet leaders of the merits of this doctrine. Since Soviet research and development in missile defense had been a component of Soviet strategic thinking since the 1940s, an alternative to MAD was possible.[12] Given the perceived superiority of Soviet BMD research, *unilateral* adherence to MAD could have a deleterious effect on U.S. national security. Therefore, a concerted effort to 1) teach the Soviets the 'logic' of MAD and 2) continue to research BMD technology in case the Soviets could not 'learn', became the dual components of U.S. strategic thought throughout the 1960s. But it is important to note that according to adherents of MAD, deterrence and ballistic missile defense were contradictory policy options and could not be implemented simultaneously.[13] Jerome Wiesner articulates this point in late 1960. "A missile deterrent system would be unbalanced by the development of a highly effective anti-missile defense system and if it appears possible to develop one, ...

agreements should explicitly prohibit the development and deployment of such a system."[14] Understanding this point, the U.S. government continued to fund R&D on BMD while simultaneously refusing to deploy the NIKE-ZEUS system.[15]

The problem with a U.S. strategic policy emphasizing MAD is that in order to succeed, its language must be understood and its doctrine employed by both sides. Without a good measure of trust that the opposing power wishes to adhere to MAD, there is always the possibility that defensive capabilities will be constructed that place the adhering state at a major disadvantage. As David Goldfischer makes clear,

> ongoing efforts in research and development reflect the provisional nature of adherence to MAD. It is simply assumed that if one side discerned a realistic chance to escape from assured vulnerability, it would defect from a MAD-based arms control regime. Episodic (and illusory) hopes for one's own escape from MAD have therefore been coupled to constant concern about the other side's efforts and plans. The result has been an ongoing search for better ways of penetrating defenses (e.g., nuclear cruise missiles, stealth technology, maneuverable reentry vehicles) that are already hopelessly overmatched and plans for new ways to protect retaliatory forces despite their existing capacity to survive an attack and inflict assured destruction many times over.[16]

The shortcomings of the MAD doctrine presented the United States with a perceived strategic imbalance by 1966. While "the United States possessed at least a three-to-one superiority (1,446 to 470) over the Soviet Union in ICBMs and an ever greater superiority in terms of overall combat effectiveness,"[17] the USSR's emphasis on defensive technology was beginning to produce positive results and the Soviets had begun deployment of BMD technology.[18] U.S. reliance on 'assured destruction' now seemed to have placed the United States at a strategic disadvantage.

> In the area of BMD systems, the Soviets, after several abortive starts, had begun to deploy the Galosh ABM system around Moscow, as well as another type of defensive system (thought to be geared to the American bomber force) elsewhere in the Soviet Union. But, whatever the exact character of these systems and pace of their deployment by the Soviet Union, American defense planners, for the time being, were predicating their strategic forces on the assumption that by the early 1970s the USSR would have deployed a heavy ABM protection around all its major cities.[19]

As a result of the perceived imbalance, the United States was faced with the need to research and deploy some form of BMD or accept an enemy with the *theoretical* potential to survive a nuclear attack. Responding to this new environment, the United States made clear to the Soviet Union that any BMD system they may have developed could easily be overwhelmed by U.S. offensive capabilities. A BMD system, however, might be appropriate for the newly-emerging Chinese nuclear arsenal- an arsenal without a second-strike capability. Toward that end, the United States once again considered a BMD system. While NIKE-ZEUS was now outdated, advances in missile and radar technology, and continuous R&D throughout the 1960s,[20] suggested that a 'thin' system could be deployed around major population centers (SENTINEL) to defend against a (smaller) Chinese attack. In addition, the possibility of protecting U.S. nuclear silos with a hard-point ABM system (SAFEGUARD), in an effort to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the United States was committed to *assured* destruction, was being considered.

These second-generation policy options, and the political problems that lead to their demise, result in the eventual signing of the 1972 ABM treaty and the triumph of

deterrence as a strategic doctrine. SENTINEL was doomed (politically) almost from the start. As an urban anti-missile missile system, SENTINEL was designed to launch nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles, from fixed positions near large cities, at incoming ICBMs. Soon after the deployment decision, the U.S. Army began locating possible deployment sites. The political movements from below,[21] in opposition to the establishment of these sites, resulted in a re-assessment of this deployment decision. Throughout 1969, as the Army continued to search for appropriate sites, national strike committees, community groups, and scientists fought SENTINEL deployment.[22] These groups, quite obviously, "raised questions concerning the dangers inherent in erecting sites within residential areas—particularly the specter of accidental detonation at the missile site or at an altitude too low above the city, thereby obliterating the city it was supposed to protect."[23]

Similarly, the SAFEGUARD program came under serious opposition from groups within the United States concerned by the seemingly exponential cost of the arms race and its negative effects on U.S. domestic society. While the U.S. was more successful in deploying SAFEGUARD, constructing sites near missile silos in North Dakota, plans for a nation-wide infrastructure were never fulfilled. In addition, protecting missile silos from harm appeared *not* to be an enhancement to national security but a condition for increased international instability. Realists, including Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, argued against SAFEGUARD on the grounds that it was too expensive and would not lead to a better security position for the United

States.[24] Kennan would argue before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "a U.S. BMD deployment would lead the Soviets to doubt whether the United States really wanted strategic arms limitation." Further, Kennan suggested that "the expansion of SAFEGUARD could raise doubt and uncertainty in the Soviet Union about U.S. goals and intentions."[25] The unilateral decision to deploy a BMD system like SAFEGUARD might very likely lead to increased international instability and move the world dangerously close to nuclear war.

With the United States and the Soviet Union moving towards a treaty on nuclear arms limitations,[26] a halt to deployment of BMD systems was required (an eventuality that came about with the 1972 ABM treaty).[27] The result of these arms control negotiations (and the freeze on BMD deployment) was the balance of terror outlined by the MAD doctrine. This doctrine would be the founding principle of Great Power strategic thought throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. While the merits of a policy of deterrence that, if it failed, would result in the obliteration of both countries were open to serious critique by scholars, policy makers and citizens, the bi-polar world solidified by MAD remained stable throughout this period.

However, the strategy of deterrence would be seriously tested following the March 1983 public initiation of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or 'Star Wars' as its detractors would come to call it.[28] SDI was an ambitious attempt to break out of the environment of mutual destruction. Unlike previous BMD systems, it was theorized (little of the technology had actually be developed) that SDI would intercept "Soviet

missiles in all four phases of flight, with a heavy emphasis on boost phase interception accomplished from space."[29] (To be precise, two versions of SDI were contemplated. Star Wars I was a more ambitious 'Astrodome' version of SDI that included reliance on space-based weapons systems to protect U.S. territory from attack. Star Wars II was a more modest plan that upgraded the basic idea behind SAFEGUARD—an attempt to defend U.S. offensive capabilities). Requiring that the United States withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty, SDI was heralded as a national necessity by its proponents "on both moral and strategic grounds."[30] Those favoring the most ambitious plan argued,

> A comprehensive Star Wars I defense... will defend the United States against Soviet nuclear blackmail, protect American society from destruction should war break out, and provide a more moral basis for American defense, by removing American dependence upon threats to destroy others' civilian populations.[31]

Expressing the potential benefits accrued from the more limited SDI system, advocates suggested that such a BMD

> can enhance deterrence by better protecting American strategic forces from attack; can protect American conventional forces from nuclear or perhaps even conventional missile attack, thus deterring both conventional war and nuclear escalation during conventional war; can reduce American casualties in an all-out nuclear war; can demonstrate American resolve, thus inducing the Soviets to bargain more generously in arms control and other negotiations; can diminish the value of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs by diminishing their effectiveness, thus inducing the Soviets to bargain away these weapons more readily in arms control negotiations; can create uncertainties about the results of a nuclear war that may help to deter a Soviet attack; can deter a limited Soviet nuclear attack by forcing the Soviets to use a larger number of nuclear weapons, which the Soviets may shrink from doing for fear of further escalation; and can protect the United States from

> accidental or unauthorized Soviet missile launches, or from ballistic missile attacks by third countries.[32]

In other words, the successful deployment of either version of SDI would allow the United States to break from the constraints imposed by mutual acceptance of 'assured destruction'. A technically-feasible BMD system "would thereby restore American nuclear superiority, re-establish the credibility of the American nuclear threat, and extend American deterrence over Europe and other areas."[33] If the Cold War was a stand-off between two superpowers with the ability to obliterate each other, then the construction of SDI would mean victory by default for the United States. Conceivably, according to its advocates, the construction of a BMD system would mean the United States would have the freedom of action available to the great power in a unipolar system. However, for reasons similar to those that killed SENTINEL and SAFEGUARD, the BMD systems envisioned during the Reagan administration were not constructed. As the United States and the Soviet Union transitioned to a post-Cold War world during the Bush administration (1989-1993), the U.S. returned to a policy of limited research without deployment expectations.

The post-Cold War world provided proponents of BMD a new environment in which to advocate for the necessity of a defensive system. The reasons given for this renewed interest in BMD require special attention. Faced with pressure by Congressional Republicans, the Clinton administration created a "3+3 program" for BMD consideration.[34] Beginning in 1996, the United States would once again research

and develop a system. "If, after the first three years, no threat justified deployment, then development would continue so that the system would always be three years from deployment with up-to-date technology."[35] While this initiative might have stopped serious debate on the issue, two events in 1998 would significantly alter the government's position and the pace of development on BMD. In July, the Rumsfeld Commission (the name given to the bipartisan Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States) released its findings on the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and the threats posed to the United States by these emerging nuclear states. According to the findings of the Commission, "North Korea or Iran could develop an ICBM within five years and with little warning."[36] As if to underscore the accuracy of the study, North Korea launched a missile over Japan one month later. While the missile launch was a technical failure (it was intended to put a satellite into orbit—which did not succeed), the effect on policy makers in the United States was dramatic. In July of 1999, Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act which stated that the United States was committed to deploying a BMD system "as soon as technologically feasible."[37]

Steven Miller locates seven repeatedly cited reasons for moving forward on a post-Cold War ballistic missile defense system. First, "deployment is warranted by new missile threats."[38] These threats no longer come from the USSR or China, but from smaller (potential) nuclear states. Second, these 'rogue states' may be undeterrable.[39] Third, the current inability to defend against ballistic missiles creates incentives for

proliferation—which creates instability.[40] Fourth, the new version of BMD will not be seen as a threat to Russia and China.[41] Fifth, because it is not a threat to Russia or China, BMD will not "provoke nuclear build-ups" in these states.[42] Sixth, because the U.S. has the ability to consult with both allies and states like Russia and China, it is possible to construct a system that does not create an acute security dilemma.[43] Seventh, the political realities of the post-Cold War world are fundamentally different from those of the Cold War. Those insisting on adherence to the ABM treaty and defending deterrence as the *only* strategy for nuclear peace are dogmatically entrenched in the realities of a world that no longer exists. Advances in technology now permit development of a forward-deployed 'boost-phase' system[44] that solves many of the problems that plagued earlier versions without additional political costs.

These seven issues provide the political cover for the development and deployment of BMD. While the Bush administration has yet to outline the systems that will be constructed, the United States will withdraw from the ABM Treaty in June of 2002.[45] At that time, the United States will being to construct radar systems in Alaska. In addition, the United States has begun negotiations with other actors in order to expand its future radar and ABM capabilities.[46]

Realism and BMD Development

The potential for states to inflict harm on one another leads realists to seek out policies that provide necessary enhancements to national security. While security can

never be assured by the policies they advocate, it is the purpose of the 'cautious paranoid' to outline the most harmful realistic consequences for any particular source of existential insecurity. To this, realists prescribe the most effective policies in order to combat the likelihood of these dangers. It might seem counter-intuitive, then, that a realist interpretation of the BMD debate consistently articulates the detrimental consequences of building such a system. But, close examination of realist tenets suggests that the requirement that states seek '*the most effective policy*' in any given situation has left realists to consistently rule out BMD as an enhancement to security. The policy-side of realism seeks to present a 'realistic' vision of policy alternatives—i.e., to argue for the most efficient and effective means to counter the most serious *realistic* threat to national security. These limitations rule out advocacy of certain security policies even though they might appear to present short-term solutions to a problem of insecurity. Realists insist on policies that recognize both short-term and long-term consequences. We must live in the world as it is, not as we would like it to be[47]—and this point has policy implications. Policies must be chosen that recognize their effects on the international system. Emphasizing these issues, realists are skeptical of the benefits of ballistic missile defense. In the discussion that follows, I will demonstrate why a consensus has emerged among realists against deployment of BMD. This discussion follows two issues that often appear in realist texts; 1) the implications for the balance of power in the system and, 2) the depth and extent of the threat that emerges. Together, the realist discussion of these points will challenge all

seven claims (outlined above) made by the policy making community in support of BMD.

First, realists are drawn to the concept of 'balance of power' in an effort to emphasize the effects of anarchy and the limitations on the power potential of each state. As the analysis of Waltz in chapter two makes clear, balance of power is both a repetitive historical condition and a necessary prescriptive component to an effective foreign policy. This issue appears as a central component in realist wariness to deploy a Cold War and post-Cold War BMD system.

Once the establishment of nuclear forces reached a level where both sides had second-strike capability, the international balance of power was preserved in the institution of MAD. Constructing the political world in this way, both the United States and the Soviet Union were considered to have created a (stable) bipolar arrangement. Deterrence is not a perfect policy—its failure results in devastating consequences—but even its detractors consider it stable, albeit it a stable system of terror.[48] If understood by all the necessary states (and this is an important requirement), MAD demonstrates how the costs of initiating a war outweigh the benefits. Indeed, while it is often difficult to differentiate between state policy makers and realist apologists of state power, on the issue of deterrence vs. missile defense, a distinction can be made. For instance, Paul Wolfowitz recently argued that "the missile defences we deploy will be precisely that - defences. They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter those who would threaten us with ballistic missile attack."[49]

However, as Steven Miller correctly argues, "[this] does not conform to any known conception of deterrence. Indeed, by definition deterrence works via threats of retaliation whereas defences seek to defeat an attack or to neutralise the deterrent threats of others." [50]An offensive attack cannot be considered a rational policy option because it would result in a net negative for the state. Therefore, once balance has been achieved in a bipolar system, instability occurs when one state seeks to defect from the 'deterrence game' being played. Unilateral deployment of BMD is one form of defection. Consider how Richard Betts weighs the Reagan-era decision to move ahead with SDI. "[The] U.S. advantage that plausibly could be achieved would be at best only one of degree (making the United States proportionally less vulnerable than the Soviet Union), not one of kind (making the United States and only the United States nearly invulnerable)."[51] Betts is suggesting that even an adequate defense does not promote the security of the United States. However, to this, it is necessary to recognize the likely impact that SDI will have on the stability of the system. Drell, Farley, and Holloway provide a succinct review of the instability invoked by unilateral deployment of BMD.

> The real risk of nuclear war is not a cold-blooded decision to initiate one, but what might happen under the pressures and suspicions of a crisis—an accidental triggering nuclear incident, miscalculation, loss of control by responsible leaders. An effective but imperfect ABM on one side would exacerbate the risk because the side that did have an ABM might calculate that it would be better off if it struck first and used the ABM defense to deal with the weakened response... Similarly, the side that did not have ABM might calculate that its situation would be better (however bad) if it struck first and avoided being caught trying to retaliate with a weakened force against the ABM defense.[52]

During Cold War crises, both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the need for restraint. This need is demonstrated during the Cuban-Missile Crisis when the policy of deterrence was under considerable strain. One wonders if the outcome would have been different had the United States (alone) possessed a BMD system. While a counterfactual case study is beyond the scope of the present discussion, realists would likely have found the presence of such a system an aggravating condition and a further source of insecurity rather than an improvement in U.S. national security. Moreover, the development of a BMD system during the Cold War would have provided an *imperfect* defense of the United States alone. This system would have been of little use to NATO allies. Rather than enhancing the security of Western Europe, the unilateral decision to protect the U.S. mainland would have challenged the viability of the Alliance. If the United States possessed a preponderance of power in the international system, skeptical allies may have questioned their own security positions.[53] Great powers that attempt to break from the constraints of their constraining environments can be considered expansionist and induce other states to counter-balance.

A similar concern engages realists in the post-Cold War moment. Concerning the current U.S. design to construct ballistic missile defenses, John Newhouse suggests that "Moscow, Beijing, and worried European capitals see in Bush's design a quest for unilateral advantage by a power already in full possession of the relevant strategic

advantages."[54] Seeking to enhance national security through the unilateral deployment of BMD, skeptics consistently argue that the United States will ultimately create situations defined by more insecurity rather than less. As Waltz reminds the international community, unipolar moments are not expected to last. At some point, states seek to balance against the power of others.[55] While this is not a law governing the behavior of states, our constructivist epistemology suggests that realists seek to emphasize this issue as a condition of their 'cautious paranoia'. It is a challenge to the policy maker to refrain from activities that promote counter-balancing tendencies. This point is particularly important in a post-Cold War world defined by a preponderance of U.S. power.

The current U.S. desire to build a missile defense system may cause other international actors to undertake strategies designed to thwart what they perceive as expansionary U.S. policies. Charles Glaser articulates the negative possibilities that ensue from U.S. insistence on unilateral deployment of BMD.

> U.S. pursuit of nuclear superiority would fuel insecurity whether or not its NMD was effective. If NMD was effective, Russia and China would believe that they were vulnerable to U.S. coercion. If, as seems far more likely, NMD was ineffective, Russian and Chinese leaders would interpret dedicated U.S. efforts to achieve effective NMD as a signal of malign U.S. motives. Because they undoubtedly believe that nuclear deterrence is adequate to preserve U.S. security, they would interpret U.S. efforts to acquire nuclear superiority as indicative of expansionist motives. This is particularly likely given U.S. global conventional superiority and the absence of intense conflicts that threaten U.S. security. Competitive U.S. policies would lend support to hard-liners and nationalists who are competing for influence in Russia and China, and their increased influence would reinforce the signal sent by highly competitive U.S. nuclear policies.[56]

Echoing the realist concern that a great power is more secure when "all of the major powers are secure,"[57] Glaser demonstrates the negative consequences of BMD deployment in the international environment. As he states, "forgoing large-scale NMD seems preferable to risking what at best would be a new Cold War."[58] Most importantly, from a realist perspective, alternative strategies for enhancing U.S. security are available.[59] Therefore, the potential of increasing international instability outweighs the possible benefits. Even if, in the near term, Russia is incapable of countering the presence of BMD technology, it is necessary to consider the potential medium and long-term consequences. "Russia will view NMD in terms of overall U.S. policy, which has included NATO expansion and military intervention in European conflicts in the face of Russian opposition."[60] When, not if, Russia overcomes its current problems, it will expect an opportunity to participate more assertively in international politics. As Miller argues, "it is very short-sighted to assume Russia's current financial problems will persist throughout the ten-to-twenty year time-frame of current US missile-defence plans."[61] The perceived expansionism of the U.S. during its moment of unchallenged power, will be among the policy considerations of a newly emergent Russia. In addition, even if BMD is not directed towards the overwhelming Russian ICBM forces, its deployment may be seen as the first stage in a more elaborate plan to defend against the Russian nuclear threat.[62] Expecting Russians to be

'cautious paranoids', realists suggest that they will "employ worst-case analysis in assessing the adequacy of [their] core deterrent capabilities."[63]

Similarly, even if the United States expects China to modernize its small nuclear arsenal in the absence of U.S. BMD deployment, the nature and extent of its response might be altered dramatically.[64] "China is likely to view NMD as part of a package in which Washington steps up its support for Taiwan, deploys TMD in the region, and calls for increases in Japanese military spending and operational capability."[65] China has already warned that it views development of BMD technology as a threat to national security. Even though, in the short-term, China will not possess the capabilities to counter U.S. BMD systems, over the medium to long-term, China will play a more active role in international affairs. How they envision the United States will be an important factor in their foreign policy. As Glaser considers, "Chinese leaders are inclined to see American policy—including support for international institutions and their universal norms, expansion of U.S. alliances, and improvements in U.S. and allied military capabilities—as designed to prevent China from achieving the great power status that they believe it deserves."[66]

Both of these states have the potential to undermine U.S. security interests in the medium and long-term futures. As Miller argues, "if relations with the United States sour, Moscow or Beijing could cause great mischief by promoting missile proliferation around the world and thereby multiplying the problems for defences."[67] In addition, from a realist perspective emphasizing even the most rudimentary versions of

rational-actor modeling, it is difficult to understand the decision to move forward on BMD deployment. "In response to the first hint of Soviet missile defences in the 1960s, for example, the United States began to contemplate the deployment of 50,000 warheads. It was to avoid such expensive and fruitless interactions that both sides came to accept the ABM Treaty."[68] It is difficult to understand why Russia and China would not contemplate such an offensive build-up in the face of U.S. BMD deployment *and* withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. "Open minds could easily conclude that Russia and China are not likely to acquiesce passively to missile-defence deployments that further buttress American primacy while potentially undermining their own deterrent postures."[69] As well, Russian and Chinese reactions to BMD deployment may increase the likelihood of an accidental launch by either state. With a BMD system in place, both powers might consider that the United States is more likely to engage in a first-strike. While this appears unlikely during the relative calm of normal international relations, during a crisis period, Russia and China may move to a heightened state of alert in an effort to be able to retaliate against a U.S. attack. Considering the present state of Russian command, control, and communication systems,[70] this eventuality could have devastating consequences.[71] In other words, applying even simple Cost-Benefit formulas, BMD is the least effective and most unreliable means to preventing an accidental launch by a major nuclear power, a point we will return to below.

The second realist principle that might be employed in an analysis of unilateral BMD deployment is an assessment of the depth and extent of the threat perceived by the United States. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear annihilation presented both the United States and the Soviet Union with reason to desire defensive capabilities. However, recognition that offensive capabilities could always be enhanced to overwhelm any defensive system imagined (through the addition of decoys, pen-aids, multiple delivery mechanisms, or by simply increasing the number of warheads), made the ICBM threat too great. Even if it were possible to construct a perfect system that could grow with advances in offensive enhancements, realists would require the state to do a Cost-Benefit Analysis. Since any weapons system takes resources away from the development and deployment of other weapons systems, it remains to be seen whether the dollars spent on BMD would be better used by enhancing offensive nuclear capabilities in order to demonstrate to the opposing state that their BMD technology was insufficient to prevent second-strike annihilation. Glaser articulates this realist claim.

> The strongest Cold War argument against NMD was that even if the United States could build a missile defense that would work against deployed Soviet forces, the Soviets could defeat the U.S. NMD at a cost much smaller than the cost to the United States of building the defense in the first place. In other words, the cost-exchange ratio significantly favored the offensive forces and the preservation of retaliatory capabilities. The result of deploying NMD would be an arms race that left U.S. vulnerability undiminished, while greatly increasing the cost of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces.[72]

On balance, then, the construction of BMD during the Cold War was seen by realists as a problematic and dangerous consideration when discussed in light of the overwhelming threat presented by the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

In the post-Cold War world, the extent of the nuclear threat envisioned by the United States is quite different. This, of course, is an understatement. As Thomas Friedman recently put it, the United States is insistent upon deploying "weapons that don't work against an enemy that doesn't exist."[73] In a post-Cold War world defined by an overwhelming preponderance of U.S power (so much so that its allies are frequently chided for not being able to field resources capable of assisting the United States in crises),[74] the envisioned threats are negligible according to many realists. However, according to proponents of BMD deployment, these threats are real and growing. According to the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq "would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability."[75] Similarly, the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (a review amended in the aftermath of the Rumsfeld Commission report and the North Korean rocket launch) argued that "during the next 15 years the United States will most likely face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq."[76]

Realists are skeptical of these states as threats to U.S. national security. Given the realist bias to examine material capabilities, the claim that these states are 'sources of insecurity' seems to ring hollow. Consider that North Korea, the country considered

the most immediate threat in terms of its ability to construct an nuclear-tipped ICBM, "is a small, impoverished nation of 23 million people whose entire gross domestic product is estimated to be less than 10% of the annual US defence budget."[77] Since it seems equally likely that North Korea will disappear before constructing a viable ICBM, "[the] American preoccupation with the North Korean threat inspires wide disbelief: many abroad simply cannot believe that the United States feels so threatened by such a weak and fragile state that it must undertake to deploy missile defences at vast expense."[78] Further, as Miller states, it is a stretch to consider any of the current developments in the international system to be threatening to the United States.

> None of the threatening states whose behaviour is motivating American moves toward missile defence presently possesses either nuclear weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Most do not possess any missiles with a range over 1,450 kilometres (900 miles). None has utilised solid-fuel rockets. None has extensive missile test facilities or the capacity to manufacture significant numbers of long-range missiles. Even in the worst case, none can have such capabilities for some years to come. In the best case, most of the potential proliferators (who are few in any case) will never acquire ICBMs armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[79]

Moreover, as one security analyst has recently argued, even if these states do obtain nuclear-tipped ICBMs, the United States is simply required to adjust its nuclear arsenal such that these states recognize they are now targets of a U.S. nuclear attack.[80] In other words, deterrence works as well against small states as it does against large superpowers. As Glaser argues, "NMD would have virtually no ability to bolster

deterrence of a rogue possessing only a vulnerable ICBM force, *because it should already be effectively deterred.*"[81]

Of course, the counter claim is that not only are these states intent on gaining nuclear weapons capable of harming the United States (either by launching an attack on the U.S. mainland or by preventing U.S. freedom of action abroad), but the leaders of these states are irrational and incapable of understanding the logic of deterrence. They will use nuclear weapons even if their use will result in assured annihilation. On this point, proponents of BMD seem to argue that these 'power-seeking' leaders do not understand the 'power' of others. This is not only a foolish claim, it is also quite dangerous. For, as Miller states quite clearly,

> Until the United States has deployed meaningful missile-defence capacities, it will necessarily rely on deterrence. Even when these defences are deployed, their perfect effectiveness cannot be assumed, which means that deterrence will continue to matter. Moreover, missile defences provide no protection against other means of delivery. Other WMD threats, against which the United States has little protection, must still be deterred. For these reasons, the [Bush] administration ought to be buttressing America's deterrent policy rather than questioning its effectiveness.[82]

Finally, it is necessary to consider by what means proponents of BMD rationalize their claims concerning its value. By employing a 'worst case analysis' to the proliferation of nuclear technology and the construction of ICBMs by 'rogue' states, policy makers and advocates of BMD are seeking to construct a *realist* vision of threats. Indeed, Bush administration officials now consistently claim to be advocating a 'new strategic framework' employing a 'new realism.'[83] What has

occurred, however, is that these policy makers have employed a "simple-minded, and erroneous, use of the game theoretic principle of 'minimax.'[84] This principle "advices one to choose a strategy so as to minimize the chance of getting the outcome you regard as worst—but properly understood it does not mean bending all efforts to avoid very bad but very improbable events."[85] Considering both the lack of any near-term threat from rogue states and the possibility that better solutions to medium and long-term threats already exist, realists see BMD deployment as both unhelpful and potentially harmful. Miller provides a succinct summary of a realist assessment of the BMD issue.

> Ultimately at issue in the present missile-defence debate is not whether or not to preserve the ABM Treaty but how best to protect the security of the United States and its friends and allies in a changing strategic environment. In the abstract, there is no reason to quarrel with the simple proposition that it is best to be defended. But the real question to ask about missile defences is: what benefit at what cost? At present, the answer seems to be that missile defences represent a high-cost remedy to a threat that is speculative, distant in time and uncertain in scale and character. Very expensive and very limited missile-defence capabilities will be acquired at the risk of provoking a variety of adverse diplomatic and strategic consequences. It is not at all clear that the net effect will be an improved security order for the United States.[86]

With the overwhelming power possessed by the United States, the potential to find a more effective strategy to the (potential) nuclear rogue threat seems obvious. Below we will consider some of the realist options to combat this threat. First, however, it is necessary to examine a political constructivist interpretation of BMD deployment.

Political Constructivism and BMD Development

A political constructivist interpretation of the BMD debate is quite different from the interpretation offered by realists. While realists are interested in assessing changes in the balance of power and the extent to which other states possess material capabilities harmful to the United States (the extent of the threat), political constructivists are concerned with exploring how culture and identity inform the threat considerations that emerge in and advance the BMD debate. In this section, I will explore three issues underscored by political constructivists that balance the interpretation offered by realists. Rather than contradicting the realist critique, the following points suggest how political constructivism might be included to offer a more robust security analysis. This will allow us, in the subsequent section, to offer a more comprehensive security programme that reduces the potential threat posed by nuclear weapons. But first, it is necessary to outline three issues consistently raised by political constructivists; 1) how American political culture influences the BMD decision, 2) how actors construct the threats they then seek to counter, and 3) how U.S. identity (as the lone superpower) defines and expands its national interests.

First, the peculiarities of U.S. history, and the particular cultural references that arise from that history, engage political constructivists in their assessment of the policies surrounding BMD deployment. Blessed by geographical gifts and weak neighbors, the United States has been able to avoid the possibility that its territory

could be invaded for more than a century. When combined with a moral claim that the United States is a hallowed community, the physical invulnerability of 'Fortress America' is both an empirical assertion and a deontological mandate. As such, during the Cold War, the presence of the Soviet nuclear arsenal created a measure of cognitive dissonance among those policy makers internalizing this particular view of American exceptionalism. Soviet weapons challenged the passivity of policy makers that did nothing to overcome the terror of MAD. Among proponents of BMD, it was considered un-American to challenge it.[87]

Moreover, the presence of Soviet ICBMs complicates the use of unilateral policies to overcome the constraints of bipolarity. The tradition of American unilateral foreign policy activity, in the face of the logic of deterrence, could be suicidal if it is not restrained. However, a culture that is in some way defined by a *manifest destiny* to rise to the role of superpower within 150 years of its birth is not necessarily inclined towards restraint in its international activities.[88] Both strategically and morally, how could the 'Shining City on the Hill' cope with the threat of annihilation brought by the 'Evil Empire'? The moral dilemma presented to the United States was acute and often articulated in the public actions of key policy makers. Consider the language that Reagan was to employ when announcing development of SDI. "What if a free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies."[89] It is

expected that a politician would use cultural rhetoric to persuade an audience. However, the form and content of this rhetoric is important and reproduces that cultural vein that accepts the unique requirements of American exceptionalism. It is a re-affirmation of the fact that the United States represents the free world (the good) threatened by an aggressor (by definition, bad) willing to destroy it. If the United States is to protect this 'free world', a prerequisite is a return to 'Fortress America'—i.e., the ability to act without impunity in international affairs. These cultural cues are repeated over and over again in the promotion of Cold War BMD.[90]

Even after the Cold War, the rhetoric of a besieged America is employed to advocate for deployment of ballistic missile defenses. In this way, a similar view of 'Fortress America' is re-articulated. As Newhouse argues, "various members of the Bush administration judge relying on deterrence immoral: far better to defend society than to have to avenge it after a destructive attack."[91] In this context, we can understand the politics of BMD proponents. "[The] mentality of the NMD partisans is a perfect fusion of isolationist and interventionist psyches [what might more accurately be considered unilateralism]: We can build a shield over 'our' country while preserving the right to intervene at will around the globe... the parochial and the imperial instincts are jointly served."[92]

The investigation of how American political culture influences debate on BMD is not undertaken simply as an historical exercise. While an improved understanding of the BMD issue is obtained through this textual analysis, political constructivists are

equally as interested in recognizing the potential that reflection plays in an improved policy debate. Again, to return to the writings of the constructivists explored in previous chapters, telling alternative histories is a political act. Emphasizing the boundedness of American cultural practices, political constructivists are challenging the parochial and ethnocentric conditions that persist. Given that we live in a world of our making, the opportunity to challenge cultural givens (those that confirm the moral necessity of BMD) is an important political addition.

The second issue that political constructivists might include in their interpretation of the BMD debate is the cultural construction of threats that require a subsequent state response. Here, the distinction between realism and political constructivism is intriguing. In a series of recent studies, political constructivists have demonstrated that the United States perpetuated its own identity by constructing enemies beyond its borders.[93] Similarly, if the above realist interpretation challenged the state claim that 'rogues' were threats on the grounds that few (if any) material capabilities could be measured that would support such a claim, the interpretation by political constructivists asks how 'rogues' come to be labeled in the first place. This addition to the BMD discussion is important. Realism provides an interesting and compelling analysis of the current lack of any material capabilities possessed by these rogues. But, realism is unprepared to investigate why these states are singled out as threats. Political constructivists, on the other hand, consider this point central to their investigation. In a recent critique of U.S. security policy, Legro and Moravcsik

suggest that states labeled as rogues are more ideological threats than a material ones. "These picayune foes are targeted not because they are the most powerful—or even minimally powerful—but because they are the least democratic and propagate the most hostile ideologies."[94] In a similar approach to that of Campbell in *Writing Security*, Legro and Moravcsik articulate how the identity of the United States is challenged by these states. Moreover, a deeper analysis would consider how, in a post-Soviet world, the United States must locate an Other in order to maintain a sense of Self.[95] However insignificant the threat, rogues constitute a 'clear' boundary for American identity. This boundary maintains the unique qualities of American culture by representing that which is different as dangerous—and that which is dangerous as different.[96]

More importantly, political constructivists recognize that if threats can be constructed they can be *de*-constructed and *re*-constituted. An interpretation of rogue states might be transformed through an examination of identity performances. Such a transformation could result in a view of these states as different but not necessarily hostile. While identities are necessary features of any culture, it is not the case that identities need be formed in (hostile) contrast to others. A recognition of difference is a healthy and necessary moment of definition for actors perpetuating a sense of self. It does not follow that these differences need be seen as threatening. Here, the emancipatory nature of political constructivism is most comfortable. Seeking to embrace a more reflexive approach to international politics, political constructivists

challenge the standard (state) construction of threats and re-introduce and re-constitute hidden practices that have been marginalized by the official version. This activity is more than an academic exercise; it is hyper-political, requiring the state to re-conceptualize the boundary between Self and Other.

Finally, the third component of a political constructivist interpretation of BMD suggests that U.S. identity influences its interests. On this issue, political constructivists and realists diverge. As noted above, realists insist that state interests are given.[97] Political constructivists, on the other hand, consider interests to be the result of particular identities.[98] Both the Cold War and post-Cold War attempt to build BMD systems seems to provide political constructivists with a measure of support for this view. During the early stages of the Cold War, for instance, the only system deployed by the United States (SAFEGUARD) was intended to defend ICBMs. If the United States identified itself as one of two superpowers caught in a bi-polar power struggle, it seems likely that a limited BMD system, designed to enhance deterrence, would be considered. If deterrence was an appropriate (and stable) institution that would ensure the maintenance of the United States as a superpower, it is likely that a comprehensive BMD system would be more problematic. The ABM Treaty—and the legal codification of MAD—represents a clear articulation of both the United States and the Soviet Union as competing global superpowers. That the Reagan-era SDI program never came to pass is further support for this position.

Similarly, the current international environment has resulted in a re-assessment of American national identity. The United States no longer considers itself competing for world hegemony—*it has it*. As has been repeatedly suggested, the United States 'won the Cold War' and is now the 'indispensable nation'.[99] A new identity, as the lone superpower, now pervades the policy making community. This identity is not constrained by the boundaries placed on Cold War America. As a result, the United States seeks to expand its interests in an effort to find some balance between its unrestrained national identity and its current capabilities. As Michael Klare argues, the resulting U.S. policy is "designed to monopolize those critical elements of military power that will enable U.S. forces to prevail on any imaginable battlefield, now and in the future."[100] Such a policy, of course, has a second component. "By the same token, this strategy holds that all other states must forever be barred from attaining a similar position of advantage."[101] A recent Joint Chiefs of Staff analysis makes clear the global parameters of this strategy. It advocates "full spectrum dominance—a capacity of U.S. forces... to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations... with access and freedom to operate in all domains—space, sea, land, air, and information."[102] Recognizing the indispensable nature of itself, the United States has successfully re-identified its purpose in international politics.

This new identity—unbounded by external constraints—is reflected in the expansion of the national interest. The United States now has 'military advisors' in more than seventy countries.[103] Military interventions have increased dramatically

since the end of the Cold War.[104] The United States now considers the territory of the vanquished to be in its national interest. This includes protecting the oil fields around the Caspian Sea, eradicating terrorism in Afghanistan and the former Soviet republics, partitioning the former Yugoslavia, and expanding NATO into Eastern Europe.[105]

The result of this unconstrained national identity—increasingly defined as victor of the Cold War and defender of the 'free world'—propels U.S. national interests closer into conflict with regional actors around the world. Moreover, as these regional actors are woefully inadequate as threats when considered alone, they must be grouped as a threatening force. Policy makers are required to group rogues in 'an Axis of Evil'. In addition, these policy makers have attempted to expand the antagonistic actors involved in terrorism.[106] The cultural cues represented in these actions should not be underestimated. By invoking the term 'axis', policy makers return the United States to its war against Germany, Italy, and Japan. By invoking the term 'evil', policy makers return the United States to its war against the Soviet Union. The result is a re-telling of the American fight against hostile and aggressive international forces. In terms of BMD advocacy, these policy makers claim American freedom of action will be deterred if the United States is incapable of defending against rogue missiles.[107] BMD becomes a necessary component of the American national interest. Without it, the United States is unable to protect and defend its other interests abroad—interests that are influenced by an identity that sees the United States as a "hegemonic stabilizer

of the system."[108] The challenge for political constructivists is to detail how this new national identity leads to an increased sense of insecurity.

Enhancing Security

Balancing the disparate political visions (and the corresponding policy directives) offered by realists and political constructivists, a more robust security analysis is possible. In terms of U.S. BMD deployment, this balance occurs when we recognize the realist concern for maintaining adequate capabilities and the political constructivist concern for understanding the role identities play in the articulation of foreign policies. Neither approach, on its own, can provide a comprehensive critique of the U.S. decision to deploy ballistic missile defenses. In this final section, I will examine how the alternative strategies posed by realists to enhance nuclear security (without recourse to BMD) are complemented by the critique offered by political constructivists. Realists have offered several alternatives to the deployment of BMD in an effort to make the United States more secure in the face of the nuclear threat. These solutions are intended to supplement (rather than undermine) the strategy of deterrence. I will discuss three issues that both enhance national security and work within a realist strategy: 1) an agreement to de-alert nuclear weapons, 2) practical programs to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, and 3) diplomatic efforts to deal with potential nuclear rogues.

First, in the event of an accidental nuclear attack, proponents of BMD technology argue that defenses can be effective. This possibility is most likely to occur among the established nuclear powers who have developed control systems that are sophisticated. For example, the deteriorating Russian system is thought to be prone to an accidental of inadvertent launch. Elsewhere, realists have countered that such a launch would most likely overwhelm any BMD system.[109] But, it is their solution to the problem of accidental launches that is important in the current discussion. Realists advocate a series of policy options that are both more effective and efficient than BMD. An international agreement to 'de-alert' nuclear missiles would provide both the United States and Russia (and any other nuclear power) with a cost-effective means of preventing an accidental firing while maintaining a cogent deterrent. "De-alerting would amount to de-mating, meaning the physical separation of missile warheads from launchers."[110]

However, a successful agreement would require the United States to accept a regime to monitor the status of de-alerted nuclear missiles. Such transparency is not necessarily a problem. Cooperation that enhances self-help security promotion is valuable.[111] As long as realists could be relatively assured that opposing nuclear missiles had been successfully de-alerted, the security of the United States could be considered enhanced. The problem for realists is appreciating the challenge posed by identity constructs. If policy makers in the United States continue to define the state as a global hegemon with unbounded freedom of action, it will be exceedingly difficult to

bind the United States to any international agreement—even if that agreement appears in the interest of the state. Understanding the necessity of re-constructing identities, political constructivism is a further requirement for a comprehensive analysis. Here, the challenge is not the more practical concern of developing a verifiable international mechanism, it is manipulating the identity calculation so that such a mechanism would be recognized as in the interest of the state. As Legro and Moravcsik note, the Bush administration seems to believe that "democracy promotion, economic integration, nonmilitary foreign aid, adherence to human rights, [and] multilateral cooperation"[112] are insignificant means of promoting the national interest. They conclude that the rhetoric of 'new realism', as it is employed by the Bush administration, is woefully naïve and simplistic. "Any policymaker who relies only on the 'realist' management of military power reveals a greater faith in simplistic theories than do academics."[113]

We might be even more discerning. The realists presented in this chapter challenge the merits of BMD because they are committed to enhancing national security and recognize the sub-optimal level that BMD provides. Military power (in this case the development and deployment of a robust missile defense system) is one way to enhance security. But, it is neither the only realist alternative nor always the most warranted. Successful management of security might also include arms control agreements, increased transparency, and cooperative strategies. When a state refuses to recognize these options on the grounds that they run counter to the unilateral nature of a global hegemon, it does so by increasing its own insecurity. The predetermined

consultations on BMD deployment with both allies and others (William Safire called it 'consultative unilateralism') has made the Bush administration appear both inflexible and uncooperative. Other states see in this behavior an unrestrained and unstoppable superpower. Consider a recent comment by Bush upon returning from meetings with European states concerned about BMD. "With all due modesty, I think Ronald Reagan would have been proud of how I conducted myself. I went to Europe a humble leader of a great country, and stood my ground. I wasn't going to yield."[114] Such comments have led Miller to argue that "open minds could easily conclude that they were dealing with a closed-minded administration whose only real aim is gaining acceptance for predetermined policies."[115]

Second, realists have also encouraged the promotion of practical programs to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.[116] This has included successful programs to remove nuclear weapons from several Soviet republics and secure potentially problematic Russian weapons. However, the Bush administration has cut the necessary funds for the latter program and seems uninterested in the proliferation issue.[117] It is unclear why the relatively low-cost program (with potentially high benefits) was considered an unattractive means to enhancing national security. Legro and Moravcsik claim the Bush administration is "skeptical of strategy and tactics not closely linked to military dominance."[118] If this is the case, it is hard to understand how realists might respond. If realists are correct to argue for policies that enhance national security in the most effective and efficient way, the behavior of policy

makers on this matter seems both foolish and dangerous. Again, we might consider what political constructivists might offer as a possible solution to this conundrum.

Political constructivism emphasizes how actors construct and re-construct their identities through their foreign policies. In this case, Bush administration policy makers construct and re-construct American might and unilateral prowess by dissuading use of policy alternatives that require cooperative utterances. Insecurity, it would seem, is a result of activities that compromise unilateralism. For political constructivists, this insecurity is ultimately alterable. Because state actors construct their worlds, it is incumbent upon social actors to reflect on their insecurity in the hopes of altering it. Such reflection is not simply a means to deeper self-awareness.[119] The reflexive component of politics is a requirement for a broader, more democratic existence.[120] Recognizing that cooperative programs can also enhance security, U.S. policy makers might come to alter an unrestrained political identity that tends toward acts of hubris.[121] As has been demonstrated elsewhere, the arrogant activities of great powers can undermine national security and leave a state less powerful than it might have been.[122]

Third, realists and others have attempted to improve U.S. nuclear security by employing diplomatic efforts to deal with potential nuclear rogues.[123] These diplomatic policies draw on realism's concern that states should discount ideological differences and concentrate on the material capabilities of others.[124] Rogues need not be destroyed militarily in order to enhance U.S. national security. In fact, a military solution to the

rogue threat seems costly and unwarranted. While realists have offered alternative strategies that emphasize less destructive means, they are constrained by their negative vision of international politics from offering a more comprehensive approach.

Political constructivists recognize the potential for multilateral cooperation to enhance national securities. In so doing, they provide this analysis with an assortment of tools that promote more secure relationships. By way of example, we might consider the recent dismissal by the Bush administration of attempts to reach an agreement with North Korea on their nuclear program. Legro and Moravcsik provide a succinct summary of this dismissal.

> Consider the quick quashing of a deal, all but reached by South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, for a far-reaching détente on the Korean peninsula, including significant restrictions on the North Korean nuclear program. Unfortunately, such a deal, designed to spur a positive evolution in North Korea's behavior, fit neither the [Bush] administration's reliance on military deterrence nor its justification for NMD.[125]

This example suggests that U.S. policy makers were unable to recognize that a change in the North Korean material interests could perpetuate a change in its antagonistic identity towards the United States (a point McSweeney emphasizes in his constructivist work above).[126] Further, policy makers were unwilling to reflect on the potential that their identity (in opposition to North Korea) might be unduly hostile and indicative of increased insecurity between the two states.

Each of the examples above demonstrates how a more pluralistic approach, one that balances the negative vision of realism with the positive potential of political

constructivism under an epistemological constructivist umbrella, offers a more comprehensive approach to security analysis. The goal of any security analysis is to find ways to improve and enhance national security. This discussion of unilateral BMD deployment demonstrates how a robust security policy cannot be constructed by relying solely on enhancements to material capabilities. Realism can offer a (necessary) critique of state policies that seek only to enhance capabilities without managing the overall security environment, but it is an incomplete tool because of its own bias towards a materialist ontology. Recourse to political constructivism provides a positive approach to overcoming the insecurity that exists in the cultural milieu. In the following chapter, a second topic will be explored. The recent expansion of the U.S. war on drugs represents a regional application of our security framework and demonstrates the necessity of balancing realism and political constructivism in an effort to enhance U.S. security.

Chapter Six: Creating Insecurity II: U.S. Policy Towards Colombia

As the above discussion concerning deterrence, national missile defense, and U.S. policy suggests, a more comprehensive security framework allows for an understanding of how the United States may indeed create its own insecurity in an attempt to manage perceived international threats. This chapter focuses on a regional issue—U.S. security policy toward Colombia—demonstrating how a similar form of analysis might be employed at a regional level to develop a more comprehensive understanding of a specific issue. The format developed in the previous chapter will be repeated in the analysis of this issue. First, I will discuss the historical roots of the current political situation in Colombia and how U.S policy has developed to manage these security concerns. Second, these policies will be analyzed from a realist perspective. As with chapter five, this section demonstrates the necessary but limited role that a realist interpretation of politics provides. Third, a political constructivist interpretation of U.S. policy will be explored. This section is intended to emphasize issues unavailable to the analyst employing realist principles. Finally, utilizing the security framework outlined in chapter four, the final section explores how a more effective analysis results from attempts to balance realist and political constructivist concerns.

Colombian History and U.S. Policy

The Colombian state has long been considered of strategic importance to the United States. At the turn of the last century, when Colombian intransigence stymied U.S. resolve to construct the Panama Canal, Washington policy makers found reason to foment rebellion in and support the independence of Panama. Throughout the Cold War, following the logic of NSC-68, "U.S. security was seen as inextricably linked to promotion of the private enterprise system and unobstructed U.S. access to Third World economies and raw materials."[1] As the Truman Administration would stress, "U.S. security is the objective of our world-wide foreign policy today," and "U.S. security is synonymous with hemisphere security."[2] Colombia, rich in petroleum and natural gas reserves, and strategically located between the Pacific and Caribbean, represented a key piece of this American grand design. By 1952, Colombia agreed to participate in a Mutual Defense Assistance Pact (MDAP) with the United States. In exchange for military assistance, the Colombian government would "facilitate the production and transfer... of... strategic materials required by the United States" and would cooperate with the United States in limiting trade with the Soviet Bloc.[3]

Consistently then, over the past century, the United States has claimed a security interest in its relationship with Colombia. During this same period, the complexities of Colombian internal politics have substantially complicated U.S. policy. With specific attention paid to issues that directly affect these policy developments,

this section examines the origins of the guerrilla insurgencies, the connection between the cocaine trade and guerrilla/paramilitary organizations, and the creation of interdiction and eradication initiatives to reduce the amount of illicit drugs leaving Colombia for the United States.

As noted above, the United States drew a parallel between access to strategic resources in Latin America and its ability to successfully wage a cold war against the Soviet Union. This overriding concern further required that the United States prevent leftist rebels from interfering with U.S. access to these materials and challenging the power of the state. By 1960, the Eisenhower administration "identified Castro's Cuba as the major source of danger in the Caribbean."[4] However, attention was also turned to "political movements in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Panama."[5] The peculiarities of the Colombian guerrilla movements require special attention. These movements are an outgrowth of struggles over land reform and access to political power.

While the origins of guerrilla movements stretch back to the early 1920s, our study focuses on their rapid growth during the early years of the Cold War.[6] The simultaneous introduction of U.S. military aid and the successful coup of General Rojas Pinilla in 1953 created an atmosphere of increased hostility and political unrest. Rojas Pinilla's dictatorial rule emphasized the armed suppression of frequent political protests (using MDAP weapons)[7] and caused disparate excluded groups to band together. Between 1955 and 1957, communist and 'common liberal' guerrillas formed

alliances and created "Independent Republics" in rural portions of Colombia.[8] After the Rojas Pinilla regime and the subsequent formation of the *National Front* (a power-sharing arrangement between the Liberal and Conservative Parties that denied other political groups and parties access to the legislative process) the government of Colombia turned its attention to eradicating these "Independent Republics" and the outlawed political groups they contained. In 1964, the Colombian military, with the assistance of the U.S. military,[9] bombed the town of Marquetalia and the surrounding populations (of south-central Colombia) in an effort to eliminate these separatist regions. Owing again to Cold War politics, the U.S. military seized this opportunity to hone its skills in the use of napalm.[10] Government offensives, however, were unable to defeat the guerrilla movements, which, later that year, mobilize as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Also in the 1960s, two other major guerrilla movements form, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the People's Liberation Army (EPL).[11] By 1970, the situation in Colombia was tense but stable. Neither the Colombian armed forces nor the disparate guerrilla groups had the resources to achieve a military victory. As LeoGrande and Sharpe note, "Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Colombia's guerrilla wars were low-intensity affairs. None of the half-dozen guerrilla groups (which operated independently) could seriously challenge the armed forces for control of the state, but neither could the armed forces defeat the guerrillas, especially those with a well-established rural base."[12]

With a political solution to rural poverty and inequality stymied by the exclusionary politics of Liberal/Conservative collusion, peasants and marginalized workers in Colombia seized upon the growing international demand for illicit drugs to supplement their incomes. In effect, an extralegal economic solution became a substitute for political reform. The growth of the drug trade and its origins in the political issues that initiated the rise of guerrilla movements further demonstrate how external political and market forces (largely from the United States) influenced the internal political and economic atmosphere of Colombia.

Colombia's participation in the international drug trade was inconsequential throughout much of the Twentieth Century. Only after drug use in the United States rose dramatically in the mid-1960s did Colombia begin to export large quantities of illicit drugs. While "Colombian marijuana production mushroomed in the middle and late 1960s as a result of growing U.S. demand,"[13] it was not until the early to mid-1970s that the "epicenter of marijuana production in the hemisphere shifted to Colombia."[14] In an early example of the 'balloon effect',[15] U.S. efforts to eradicate the marijuana industry in Mexico resulted in beneficial market entry for Colombian growers and traffickers.

> By the end of the 1970s Colombia accounted for some 70 percent of the marijuana reaching the United States from abroad. Between 30,000 and 50,000 small farmers along Colombia's Atlantic coast came to depend directly on marijuana cultivation for their livelihood, while at least another 50,000 (seasonal pickers, transporters, guards, bankers, and such) made some part of their living from it.[16]

Similarly, and again as a result of international market forces, Colombian entry into the cocaine market was a consequence of increased U.S. consumer demand during the mid-1970s as well as U.S.-led marijuana eradication programs during the same period. During the Carter and Reagan administrations, increased awareness of a domestic drug problem resulted in more aggressive U.S.-led interdiction and eradication campaigns in the 'source' Andean countries. In the late 1970s, the United States and the Colombian military cooperated in the eradication of the Colombian marijuana trade (mainly in the northern 'Guajira' region along the Atlantic Coast). However, these eradication efforts would presage myriad problems with the militarization of drug policy. Important for our consideration, these eradication efforts came at a high cost to the local population. In addition, "to the extent that enforcement efforts in the Guajira were successful, they tended merely to displace drug cultivation and transport activities to other parts of the country, such as the Eastern Plains and the Amazonian jungle, rather than eliminating them."[17] This seemingly mundane example of a domestic 'balloon effect' would have lasting consequences for Colombia. Pushing the drug trade south and east meant pushing drug cultivation into areas protected by the largest guerrilla movements. In addition, by directly involving large components of the Colombian military, police, and judicial agencies on the front lines of the 'drug war', the United States involved these government agencies in activities susceptible to corruption.[18]

Shortly after the marijuana eradication efforts in Colombia, U.S. coca eradication programs in Peru and Bolivia hastened the development of sophisticated coca-processing plants inside Colombia and turned significant tracts of rural acreage within Colombia into coca cultivation regions. These eradication efforts demonstrate the further militarization of U.S. drug policy. Following the 1986 signing of National Security Decision Directive No. 221, "which identified drugs as a threat to the United States and, by implication, hemispheric security,"[19] U.S. eradication and interdiction programs increased in frequency and became more invasive. As a paradigmatic case, Operation Blast Furnace demonstrates how U.S. and Andean militaries were to work together in the eradication effort. Constructed by U.S. embassy officials in La Paz, Bolivia as early as 1985, the joint U.S.-Bolivian counternarcotics effort known as 'Operation Blast Furnace' was launched in July of 1986. Supplied with U.S. Black Hawk helicopters and 160 U.S. troops,[20] special Bolivian police units entered the 'Chapare' region of Bolivia in an effort to destroy coca production facilities and eradicate large tracts of coca plants.

> Blast Furnace pursued three objectives. First, cocaine-processing laboratories in the Beni region would be closed down. Second, this action would disrupt cocaine processing and consequently reduce the demand for coca leaves. Third, the price of coca leaves would fall below production prices thus forcing peasants to turn to crop substitution programs.[21]

Unfortunately, except for undermining the Bolivian constitution,[22] invigorating anti-American protests throughout the region, and reducing the short-term price of the

coca leaf, Operation Blast Furnace was largely ineffective. "As soon as the U.S. troops left... the price of coca leaves jumped back to pre-Blast Furnace levels." Additionally, "the total hectarage under cultivation increased concomitantly over the next three years."[23] Another unintended consequence of Blast Furnace (and similar operations in Peru including 'Operation Verde Mar' and 'Operation Condor' as well as the broader Andean initiative 'Operation Snowcap')[24] was the regional 'balloon effect.' While Colombia had been a transport center for the cocaine trade, U.S. eradication and interdiction policies in Peru and Bolivia pushed coca cultivation further into remote regions of Colombia.

Pressure by the United States on the Colombian government to dismantle the cocaine transportation networks further complicated the eroding political and economic situation in the country. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. efforts focused on eliminating the 'narcotrafficking' cartels in Medellin and Cali. While the U.S. and Colombian effort to dismantle these cartels was largely successful, the resulting effects on the cocaine industry demonstrated how U.S. policy designs were inadequate and incomplete. LeoGrande and Sharpe summarize the point nicely when arguing that "smashing the cartels did not reduce the flow of drugs. It simply changed the structure of the industry, creating space in the market for many new small and intermediate producers."[25] In addition, having pushed coca cultivation and cocaine production into rural Colombia, U.S. policy demonstrably increased the strength of the leftist guerrilla groups. The FARC, for instance, grew from a force of barely 3,000 in

1985 to a force of between 16,000 and 20,000 by 2000.[26] Most devastating, however, the disparate right-wing death squads—remnants of the Conservative Party's campaign to prevent land reform efforts in the 1940s—used their newly gained access to drug trafficking to finance increasingly brutal attacks on peasants in rural areas. In 1995, Carlos Castano officially brings many of these groups together as the Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC). The resulting right-wing paramilitary offensives against FARC-controlled coca cultivation areas in the south as well as the solidification of AUC regions in the north dramatically increased political violence and further destabilized efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the political crises.[27]

As Cold War hostilities gave way to the complexities of the post-Cold War world, U.S. eradication and interdiction policy changed little. The Bush Administration (1989-1993) created the Andean Drug Strategy in 1990 as a response to concerns that military strategies could not be effective unless they could be coordinated at a regional level (a weak policy response to the seemingly law-like balloon effect). Quixotically, recognizing the limitations of a predominantly military response to the illicit drug trade, the Bush administration actually *increased* militarization. Military aid to Colombia, already on the increase during the Reagan administration, increased to $500 million between 1989 and 1993.[28] Increased militarization occurred, as well, during the Clinton Administration, which supplied Colombia with over $1 billion prior to 2000. So, too, did the ineffective nature of the military response to coca cultivation and cocaine production in the Andean region. As a result, U.S. and Colombian officials

found it necessary to unveil 'Plan Colombia', a $1.3 billion three-year anti-drug initiative that emphasizes further military means to eradicating and interdicting illegal drugs. Rather than the final offensive in the war on drugs, Plan Colombia represents the dire situation present in Colombia at the turn of this century. As Walker notes, "Plan Colombia cannot be understood, let alone implemented, in isolation from the totality of the situation in Colombia. In spring 2001, even before a significant infusion of Plan Colombia aid had begun, the country was facing an unemployment rate of approximately 20%; as much as 40% of the countryside was not fully in government hands."[29] Since Colombia covers a land mass about the size of Texas and California combined, it is not unrealistic to contend that by the end of the century, Colombia was a failed state.[30] Further evidence for such consideration is supplied by the fact that as a direct result of the drug war,

> [the] internal migration of perhaps two million people, better characterized as dislocation if not exile, was exceeded only in Sudan and Angola. Human flight of the privileged classes, with its attendant and burgeoning capital flight, to North America and Europe was continuing apace; and foreign investors were growing more reluctant by the day to continue business as usual.[31]

The history of U.S. security policy towards Colombia over the past sixty years demonstrates an attempt to fit Colombia into a 'national security' paradigm constructed during the Cold War and re-tooled as a reaction to social problems in the United States. Three issues, in particular, largely define the nature of U.S. policy proposals and programs. First, the United States has consistently sought to externalize

domestic considerations. During the Cold War the United States placed Colombian insurgencies in the context of East/West issues. Doing so, the specific political dynamics of U.S/Soviet relations were externalized to the South. In the case of Colombia, the domestic conflict between an elite-controlled government and predominantly rural guerrilla movements was envisioned as a micro-example of the macro-Cold War. As well, the United States externalized its domestic social and political problems involving illicit drug use. Unable or unwilling to deal with the domestic demand side, the United States found 'the problem' to be located in an external environment- the source countries of the Andean Region.

Second, the United States has consistently endeavored to define its policy problems by recourse to increased militarization. Repeatedly during the Cold War, the United States aided the Colombian military in its war against leftist insurgents. These policies often antagonized actors involved in the conflicts and reduced the effectiveness of already fragile Colombian institutions. Likewise, as the demand for drugs increased beginning in the 1970s, the U.S. responded with military assistance and intervention in these 'source' countries.

Third, U.S. policy makers have often given confusing and contradictory statements when attempting to distinguish between policies intended to combat guerrilla insurgencies and those intended to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. While social scientists rarely take policy makers at their word, just how confused the policy directives become during the latter part of the Cold War suggests how the policies of

the Cold War merged with the policies of the drug war. During the Reagan-era Cold War, Elliott Abrams and other high-ranking officials were explicit in making a link between the war on drugs and the war against leftist insurgents. In early 1987, Abrams would argue before Congress that "MAP funds for Colombia strengthen the government's antinarcotics programs and at the same time assist it in dealing with the increasingly violent insurgents who have rejected the government's peace initiatives."[32] Similarly, Barry McCaffrey, drug czar during the Clinton Administration and former U.S. commander of SOUTHCOM, has argued that "Colombia is losing the drug war because it cannot eradicate coca in the areas under guerrilla control, and it is losing the guerrilla war because the Colombian armed forces are out-gunned by insurgents flush with the 'taxes' they collect from coca growers."[33] In this way, McCaffrey insists that Plan Colombia is the answer to the 'twin ills' that afflict the country. However, Plan Colombia has been advertised as a comprehensive plan to eradicate and interdict drugs—not a counterinsurgency initiative.[34] Indeed, its approval by Congress required that the executive branch significantly separate the two issues.[35] Yet, to add to the confusion, the United States and the Colombian military have pushed for and begun the eradication of coca cultivation areas in the south of Colombia- regions controlled by the FARC- instead of the eradication of the larger and more integrated fields of northern Colombia- regions controlled by the right-wing AUC. Moreover, in the present context, and after the events of September 11, the drug/leftist insurgency connection has become mired in the language of the war against terrorism. While

officials as early as the first Bush administration used the rhetoric of 'terrorism' to define the activities of the FARC[36] such language now takes on added significance. In a recent article, Russell Crandall notes that, "following the terrorist attacks on United States soil, the taboo against counterinsurgency assistance has vanished."[37] Linking FARC rebels to coca cultivation in regions controlled by this group and further labeling them 'terrorists' lends *official* legitimacy to counterinsurgency campaigns that have been unpopular since the Vietnam era. Perhaps most importantly, it also renders the stated 'separateness' of the guerrilla and drug issues irrelevant.

If this brief history of Colombia and the corresponding U.S. security policies created to manage it suggest anything, it is that further analysis is required in order to understand and critique the current 'drug war'. In the following section, I will explore how realism might be employed to analyze the this war on drugs. As with the previous chapter, this section demonstrates how the traditional approach to security studies offers only a limited understanding of a complex issue.

Realism and the War on Drugs

A realist interpretation of the security concerns surrounding national missile defense, in the previous chapter, demonstrated a fundamentally comfortable policy discussion for realism. Ballistic Missile Defense is a paradigmatic example of realism's emphasis on 'high politics'.[38] Moreover, BMD is a material response to external threats—an other's destructive capability and will to harm. In addition, due to steep

entry barriers, only the most sophisticated of *states* could attempt construction of such a system—once again playing to realism's prejudicial interest in both state-centric analysis and Great Power politics.

Such limiting factors are not present in U.S. security concerns with the Colombian drug trade. While 'illicit drugs' can be defined as an external danger to U.S. security, their depiction as a 'capability' harnessed by an 'enemy' desiring to harm the United States is inadequate. As the issue involves a danger to the social fabric rather than a military weapon, it tends to represent a matter of 'low politics' beyond the immediate purview of realist thought. As it involves both sub-state actors and a relatively weak 'Southern' state, the issue of the Colombian drug trade also seems to be of marginal direct interest to a realist interpretation.

This caveat is entered as a factor complicating a realist interpretation of the drug war rather than a factor disabling such an interpretation. For, even though realism seems conceptually out of place in discussing the illicit drug trade, the securitizing influence of pertinent political actors has significantly raised the issue from one of 'low politics' to one of 'high politics'. Security issues do not exist independent of the actors that create them. To repeat, the focus of our 'epistemological constructivist' framework is to note how security issues emerge when pertinent 'gatekeepers' label them such and are accepted by the broader society. Within this framework, then, realism plays the role of the 'cautious paranoid'. This section outlines how a realist interpretation might conceptualize the threat from 'illicit drugs'., I will demonstrate

the policy options that would likely follow from a realist reading of the issue and analyze how the likely result of such policies effects the overall security of the United States.

As noted, the complexities of the drug issue complicate attempts to construct a realist understanding of 'threat'. Rather than considering illicit drugs to be a threat to U.S. national security, we must first alter the discussion slightly in order to more accurately discuss them as 'dangers'.[39] In this way, illicit drug use is closer in kind to global warming, ozone depletion, or declining food supplies. These issues challenge a state's long-term survival. Their consequences for national insecurity result from their deleterious effects on population health and social cohesion rather than the intentional destruction of the state by an enemy using capabilities constructed for this specific purpose.

Redefined as an existential danger to U.S. national security, cocaine might still be envisioned by realists as an external 'source' problem rather than a social-ill. This fits with the materialist ontology and empirical epistemology common to realism and outlined in chapter two. In this way, the effects of cocaine use in the United States can be measured in higher crime rates, lost productivity, premature mortality, etc. The issue represents one of the Sprouts' 'functional limitations' on a state power.[40]

It is important to consider such conditions in light of the somewhat pessimistic viewpoint of the 'cautious paranoid'. This description of the Colombian drug trade represents the negative potential of what *might* occur if the drug issue is not

adequately addressed by the state. This negative vision is a requirement for the state if an appropriate policy response is to be constructed. The 'cautious paranoid', limited by a world-view defined by anarchical relations between states, must implore the state to recognize how illicit drug use could undermine the social fabric of the state, thus weakening its external capabilities. At its worst, this event could embolden sub-state actors further weakening state power. Declining productivity and increased government expenditures to manage rampant social-ills would lead to diminished state resources for implementing adequate defensive capabilities against external threats. Thus, it is possible to construct a pessimistic scenario whereby undeterred drug use gives way to state incapacity and decline.

Having developed such a scenario, the realist might likely respond with a policy proposal appropriate for managing this perceived insecurity. Further drawing on a materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology, and following from realism's bias towards viewing threats/dangers external to the state, realist policy direction would focus on source country production of the illicit drugs—measuring the production capacities, interdiction rates, and acreage fumigated. A quasi-war could likely be constructed. Producers, traffickers, and (most importantly) those that protect these groups might be defined as enemies intent on harming the U.S. population and, by default, U.S. national security interests.[41]

Considering the potential harm to U.S. interests and the construction of an 'enemy', realists might contemplate how to bring to bear the power of the United

States against that enemy. Given realism's proclivity to define power in military terms, it seems likely that once a national security danger *has been clearly envisioned*, realists would develop policy proposals similar to those of the United States. Certainly, this would be the focus of what Alan Gilbert has termed 'official realism'—a version of realism that remains an apologist for state power and disengages from moral thinking.[42]

However, I would like to concentrate on this matter of a "clearly envisioned national security danger." A more sophisticated reading of realism, one that recognizes the requirements of a just policy[43] would challenge the policy maker's invocation of drugs as a national security problem. Realists have been loathe to introduce low politics issues into the pantheon of security concerns. This can have a demonstrably democratic effect. By leaving low politics concerns to the arena of public debate, realism maintains a space for healthy political discourse free from the constraints of the security dilemma. Global warming, ozone depletion, immigration policy, *and* drug use come to be seen as domestic political concerns requiring domestic political solutions rather than issues to be determined by the requirements of a state-in-anarchy.

In addition, even when low politics issues achieve security status, realists insist on pursuing the national interest reasonably and rationally defined.[44] It seems unlikely that realists could coherently conceptualize the relatively meager resources of the 'narcoguerrillas' as a threat to the national interest of the United States. On this account, realist policy would likely challenge the state view. Drugs would either be

challenged as to their status as a threat or be discounted as a weak threat incapable of diminishing U.S. power.

But, I suggest this more sophisticated rendering of a realist interpretation puts the realists on the horns of a dilemma and demonstrates realism's incomplete approach to national security analysis. Either realists must challenge the claim that the Colombian drug trade is a legitimate security issue or, given their military bias, they must conceptualize a response to the drug trade similar to that of the state. If they choose the first option, they risk becoming irrelevant. Realism claims to be a theoretical approach to understanding international politics. If realists argue that the war on drugs is an insufficient national security problem and thereby return the issue to the domestic scene, they lose the ability to participate in the drug debate *as realists*. Their emphasis on international relations precludes their analysis of a domestic social-ill. Developed in this way, realism is unimportant as a policy tool to solve the drug problem.

On the other hand, if realists seek to agree with the state policy making claim that the Colombian drug trade is a security issue, their theoretical focus (on military concerns) and their metatheoretical focus (a materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology) limit their policy initiatives to those quite similar to those of the state. As a result, realism slides back into its traditional role as an apparent apologist for state-centric military/security policy and risks losing much of its analytic rigor.

What does remain—and this seems a necessary but highly incomplete component—is realism's ability to measure the success of state policy by recourse to its own theoretical conditions. Realism is well-suited to arguing that 1) because drug use continues (with only modest declines), 2) the street price for cocaine has actually gone down, and 3) coca cultivation has increased in the source countries, the state policy initiatives have been decidedly ineffective. We might return to this discussion below when examining how to construct a more comprehensive analysis.

Just the same, the point I wish to emphasize is that this dilemma demonstrates the incomplete role that realism plays in the investigation and analysis of national security concerns. As an analytic device, realism presents a necessarily negative vision of the calamities that *might* befall the state. It also provides a means to measure whether policies are successful in combating the effects of this negative vision. However, if we are to develop a more robust analysis, the realist interpretation must be supplemented by an all-together different vision of international politics.

Political Constructivism and the War on Drugs

A different set of questions engage those scholars working in the political constructivist tradition. Rather than focusing on the material environment that makes up the U.S.-Andean drug trade, political constructivists might begin an investigation of the drug war by investigating how U.S. collective identity is reflected in its Andean policies. For example, the language employed to define the policy problem is

inherently political and demonstrates how U.S. cultural practices are reinforced and re-produced in the policies proposed. In a review of this language as it applies to the drug war, Tokatlian explores the extent of these cultural practices. First, he argues that much like the vehement *anti-communist* rhetoric that prevailed during the Cold War, drug use "produced a broad consensus as to its origins."[45] And, like communism, the drug problem "comes from abroad, whether or not as the result of a conspiracy to undermine the foundations of U.S. society."[46] Even in the early years of Cold War drug policy, U.S. officials have emphasized its external origins. This act is reproduced in popular culture as well. The villains in the popular 1980s television drama, *Miami Vice*, are Latin American drug runners in fast-moving cigar boats penetrating the sovereign waters of south Florida. Colombian drug lords directly challenge Tom Clancy's protagonist, Jack Ryan, in the both novel and film *Clear and Present Danger*. Similarly, drug traffickers threaten the U.S. Drug Czar's family in the film *Traffic*.

The emergence of a specific sociological language further reinforces the perception that the 'evil' exists outside U.S. cultural and political boundaries. "Such is the case with the term *drug trafficking*, which suggests the external dimension of the issue: i.e., that the core of the problem is the *traffic in* and transport of drugs, rather than their consumption."[47] The attempt to externalize the drug problem reached a frenetic state in the late 1980s. In 1988, a House bill required President Reagan to

order the U.S. military to "seal the borders to drug smugglers" and to "substantially halt' the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States within 45 days."[48]

At its most sophisticated, the externalization of the drug threat is coupled with the threat of communism. Before a Senate hearing in 1984, U.S. Customs Commissioner William Von Rabb gives voice to the 'narcoguerrilla' theory. "Drugs have become the natural ally of those that would choose to destroy democratic societies in our hemisphere through violent means."[49] Alleging that (*communist*) Cuba and Nicaragua were financing insurgent revolutions throughout Latin America with drug money, Von Rabb reproduced Cold War anti-communist ideology in the new fight against illicit drugs. Similarly, Elliott Abram's comments above suggesting the FARC connection to drugs paints these rebels as drug traffickers intent on creating, in Rep. Benjamin Gilman's words, a "narco-state' just three hours by plane from Miami."[50]

Moreover, as Cold War hostilities began to ebb, military planners (especially those in SOUTHCOM) came to see the challenge of illicit drugs as a replacement for the challenge posed by communist guerrillas.

> For the U.S. military, the drug war served as a rationale, not only to maintain but to expand military-to-military relations across the hemisphere, and ensure a U.S. troop presence through a variety of counter-narcotics training programs and joint operations. Defining the problem as a narcoguerrilla threat... allowed the U.S. military to employ the same low-intensity conflict strategies they had used in fighting Communism.[51]

In each case, the discourse that emerges places the problem beyond the United States. Drugs come to be seen as a 'threat' in the same way that Soviet ICBMs were during the Cold War. Similarly, the drug trafficker becomes analogous to the soldier in the Red Army. Both the capability (drugs/ICBMs) and the willing agent (trafficker/communist soldier) are present in the resulting national security issue.

Second, Tokatlian emphasizes how the perception of drugs as an external evil quickly translated into policy proposals and initiatives following a "politico/strategic logic." "This logic discards the underlying economic-commercial basis of the traffic and emphasizes a language high in moral content in order to wage a 'war on drugs."[52] As a 'civilizing crusade' the war on drugs reproduces and reinforces a particular strain of American political culture.[53] It is not unwarranted to argue that the drug war is another moral crusade like previous crusades exporting Christian values, outlawing gambling, and prohibiting alcohol consumption.[54]

Perhaps most powerful, the moral content of the policies developed to stop the drug trade suggest that drug traffickers are not simply targeting Americans, but are targeting *innocent* Americans. Claims that 'our children' are at risk and 'America's future' is being compromised strengthen the purpose of U.S. policy and perpetuate an image of the United States as good, pure, and innocent. When George W. Bush claims that drugs rob Americans of their "innocence, and ambition, and hope,"[55] he not only signals the need to respond to this external problem, he also reproduces the capitalist ideology of a hard-working, industrious, and energetic America.

Third, Tokatlian argues that when the U.S. perceives the danger of drugs as emanating from abroad and representing a destructive force, then "its logic suggests that it wage war on the 'source."[56]Here, Tokatlian recognizes how the 'war on drugs' becomes the only 'appropriate' policy for a society being threatened by an external existential force.

> the concept of war demands that the predominant instruments should be of a coercive-repressive nature. In this logic, there is no room for the suggestion that demand may be generating that supply. Consequently, not only is the commercial-financial aspect of the drug traffic concealed (or ignored, depending on your point of view), but a clear political objective is revealed" e.g., to transfer the costs of the war to the countries where the illegal drugs are cultivated, produced and processed.[57]

For a state founded on political liberty and limited government interference, a domestic war on drugs would be both unpopular and potentially destabilizing. It is not surprising that domestic legislation to fight this war seeks to limit its negative consequences by targeting already marginalized groups thus reducing domestic strife while simultaneously demonizing groups already suspect in the minds of the dominant political constituency.[58] Stronger prison sentences for 'crack cocaine' possession (common among African-Americans because of its cheaper market price) are meted out than for similar amounts of cocaine powder possession.[59]

The long-term effects of drug legislation on American politics are striking but limited to marginalized groups, leaving political institutions in the control of groups perpetuating mainstream cultural values. "For African-American men between the ages

of 20 and 29, almost one in three are currently under the thumb of the criminal justice system."[60] The racial bias of domestic drug incarcerations reaffirms the nativist impulse in the United States to define others as threatening to the self. As with Japanese internment during WWII and post-September 11 incarcerations of Arab-Americans, the African-American male has become the domestic source of insecurity.

> African-Americans do not use drugs more than white people; whites and blacks use drugs at almost exactly the same rates. And since there are five times as many whites as blacks in the United States, it follows that the overwhelming majority of drug users are white. Nevertheless, African-Americans are admitted to state prisons at a rate that is 13.4 times greater than whites, a disparity driven largely by the grossly racial targeting of drug laws. In some states, even outside the old Confederacy, blacks make up 90% of drug prisoners and are up to 57 times more likely than whites to be incarcerated for drug crimes.[61]

The purpose of these laws seems to be as much about retaining the perception of an innocent America under attack as it is about incarceration. By limiting the domestic problems of illicit drugs to a predominantly African-American male core group, the United States seems able to focus on drugs as a security threat rather than a social problem. By understanding the drug threat as emanating from external drug traffickers and domestic African-American males, it is possible to avoid direct discussion of the economic features of the drug trade. Tokatlian cogently summarizes this point.

> To define the problem as an economic one of demand and consumption would mean that the consuming countries would have to become the site of stronger, more repressive measures. In the United States, implementing such measures would carry undesirable social costs, infringing upon established civil liberties and rights and, possibly, leading to social conflict. Imposition of draconian measures, in order to

> transfer the battle from the foreign to the domestic front, is a dismaying prospect. Such measures would also imply an increase in control over the domestic financial establishment, which would interfere with and upset powerful political and economic interests at home.[62]

More striking still, an economic analysis of the illicit drug trade would emphasize issues that directly question the merit of U.S. government policies. These issues remain largely outside a realist analysis of the drug problem because of realism's tendency towards military/strategic analysis. Political constructivists, however, are not so limited. Their emphasis is on reflection and critique—and when attention is turned to an economic critique, the resulting analysis undermines much of the official position. Consider that, "while spending on eradication and interdiction programs has grown from a few million dollars in the early 1970s to billions annually today, the street price of a pure gram of cocaine has dropped from $1,400 to under $200 during that time."[63] While the political process seems to require more money to be spent on foreign eradication and interdiction, the structure of the market "invariably thwarts Washington's best efforts to suppress supply."[64] "Drugs are so cheap to produce, the barriers to entry are so low, and the potential profits are so enormous that market forces invariably attract willing growers, producers, and traffickers."[65] A brief synopsis of the economics of the Colombian cocaine trade illustrates the near futility of U.S. policy to date.

> Even if the United States could significantly cut coca acreage, the market structure for cocaine would undermine the drug war in another way. Most of the markup on drugs occurs after they enter the United States; the actual costs of growing and processing illegal drugs abroad are a tiny fraction of their street price. In 1997, the price of the coca

> leaf needed to make a pure kilo of cocaine was $300. Refined and ready for export from Colombia, it was worth $1,050. The cost of smuggling that kilo into the United States raised its price in Miami to $20,000, and black market distribution costs raised its retail price in Chicago to $188,000. This means that even an incredibly successful crop eradication program that tripled the price of coca leaf to $900 would raise retail prices in the United States imperceptibly.[66]

Reflecting on these factors, political constructivists uncover hidden discourses and challenge dominant ideologies. Re-examining how policies come to reflect dominant cultural patterns and reproduce bounded identities, the critique that emerges from a reading by political constructivists invites policy makers and analysts to challenge assumed practices.

Political constructivists would challenge the official version of the war on drugs and question whether the purpose of U.S. policy is eradication or whether "the purpose of the drug war is war itself."[67] If they are correct to consider it the latter, then "the goal has not been to stamp out drugs per se, but to create a war-time atmosphere of hysteria in which the government would feel justified in using extraordinary measures to counter an extraordinary threat."[68] By transferring from a communist other to a drug-trafficking other, a seamless and unreflective transition has occurred between Cold War U.S. security policy and post-Cold War policy. Maintaining a national identity as a consequence of external threats, the United States re-produces its own cultural proclivities for waging moral crusades in the form of wars against foreign enemies.

It is the very act of challenging current policies that points the way forward for political constructivists. Re-examination and reflection ultimately result in re-conceptualization and re-formulation. For state actors and social scientists this seems a distortion of the policy making process. Set against a linear problem-solving model, policy implementation is a means to an end. Constant critique and re-evaluation place the analyst in an infinite regress unable to move to policy resolution. Yet this assertion need not be considered the only possibility. Reflection is an inherently political act. On this point, Campbell is correct. In order to live a more democratic life, constant critique is a necessary addendum to proper policy development.

Moreover, the purpose of this project is to develop a more robust framework for analyzing the sources of insecurity. At a practical level, then, any distortion in the traditional policy making model is more than compensated for by the enhanced understanding achieved when balancing realist and political constructivist interpretations of the security implications of the drug war. If the purpose of the state is to enhance security, then it seems appropriate to consider the security analyst as the individual charged with informing others as to the merits of that state's security policy.

Enhancing Security

Balancing the disparate political visions offered by realists and political constructivists (and their corresponding policy directives), a more robust security analysis is possible. In terms of U.S. drug policy, this balance recognizes that we

engage the realist concern for the potential for drug use to diminish state power.[69] While reduced U.S. capabilities from Colombian drugs seems to be an excessively paranoid vision given the practical limitations on the trafficking of illicit drugs and the size and scope of both the U.S. population and economy, prudent state agents are required to recognize their theoretical potential for harm.

In addition, realism's tendency to focus on defining a (material) problem and offering a (material) solution supplies a policy analysis with a necessary practical grounding. International crises occur in real-time. States require policy responses that can be constructed rapidly and lend themselves to a construction appropriate for the technological and bureaucratic tools available. In the case of the war on drugs, measurement of the absolute and relative capabilities of the Colombian drug community is an integral part of a broader analysis. Moreover, a realist analysis of state policies *so far* in the drug war seems an invaluable addition. As noted, the inability of the United States to demonstrate any real success in the war on drugs suggests that valuable resources are being misapplied. Realists are wary of any ill-conceived policy that expends limited resources on an initiative of questionable merit.

More than anything, a realist inquiry highlights the insufficiency of U.S. policy. By focusing on the state-initiated problem in the source country, realism articulates the shortcomings of that policy. However, realism does not provide a solution to state insecurity; nor is its assessment of the problem complete. The addition of a political constructivist approach more completely tells the story of the drug war. Its emphasis

on how actors construct and re-construct their identities through foreign policies locates insecurity in the cultural milieu rather than the external environment. More to the point, it locates enhancements to security in this same cultural milieu. If insecurity is a result of identity performances, then (owing to the social construction of our world) it is incumbent on social actors to reflect on their insecurity in the hopes of altering it. Of course, this does not mean that 'thinking' about a more secure world creates one. The environment in which actors exist makes certain constructions more likely than others.[70] Drug use has very real and tangible negative consequences and these need to be addressed in the security calculus. But political constructivists are in a good position to address particular alternatives to the current construction of the problem.

The introduction of market explanations demonstrates two important elements overlooked by a realist analysis of the drug war. First, large groups of Colombians are reliant on selling coca leaves in order to survive. Their 'ontological security', to use McSweeney's term, is tied to their ability to sell coca leaf to the myriad small-time producers throughout Colombia. Having been marginalized by the 'legitimate' political process, large segments of the rural population find it necessary to engage in this illicit cultivation. It is not uncommon for the small farmers to argue "What's the point of planting yucca if nobody will buy it? At least with coca I make just enough to feed the family."[71] The identities of these marginalized groups (as *outlaw* coca farmers) is connected to their material interests (survival) in coca cultivation. Changing those

interests would consequently change their identities. This, in turn, would enhance U.S. national security by removing the market incentives now present to grow coca.

However, altering current interests would mean finding a solution to poverty in Colombia. A stronger U.S. foreign/security policy would pressure the government to take the peace process seriously and forego trying to win the political fight through a military victory. A 'democratic' and economic system that marginalizes large segments of civil society and distributes land and other forms of wealth unequally, does not constitute an environment conducive to U.S. security interests. Such a system constrains the choices for marginalized groups. Their ability to achieve basic ontological security is severely compromised.[72]

Moreover, as U.S./Colombian initiatives result in further disruption to these marginalized groups they are pushed deeper into unpopulated regions of Colombia. Their survival-choices become even more constrained. At this point, peasant economic interests converge with the political interests of both guerrilla and paramilitary groups. These groups come to represent the only possible protection for coca-producing farmers—and their collective interest is *protection from* the state (and United States). In a very real way, U.S. policy and Colombian strategies make it inevitable that coca farmers define their interests in opposition to these governments. This analysis suggests that not only is U.S. policy ineffective, it is also counter-productive. U.S. policy creates insecurity. The eradication of coca plants actually increases the incentives for market entry and strengthens the position of extra-legal armed political

movements. Thus, political constructivists counter state policy initiatives arguing that alleviating rural poverty through democratic reforms and micro-development assistance is actually a *stronger* security tool than current eradication and interdiction efforts.

Second, a political constructivist analysis of the drug war also questions U.S. identity performances and the interests they engender. By demanding that a critique of U.S. cultural practices ensue which challenges the drug war as a foreign war and suggest its domestic importance in defining an 'other', political constructivists reflect on how the drug war reinforces racism and the negative effects of capitalism at home. By transferring the domestic effects of the drug war onto a predominantly poor African-American sector of the population, U.S. society is able to define drugs as something existing on the 'outside', harming a cultural constituency that is largely 'innocent'.

This reflective activity is more than a passive study in cultural attitudes. Political constructivists are insistent that they play an active role in the political process—the object of their study. They challenge the policy maker to answer for domestic poverty and the concomitant racism that reaffirms it. The same measures that go into alleviating poverty abroad become possible solutions to the domestic-side of the drug war. More to the point, the activities of the political constructivists demand a constant form of critique in order to construct a more democratic existence where

marginalized groups are given opportunities to participate in political and economic reforms.[73]

On both points, political constructivists offer radical solutions to the problems of illicit drug production and use. Their analytic character results from a different form of inquiry than that of realism. Uncovering the relationship between contingent identities and interests becomes a central feature of a more robust understanding of the drug issue. By doing so, political constructivists demand more of the state than realists. Yet, after these alternative programs have been developed, a return to realism is once again necessary. Realism offers the policy maker an opportunity to measure the level of security possessed by the state. If the alternative policy strategies required by political constructivists are effective, they will result in an enhanced security arrangement for the United States and Colombia. And, realism will attest to this improved security environment.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This project has endeavored to bring together two seemingly contradictory approaches to the study of security. To date, the discipline has yet to provide a comprehensive analysis of the sources of insecurity and a means to overcome them. Because the study of security bridges the divide between theory and policy, it is imperative that a concept of security emerge that is both philosophically coherent and policy relevant.

The multiple sources of insecurity that influence the behavior of states require analysis if more pacific (and secure) relations are to be had. Both realism and political constructivism offer necessary but incomplete understandings of these sources of insecurity. When realism and political constructivism are treated as more or less complete approaches to the study of security, the conclusions reached and policies offered are potentially harmful to the state and its citizens.

While realism necessarily demonstrates the potential dangers that could befall a state in anarchy, it cannot be considered a complete rendition of international relations. Realism provides a study of security with a proper understanding of the *material* threats that influence state behavior. But, realism is unable to account for the *ideational* sources of insecurity that also threaten the state. If realism is treated as a

comprehensive approach to security management, the state can only achieve a sub-optimal level of security. In order for the precepts and principles of realism to be useful to policy makers and security analysts, realism must be conceptualized within an epistemological constructivist framework. In this way, realism becomes a rhetorical tool in the hands of the 'cautious paranoid'. By re-conceptualizing realism as a rhetorical device—what Donnelly has termed an 'orienting set of insights' or a 'a 'philosophical orientation'[1]—realism emerges as a negative disposition requiring the attention of the security theorist. Its principles become warnings and cautionary tales to be considered in the construction and evaluation of national security policies. In this way, governing laws become constraints. And, "the need for caution..." no longer becomes "confused with the invariance or inevitability of that which demands caution."[2] Above all, realism comes to be seen as part of security framework, rather than the framework itself.

Similarly, studies employing political constructivism cannot be considered complete renditions of national security issues. Their emphasis on identity and culture, and their alternative forms of analysis, provide a necessary understanding of ideational threats. However, these reflexive critiques do not demonstrate an understanding of the role that material threats play in national security matters or the negative consequences of ignoring those material threats. Their alternative analytic focus often rejects the traditional state 'security dilemma' and its corresponding policy needs. The consistent deconstruction of identity performances and cultural givens may provide the

opportunity for the emergence of a more democratic ethos, but the state is marginalized in the process. Such an occurrence does not fulfill the requirements of a security framework that seeks theoretical rigor *and* policy relevance. For these reasons, political constructivism, too, must be subsumed within an epistemological constructivist framework. It is a necessary (but insufficient) component of a more comprehensive understanding of security. The potentially positive political vision that emerges from political constructivism balances the negative vision provided by realism and suggests an opportunity to overcome culturally constructed threats.

It is the construction of an epistemological constructivist framework that allows this project to overcome some of the shortcomings of previous security studies. By recognizing the socially constructed nature of our world, epistemological constructivists counter the problems associated with positivist approaches. Moreover, with the epistemological debate settled in favor of the constructivists, realism and political constructivism can be re-introduced as 'rhetorical tools' rather than general theories. These rhetorical approaches are then seen as complementary tools in the analysis of security rather than contradictory paradigms. Each approach offers a partial understanding of insecurity. At each instance, the other approach is necessary in order to balance the security analysis being offered.

As a contribution to the field of security studies, this framework offers analysts a more comprehensive means to understanding this "essentially contested concept."[3] Previous approaches, whether realist or constructivist, have placed ontological and

epistemological barriers on the concept of security. Seeking to remain relevant to the policy community, realists espousing a materialist ontology and state-centric bias reduced threats to existential dangers accessible to an empiricist epistemology. In response, constructivists challenged realism by deconstructing academic texts and policy statements to uncover hidden discourses and expose traditional efforts as discursively constituted and ultimately malleable. If realism demonstrated the importance of power in the national security calculus, constructivists demonstrated its 'necessary' (re)production by actors involved in multiple speech-acts. If realists argued that a specific (material) condition—tanks, bombs, hostile protests, etc.—was an existential threat, constructivists claimed an a priori establishment of these physical 'things' in security terms.

The result for the study of security was compelling. A schism in the field separated those pursuing a traditional (state-centric and policy relevant) approach from those pursuing an investigative critique.[4] Realists could claim to participate in the 'real world' while constructivists could claim to be intellectually and morally superior. But, what has been the cost to the field of security studies and the policies of the state?

Ultimately, an investigation of the sources of insecurity must attempt to manage the crises of human existence. Security is a necessary component to the construction of the good life. In an international environment largely defined by the presence of states, security policies must be understandable to those states. Policies must be designed that manage the security needs of all the relevant states in the

system. This is not a new challenge. It returns the discussion of security to the works of earlier realists. Balancing the negative vision of realism with something more positive engaged Carr, Herz, and others. In this way, these scholars could "insist on keeping 'realist' insights in dialectical tension with higher human aspirations and possibilities."[5] The challenge of this project has been to find a framework wherein this dialectical tension can move the study of security forward. Similarly, Arnold Wolfers's conclusion that "the ideal security policy is one that would lead to a distribution of values so satisfactory to all nations that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimized," challenges students of security to more completely understand the sources of insecurity. But, existential dangers and culturally constituted threats require a constructivist framework that provides a coherent epistemology in order to more closely achieve Wolfers's ideal. The epistemological umbrella constructed over a rhetorical realism and political constructivism provides a way through to this ideal policy.

In today's world, the investigation of security that balances the negative with the positive, the realist with the constructivist, is a possibility. It can be achieved by investigating issues through the lens of the 'cautious paranoid' while simultaneously investigating the same issues through the lens of the political constructivist. Both offer something valuable to a more robust understanding of security. But, both require the presence of an epistemological constructivist framework in order to coherently offer this improved conceptualization of national security.

In chapters five and six, this framework was applied to the U.S. decision to deploy a BMD system and its decision to wage a drug war in Colombia. While both issues have been labeled 'security problems', the discussion in both chapters suggests that a more robust analysis of each issue—balancing the concerns of realists and political constructivists—can improve the security calculation of the state. Such a finding is important because, as has been discussed above, the state represents the most powerful international actor in the system and maintaining the state as the central focus of security studies commits this approach to a policy relevant critique. As the study of security bridges both theoretical inquiry and state policy considerations, this project has attempted to remain firmly attuned to the world-view of the state in order to offer a more comprehensive understanding of insecurity. If the concept of security is to resonate, then it must be applicable to the political units capable of producing system-wide effects because of their policies.

Because the United States represents the most powerful actor in international relations, it is important to examine how its security policies are created and transformed. As chapters five and six suggest, the United States has, paradoxically, created insecurity while attempting to manage its security concerns. The framework developed here offers a more rigorous test for policies designed to enhance national security. By balancing realist and political constructivist positions on any given issue, the analyst and policy maker is required to contemplate the requirements of two very different political visions. Additional studies might employ a similar framework in

order to investigate other issues designated 'security' topics by relevant actors. The official American position towards non-nuclear rogues (Cuba, Libya, Syria, and possibly Venezuela) suggests a need to balance concern for their material capabilities with an understanding of the U.S. construction of these states as *antagonistic actors*. In addition, American policy in the Middle East requires a thoroughgoing analysis employing the framework developed here. A realist critique of state policy in the Middle East (one which measures the material capabilities of the states in the region and demonstrates how regional balance of power issues influence state behavior) could be complemented by a political constructivist interpretation of U.S. self/other constructs. Such a study could demonstrate how the works of Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, and David Campbell,[6] might be supplemented by a realist discussion of the U.S. national interest in the region. As the applications to this approach have suggested, an investigation of this matter might bring about a more coherent policy package that offers the United States an opportunity to promote and encourage a more democratic ethos at home and abroad.

If this framework is successful in demonstrating how the United States creates insecurity by not fully understanding its security environment, it might also be used to investigate security considerations for other states in the world. Regional hegemons, as well as minor powers, might benefit from a more comprehensive understanding of their relative power capabilities *and* their identity performances. A balanced understanding

of the sources of insecurity provides a deeper critique of the security problematique that emerges.

Such an approach might prove valuable to states in the Middle East. For example, the Israeli need for military defense might be examined in light of the Palestinian need for basic, ontological security. The existential conditions for most Palestinians resemble the conditions present in South African townships during Apartheid[7] or the conditions of peasant communities in rural Colombia today.[8] A robust study involving Israel and its neighbors might improve the regional security environment by balancing realist and political constructivist interpretations. It would challenge Israel to recognize how Palestinian ontological security is a prerequisite for Israeli national security. Similarly, it would challenge Palestinians to recognize the security needs of Israel as fundamentally important to their own security environment.

In other regions, a study employing this framework may prove useful as well. The security situation between India and Pakistan continues to deteriorate. Since both sides have refused to engage in a consistent and meaningful political dialogue, deciding instead to propagate a military understanding of their security interests, their separate understandings of the situation remains dangerously incomplete. The framework developed here provides a way for these states to investigate both the material and cultural sources of their shared insecurity.

Perhaps Simon Dalby is most accurate, contending that the current debate in the field finds scholars "contesting an essential concept."[9] The idea of security is,

indeed, an essential concept. Without security, humans are unable to search for, obtain, or even imagine the good life. Dalby summarizes the issue convincingly.

> *security* is a crucial term, both in the political lexicon of state policy makers and among academics in the field of international relations. Precisely because of the salience of security, the current debates about reformulating it provide, when read as political discourse in need of analysis rather than as a series of solutions to problems, a very interesting way to come to grips with what is at stake in current debates around world politics and the constitution of the post-Cold War political order.[10]

This project has attempted to provide an analytic framework that functions in this post-Cold War world. It offers the analyst and the policy maker an approach that maintains the state at the center of the security problematique. It demonstrates the necessary roles that realism and political constructivism play in the development of a robust security critique. And, it does so within an epistemological constructivist umbrella that seeks to balance the sources of insecurity confronting the state. But, this framework is not intended as a solution to state insecurity. Rather, it provides a framework that challenges the analyst and policy maker to consider and re-consider their security assumptions in an effort to constantly enhance national security.

ENDNOTES

Notes for Chapter One

[1] See, for instance, the collection of essays in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Nan Poku and David T. Graham, eds., Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998); Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8 (Summer 1983): 129-153; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68 (Spring 1982): 162-177.

[2] Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 33.

[3] See, for example, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

[4] Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 70.

[5] Craig Carr uses the term 'reasonably decent polities' in a discussion of fairness and obligation. See, Craig L. Carr, "Fairness and Political Obligation," Social Theory and Practice 28 (January 2002): forthcoming.

[6] Ken Booth, "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist," in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, p. 114.

[7] For a discussion of the legal and moral idealists, see, Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 91-97.

[8] Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd edition (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964).

[9] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions," American Political Science Review 44 (December 1950): 833-854; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

[10] John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

[11] George Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

[12] Buzan, p. 8.

[13] Ferguson and Mansbach, p. 96.

[14] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 204.

[15] Buzan, People, States & Fear, p. 10.

[16] See, for instance, Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. xii; Amos A Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., revised ed, American National Security: Policy and Process (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 3.

[17] Buzan, People, States & Fear, p. 10.

[18] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 115.

[19] Here, Wittgenstein's discussion of logic and the limits of the world is intriguing. "Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot *say* either." Ibid.

[20] See, for instance, Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Insecurities in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 1992).

[21] See Poku and Graham, Ullman, and Tuchman Mathews, supra note 1.

[22] Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 125.

[23] Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millenium's End," in On Security, pp. 214-215.

[24] Craig L. Carr, "Fairness and Political Obligation," forthcoming.

Notes for Chapter Two

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc., 1972), p. 404. *My italics.*

[2] Ibid.

[3] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Impasse of American Foreign Policy, volume two (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 56.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," American Political Science Review 46 (December 1952): 978.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy, p. 57.

[10] John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (January 1950), p. 157.

[11] Ibid., p. 158.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., p. 173.

[16] Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate", p. 978.

[17] Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays (New York: Appleton, 1896), p. 81. Cited in Herz, "Idealist Internationalism," p. 179.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 149.

[21] Ibid., p. 150.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p. 158.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., p. 161.

[28] Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 201.

[29] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 91-92.

[30] Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 203.

[31] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 132.

[32] Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6 (Autumn 1996): 54-57.

[33] Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security 25 (Summer 2000): 27.

[34] Ibid., p. 28.

[35] Ibid., p. 37.

[36] Ibid., p. 38.

[37] Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 1991), 58. For a cogent discussion of the rise of the nation-state and its transcendence over other political forms, see, Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[38] Buzan, p. 58.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., p. 95.

[41] Ibid., p. 112.

[42] Ibid., p. 114.

[43] Ibid., p. 115.

[44] Ibid., p. 141.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid., p. 331.

[47] For a traditional discussion that links intelligence to greater security, see, Roy Godson, "Intelligence and National Security," in Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and

Ted Greenwood, eds. Security Studies for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's 1993), pp. 211-235.

[48] Buzan, pp. 22-23.

[49] Ibid., p. 22.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] See, Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 132-154.

[53] Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 1992), p. 18.

[54] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 22.

[55] Ibid., p. 23.

[56] Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 13.

[57] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 35.

[58] Gary L. Scott and Craig L. Carr, "Are States Moral Agents?," Social Theory and Practice 12 (Spring 1986): 83.

[59] Ibid., p. 84.

[60] Kal J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 108.

[61] While the events of September 11, 2001 would seem to have strengthened this relationship, recent scholarship seems to be questioning this historic contract, see, for example, Daniel Deudney, "Political Fission: State Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Security Politics in the United States," in Ronnie Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 87-123.

[62] Scott and Carr, p. 79.

[63] Robert Jackson, "The Security Dilemma in Africa," in Brian L. Job, ed. The Insecurity Dilemma, p. 84.

[64] See, for instance, the discussion by Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 16-17.

[65] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 131.

[66] John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 337.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Donnelly, p. 10.

[70] Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds. The Perils of Anarchy, p. 387.

[71] Consider, for instance, Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1991), pp. 1-36.

[72] Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points," from an address to Congress, January 8, 1918 reprinted in John A. Vasquez, ed. Classics of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hal, 1986), p. 18.

[73] The best example of this philosophy might be the post-WWII work by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace through World Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[74] The official name of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact is, of course, the *General Treaty for the Renunciation of War*. For a discussion concerning the treaty, see, Seyom Brown, The Causes and Prevention of War, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 170-171.

[75] Herz, "Idealist Internationalism," p. 177.

[76] Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate," p. 966.

[77] Clark and Sohn, supra note 73.

[78] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

[79] See, for instance, Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," The American Political Science Review 80, 4 (December 1986): 1151-1169; and Bruce Russett, et. al. "The Democratic Peace," International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 164-184.

[80] Donnelly, p. 10.

[81] Rosenthal, p. 151.

[82] Herbert Butterfield, cited in Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Faux Realism," Foreign Policy (July/August 2001): 81.

[83] Ferguson and Mansbach, pp. 143-160.

[84] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Anlaysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 206.

[85] Ferguson and Mansbach, p. 217.

Notes for Chapter Three

[1] Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 164. This agrees with Bartelson's concern that "the ultimate subject of security is sovereignty, whether personalized in the sovereign, or in the abstract and naturalized sense of the state as a whole, but its precise signification varies with the point of reference." (p. 163).

[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 115.

[3] David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

[4] Ibid., p. 227.

[5] Ibid., p. 156.

[6] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[7] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[8] Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, translated by Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso Books, 1985), p. 108. Cited in Campbell, p. 6.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. 226.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., p. 227.

[13] Ibid., p. 12.

[14] Ibid., p. 208.

[15] Ibid., p. 227.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[18] Ibid., p. 3.

[19] Ibid., p. 22.

[20] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

[21] Ibid., p. 82.

[22] Ibid., p. 198.

[23] Ibid., p. 85.

[24] Ibid., p. 87.

[25] Ibid., pp. 154-155.

[26] Ibid., p. 154.

[27] Ibid., p. 208.

[28] McSweeney is drawn to Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge Books, 1958); Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Newark, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967); Anthony Giddens, Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); as well as the work of Emile Durkheim.

[29] McSweeney, p. 91.

[30] See, for instance, the discussion at Ibid., p. 100.

[31] Ibid., pp. 91-92.

[32] Ibid., pp. 210-211.

[33] Ibid., p. 211.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., p. 196.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., p. 179.

[38] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 10.

[39] Ibid., p. 32.

[40] Ibid., p. 24.

[41] Ibid., p. 25.

[42] Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security, p. 38.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Katzenstein, p. 17.

[45] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, p. 33.

[46] Katzenstein, p. 11.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, p. 36.

[49] Katzenstein, p. 26.

[50] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, p. 54.

[51] Ibid., p. 58.

[52] Ibid., p. 60.

[53] Ibid., p. 62.

[54] Ibid., p. 63.

[55] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

[56] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, p. 53.

[57] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 1998), p. 208.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid., p. 57.

[60] Ibid., p. 204.

[61] Ibid., p. 34.

[62] Ibid., p. 31.

[63] Ibid., p. 205.

[64] Ibid., p. 35.

[65] Ibid., p. 33.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid., p. 51.

[68] Ibid., p. 58.

[69] Ibid., p. 57.

[70] Knud Erik Jorgensen, "Four Levels and a Discipline," in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds. Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 41.

[71] To complicate this brief description, it is important to note that a challenge to strict positivism (defined as adherence to a materialist ontology and an empiricist epistemology) does not make one a post-positivist. Wendt's more recent work as well as The Culture of National Security represent two positivist approaches to constructivism that challenge a materialist ontology but otherwise maintain a desire to construct a social scientific theory of political action. See, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security.

[72] For a concise explication of correspondence theories of truth, see, Mark Neufeld, "Reflexivity and International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 22 (Spring 1993): 54-61.

[73] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significanceof Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), p. 3.

[74] In a discussion concerning how philosophical concepts are brought into the social sciences, Hanna Pitkin argues, "For most of us who work in political and social studies, the inherited, unexamined fragments of philosophy we bring to our work derive from some form of positivism, and thus from a model of the physical sciences developed by philosophers in the 1920s. These fragments are likely to include certain assumptions about what constitutes 'the real world,' such as that it is 'out there' rather than 'in here.' They are likely to include the assumption that the world consists exclusively of facts, about which we make descriptive statements, and of values, about which we make normative statements. They are likely to favor the abstract and general over the concrete and specific; objectivity over the self; rationality over affect." Ibid.

[75] Dale Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," International Security 25 (Fall 2000): 189.

[76] Pitkin, p. 3.

[77] Wittgenstein, p. 115.

[78] It is crucial to recognize the limits of this 'post-positivist' similarity. The recent writings by Wendt, as well as other 'conservative constructivists' (a term employed by Ralph Pettman) suggests that these constructivists are, in fact, positivists. Increasingly, Wendt has objectified the social world in order to do 'scientific research'. While I am sympathetic to Pettman's concerns, it would appear that some distance still exists between the positivism employed by traditional security texts and Wendt's positivism. Much of this distance is the result of the dissimilar ontological positions between these scholars. Wendt's acceptance of ideational structures and ideas as 'facts' just the same as material structures and physical entities, allows him to employ positivist techniques in the investigation of international politics. However, this does not necessarily mean the Wendt is a thorough-going positivist. As Maja Zehfuss notes, Wendt's most recent writings are an attempt to bridge rationalist and reflexive studies. See, Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil," in Fierke and Jorgensen, p. 56. For a deeper discussion that involves an alternative view to that offered above, see, Ralph Pettman, "Commonsense Constructivism and Foreign Policy: A Critique of Rule-Oriented Constructivism," in Vendulka Kubalkova, ed. Foreign Policy in a Constructed World (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001): 249-265.

[79] Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 2.

[80] Hopf, p. 175.

[81] Finnemore, pp. 5-6.

[82] McSweeney, p. 210.

[83] Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 335-370.

[84] McSweeney, p. 207. For a further discussion of the differences between McSweeney and Wendt, see, pp. 122-125.

[85] Ibid., p. 203.

[86] Campbell, p. 218.

[87] Ibid., p. 219.

[88] Ibid., p. 220.

[89] Ibid., p. 205.

[90] Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, p. 205.

[91] Ibid., p. 206.

[92] Ibid., p. 206.

[93] Ibid., pp. 33-35.

Notes for Chapter Four

[1] This idea is most clear in Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 212-222.

[2] This is, perhaps, best demonstrated by looking to various scholarly journals. 'Traditional' security studies journals, like International Security and Survival emphasize the importance of realism and its variants. Journals such as Millennium and Alternatives have increasingly published articles by security 'wideners' and post-structural security theorists.

[3] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 204. See also, pp. 23-26.

[4] Ibid., p. 204.

[5] Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of Columbia Press, 1989), p. 43.

[6] Karin M. Fierke, "Critical Methodology and Constructivism," in Constructing International Relations: The Nest Generation, Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 118.

[7] Jennifer Milliken, "Discourse Study: Bringing Rigor to Critical Theory," in Constructing International Relations, p. 138.

[8] Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 6, 2 (2000): 159-160.

[9] Jonathan Potter, Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric, and Social Construction (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 7.

[10] Aron Ben-Ze`ev, "Is There a Problem in Explaining Cognitive Process?" in Rethinking Knowledge: Reflections Across the Disciplines, eds. Robert F. Goodman and Walter R. Fisher (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995). Cited in Knud Erik Jorgensen, "Four Levels and a Discipline," in Constructing International Relations, p. 39.

[11] Guzzini, p. 159.

[12] Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, p. 33.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, p. 35.

[15] Fierke, p. 129

[16] Michael C. Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security," European Journal of International Relations 4, 2 (1998): 206.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ferguson and Mansbach, p. 96.

[19] Williams, pp. 216-217.

[20] Williams, p. 208. Williams is citing the work of Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 11.

[21] Williams, p. 208.

[22] Ibid., p. 213.

[23] Ferguson and Mansbach, p. 217.

[24] For a discussion of critical security studies, see, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

[25] This idea has been explored by Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again Into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 19, 1 (1990): 83-110. See, also, Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospect of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly 33, 3 (1989): 235-254.

[26] In a recent essay, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach offer a telling reading of the current battle between realism and their version of a contender. For our purposes, it is interesting how their contending approach that might replace realism emphasizes identity and culture (and therefore demonstrates some affinity with the political constructivism outlined here). "Surely we must discard and replace theory that fails to shed light on issues that any reader of today's headlines knows are most important. But replace it with what? In our view, we should conceive of global politics as involving a world of 'polities' rather than states and focus on the relationships among authority, identities, and ideology. Central questions are: In particular times and places, who or what controls which persons with regard to which issues, and why? How and why do old political affiliations evolve or die and new ones emerge?" See,

Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "The Past as Prelude to the Future?: Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics," in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Inc., 1996), p. 21.

[27] Nicholas G. Onuf, "The Politics of Constructivism," in Constructing International Relations, p. 253.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Discussed in Fierke and Jorgensen, "Introduction," in Constructing International Relations, p. 6. This follows the discussion in John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, 3 (1995): 5-49.

[32] Steve Smith, "Foreign Policy is What States: Social Construction and International Relations Theory," in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World Vendulka Kubalkova, ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 44.

[33] Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy 110 (1998): 38.

[34] Knud Erik Jorgensen, "Four Levels and a Discipline," in Constructing International Relations, p. 47.

[35] For a compelling discussion of this issue at a deeper, philosophical level, see, Steve Fuller, "The Reflexive Politics of Constructivism," History of the Human Sciences 7, 1 (1994): 87-93.

[36] Jef Huysmans, "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier," European Journal of International Relations 4, 2 (1998): 245.

[37] Ralph Pettman, "Commonsense Constructivism and Foreign Policy: A Critique of Rule-Oriented Constructivism," in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, p. 259.

[38] Ibid., p. 261.

[39] Ibid., p. 258.

[40] Ibid., p. 257.

[41] Huysmans, p. 233.

[42] Ibid., p. 232.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 245.

[45] Ibid., p. 247.

[46] Ibid., p. 248.

[47] Henry Kariel, "Bringing Postmodernism into Being," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1988, p. 10. Cited in Pauline Rosenau, "Once Again into the Fray," p. 100.

[48] A cursory of review of recent texts on American promotion of 'democracy' will demonstrate how the term has been mis-applied to much of the U.S. effort. See, in particular, Alan Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?: Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[49] A brief discussion of U.S. promotion is supplied by Duncan Green, Silent Revolution the Rise of Market Economics in Latin America (London: Cassell LAB, 1995).

[50] Badredine Arfi, "Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity," Security Studies 8 (Autumn 1998): 152.

[51] Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security 23 (Summer 1998): 173.

[52] David Campbell, for instance, writes, "Were there no borders, there would be no danger, but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the containment of contingency, and the delineation of border." David Campbell,

Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 81. See, also, Glenn Chafetz, Michael Sprirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, "Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy," Security Studies 8 (Winter 1998/9 - Spring 1999): vii-xxii.

[53] Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," European Journal of International Relations 4, 3 (1998): 273.

[54] Campbell, p. 227.

[55] Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 150.

[56] Campbell's analysis of the Soviet threat during the Cold War represents a case in point. For the U.S., Soviet otherness created "the basis for an interpretive framework that constitutes the Soviet Union as a danger independent of any military capacity." (p. 139) In order to complete his analysis of the Cold War, Campbell offers this caveat, "This is not to suggest that the USSR's military was either insignificant or benevolent." (p. 139) But does not this beg the question? Even after accounting for the role that identity plays in the construction of a threat, there remains a residual form of insecurity on account of the fact that we cannot know whether the Soviet Union is 'insignificant' or 'benevolent'. Can we assume that the material capabilities of the Soviet Union represent an existential danger that also involves a measure of insecurity?

[57] Paul Kowert, "Toward a Constructivist Theory of Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, p. 276.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Jorgensen, "Four Levels and a Discipline," p. 48.

[61] Campbell, p. 223.

[62] Jorgensen, p. 40.

Notes for Chapter Five

[1] Debates concerning BMD are often complicated by multiple and competing system designs and what these designs are intended to do. Wherever possibile, I shall use 'BMD' (ballistic missile defense) to refer to the general set of systems designed to defend against a nuclear missile attack. At times in the following discussion, the use of the terms 'ABM' (anti-ballistic missile) and 'NMD' (national missile defense) will become necessary. See the Appendix in the back for a more detailed account of these differences.

[2] Benson D. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971), p. 17.

[3] Ibid., p. 19.

[4] Ibid., p. 17-19.

[5] Ibid., p. 20.

[6] The U.S. Army's first ABM, the 'NIKE-ZEUS', is actually the third generation antiaircraft missile. The first two missiles, 'NIKE-AJAX' and 'NIKE-HERCULES' were the first air-to-surface missiles. For a discussion, see, Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 27.

[7] Adams, p. 20.

[8] Ibid., p. 41.

[9] Yanarella, pp. 64-65.

[10] Adams, p. 38.

[11] See, David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for U.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1993), p. 2.

[12] Ibid., p. 107.

[13] Ibid., p. 4.

[14] Adams, p. 41.

[15] Ibid., p. 57.

[16] Goldfischer, p. 58.

[17] Yanarella, p. 127.

[18] "The Soviet Union had begun placing a network of ABMs around Moscow early in 1964. Later in November the Soviets paraded a Galosh ABM during a holiday celebration." Yanarella, p. 105. It was not until November 10, 1966 that official acknowledgment of the Soviet ABM system was made. "McNamara announced that 'there [is] now considerable evidence that they [the Soviets] are deploying an anti-ballistic missile system.' The Soviet Galosh ABM system- as it was code-named by NATO- was believed to be composed of a network of radars and a two- or three-stage, solid-fueled interceptor missile designed for long-range, exoatmospheric interception of incoming ICBMs." Yanarella, p. 118.

[19] Yanarella, p. 127.

[20] The United States had been making modifications to NIKE-ZEUS, including the enhancement of radar systems and the addition of the faster SPRINT missile. This system was designated 'NIKE-X' and would become the urban defense system SENTINAL in the late 1960s.

[21] I take the idea of 'political movements from below', from Alan Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy: Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 4 and generally. Gilbert differentiates between a 'democratic internationalism from below' with a 'democratic internationalism from above'.

[22] See, for instance, Yanarella, pp. 146-149.

[23] Ibid., p. 147.

[24] For Morgenthau's role in the policy debate, see, Yanarella, p. 156. For Kennan's role, see, Adams, p. 223. For a detailed discussion the realist concern with the development of BMD, see, Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pp. 107-120.

[25] Adams, p. 223.

[26] These are often referred to as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

[27] Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3435, TIAS No. 7503 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972) [ABM Treaty], amended by Protocol of July 3, 1974, 27 UST 1645, TIAS No. 8276.

[28] Steven Van Evera, "Preface," in The Star Wars Controversy: An *International Security* Reader, Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. ix.

[29] Ibid., p. xi.

[30] Ibid., p. xvi.

[31] Ibid., p. xvi.

[32] Ibid., p. xvi.

[33] Ibid., p. xvi.

[34] George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright, "National Missile Defense: An Indefensible System," Foreign Policy 117 (Winter 1999/2000): 121.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., pp. 121-22.

[37] Ibid., p. 122.

[38] Steven E. Miller, "The Flawed Case for Missile Defence," Survival 43 (Autumn 2001): 96.

[39] Ibid., p. 97.

[40] Ibid., p. 98.

[41] Ibid., p. 100.

[42] Ibid., p. 101.

[43] Ibid., p. 102.

[44] A boost-phase system could be constructed at various sites around the globe—near rogue states. It is designed to launch interceptor rockets at ICBMs in the early 'boost-phase' before an ICBM has reached the exoatmosphere. This is also the stage before an ICBM can deploy its warheads and possible decoys. A boost-phase system could employ the Navy Aegis Destroyer as a platform for launching the anti-missile missiles, thus reducing the political consequences of deploying a BMD system. However, as the discussion below suggests, it does not solve all of the problems associated with BMD deployment. For a discussion of 'boost-phase' systems, see, James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 147-151.

[45] "Bush's Hang-Ups," The Economist (December 15-21, 2001), pp. 10-11.

[46] The complexities of these negotiations and problems they have caused to U.S. foreign relations are detailed in, "Missiles Over the Moors," The Economist (20 January 2001), p. 51; "Missile Defense: A Shield in Space," The Economist (3 June 2000), pp. 21-23; James Brooke, "Greenlanders Wary of a New Role in U.S. Defenses," The New York Times (18 September 2000), p. A6.

[47] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*: A Response to My Critics," in Neorealism and Its Critics, Robert O. Keohane, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 338.

[48] Goldfischer, p. 44.

[49] Paul Wolfowitz, "Prepared Testimony on Ballistic Missile Defense to the Senate Armed Services Committee," p. 7. Cited in Miller, p. 103.

[50] Miller, p. 103.

[51] Richard Betts, "Heavenly Gain or Earthly Losses? Toward a Balance Sheet for Strategic Defense," in The Strategic Defense Initiative: Shield or Snare?, Harold Brown, ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987; reprint ed., The Bookings Institution, February 1988), p. 256.

[52] Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, "Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative," in The Star Wars Controversy, p. 87.

[53] Consider the problems associated with NATO/French relations when the United States was considered to a preponderance of power in that Alliance. See, Constantine A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem 1960-1963 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), pp. 35-42; Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981-97: The Politics of Ambivalence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

[54] John Newhouse, "The Missile Defense Debate," Foreign Affairs 80 (July/August 2001): 100.

[55] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security 25 (Summer 2000): 28.

[56] Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," International Security 26 (Summer 2001): 64.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., p. 65.

[59] I will discuss a number of these alternative strategies in the final section below.

[60] Glaser and Fetter, p. 65.

[61] Miller, p. 102.

[62] Glaser and Fetter, p. 74.

[63] Ibid., p. 75.

[64] As Miller argues, "this interpretation is contrary to the explicit position of the Chinese government and simply ignores the possibility that US missile-defence efforts will affect the scale, pace and character of China's nuclear modernization." Miller, p. 101.

[65] Glaser and Fetter, p. 65.

[66] Ibid., p. 84.

[67] Miller, p. 102.

[68] Ibid., p. 102.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Consider, for example, that in 1995, "the detection by Russian radar of the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket generated a warning of possible attack serious enough to trigger the first-ever activation of President Boris Yeltsin's 'nuclear briefcase." Glaser and Fetter, p. 70.

[71] According to Glaser and Fetter, most accidental launch scenarios with Russian ICBMs would overwhelm any BMD system. See the discussion at Ibid., p. 43.

[72] Ibid., p. 59.

[73] Thomas L. Friedman, "The Rumsfeld Defense," New York Times (July 13, 2001), cited in Miller, p. 105.

[74] Center for Defense Information, "World Military Expenditures," on the www at http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme

[75] 1998 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, reprinted in Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, p. 198. See the discussion of the Rumsfeld Commission at Glaser and Fetter, p. 44.

[76] See, Glaser and Fetter, p. 45.

[77] Miller, p. 97.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Interview with Dr. Gary L. Scott, Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, 11 July 2001.

[81] Glaser and Fetter, p. 67. *My italics.*

[82] Miller, p. 98.

[83] Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Faux Realism," Foreign Policy (July/August 2001): 80.

[84] Bruce M. Russett, No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), p. 67. While Russett examines 'minimax' in terms of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, the logic of his argument seems appropriate for a discussion of U.S. policy toward BMD.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Miller, p. 107.

[87] Consider, for example, the language used by Senator Steve Symms (R-Idaho), an advocate of SDI, when challenging legislation that would weaken development of BMD. "If I were over in the Kremlin, I would say, if this amendment passes with this great momentum behind it, 'Just stand firm, boys, because the Americans are weakening. They are voting on the Senate floor the same position we would like to see them take to demonstrate that they are weakening their position all the time." Cited in Larry Pressler, Star Wars: The Strategic Defense Initiative Debates in Congress (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 58.

[88] George Kennan speaks to the American tendency towards unrestrained foreign policies in George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, expanded edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). See, especially, pp. 17-20.

[89] Ronald Reagan, "Speech on Defense Spending and Defensive Technology," March 23, 1983. Reprinted in Miller and Van Evera, The Star Wars Controversy, p. 257. Bruce Jentleson, argues that "during his 1984 re-election campaign, he accused his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale, of being so misguided as to believe that the 'Soviets were just people like ourselves.' Reagan matched this demonic view of the enemy with classic American exceptionalism. America was 'a shining city on a hill,' the 'nation of destiny,' the 'last best hope of mankind." See, Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), p. 167.

[90] The self/other distinction that emerges in this issue returns us to the approach taken by David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

[91] Newhouse, p. 99.

[92] Christopher Hitchens, "Farewell to the Helmsman," Foreign Policy (September/October 2001): 70.

[93] Again, see, Campbell, supra note 90 and Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Re(Introduction) to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

[94] Legro and Moravcsik, p. 81.

[95] Consider both David Campbell, "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility," in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 163-180; and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Citizenship: On the Border of Order," pp. 181-197.

[96] These representations reinforce each other. Danger is considered 'outside' while the outside is considered 'dangerous'.

[97] Martha Finnemore's critique of this realist claim is straightforward. See, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 1-3.

[98] Again, see, Finnemore, generally; Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security 23 (Summer 1998): 174-177; John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," International Organization 52 (Autumn 1998): 862-864; and Paul A. Kowert, "National Identity: Inside and Outside," Security Studies 8 (Winter 1998/9 - Spring 1999): 2.

[99] "From Albright to All-murk," The Economist (15 August 1998), p. 25.

[100] Michael T. Klare, "Permanent Preeminence: U.S. Strategic Policy for the 21st Century," NACLA Report on the Americas 34 (November/December 2000): 12.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Newhouse, p. 105.

[103] NPR, "Morning Edition," 13 May 2002, "Advisors' Roles," Eric Westervelt.

[104] J. Patrice McSherry notes that "U.S. Special Forces deployments in Latin America have actually increased from 147 in 1995 to some 200 today." See, J. Patrice

McSherry, "Preserving Hegemony: National Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era," NACLA Report on the Americas 34 (November/December 2000): 27. On the more general problems with intervention, see, Stephen Van Evera, "American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better," Security Studies 1 (Autumn 1991): 1-24.

[105] On NATO expansion, see, Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," pp. 36-38.

[106] The most recent example is the Bush Administration's attempt to include Cuba in the terrorist camp. According to Undersecretary of State, John Bolton, "Cuba should be added to the list of rogue states involved in making, or helping to make, weapons of mass destruction." See, The Economist, "Playing Softball in Havana," (May 18-24, 2002), p. 35.

[107] Miller, pp. 98-100.

[108] McSherry, p. 26.

[109] Glaser and Fetter, p. 43.

[110] Newhouse, p. 99.

[111] Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, 3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.

[112] Legro and Moravcsik, p. 81.

[113] Ibid., p. 82.

[114] Peggy Noonan, "A Chat in the Oval Office," Wall Street Journal (25 June 2001), cited in Miller, p. 103.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Perhaps the most promising example is the Nunn-Lugar initiatives to reduce the threat of WMD. For a detailed discussion, see, "Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Programs," Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers 2, 10 (30 March 1998) at www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/brief10.htm

[117] Indeed, recent diplomatic activities in South Asia suggest that India believes that in exchange for favorable comments regarding BMD, the United States is willing to allow states like India into the 'nuclear club'. See, for instance, Subhash Agrawal, "NMD: India's Curious Response," Far Eastern Economic Review (14 June 2001), p. 34.

[118] Legro and Moravcsik, p. 81.

[119] By this, I mean that the act of reflection is the engine which propels the dialectic forward.

[120] Nicholas G. Onuf, "The Politics of Constructivism," in Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 248.

[121] Consider the argument by Alan Gilbert that a sophisticated realism cautions against acts of hubris in order to enhance security. See, Gilbert, pp. 12-13.

[122] See, Ibid., generally, but with specific attention to pp. 170-175; and Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Cost and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000).

[123] Miller, p. 106.

[124] As Hollis and Smith argues, "[this] is clear in Morgenthau's work, where he argues that the requirements of national interest drive out ideological considerations in the formulations of foreign policy." See, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1991), p. 85; see, also, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 7; and George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, volume II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 57-60.

[125] Legro and Moravcsik, p. 82.

[126] McSweeney argues that a change in material interests can change actor identities. He relates this issue to the Northern Ireland peace talks. See, Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 175-197.

Notes for Chapter Six

[1] J. Patrice McSherrey, "Preserving Hegemony: National Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era," NACLA Report on the Americas 34 (November/December 2000), p. 29.

[2] Draft Paper, "Development of U.S. Latin American Policy in Terms of U.S. World Objectives, 1950-1955," 9 November 1950, FRUS, 1950, 2: 634. Cited in Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

[3] Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 200.

[4] Rabe, p. 138.

[5] Ibid.

[6] For a detailed history of the guerrilla movements in Colombia, see, Alfredo Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History," NACLA: Report on the Americas 34, 2 (September/October 2000): 23-31.

[7] Rabe, p. 96.

[8] Erma von der Walde and Carmen Burbano, "Violence in Colombia: A Timeline," NACLA: Report on the Americas 35, 1 (July/August 2001): 24.

[9] According to Alfredo Molano, the Colombian military was backed "by Washington's National Security Doctrine and a $170 million U.S. loan." See, Molano, p. 25.

[10] von der Walde and Burbano, p. 24.

[11] Molano, p. 26.

[12] William LeoGrande and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia's New *Violencia*," World Policy Journal 17, 3 (Fall 2000): 4.

[13] Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombian and the War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs 67, 1 (1988): 73.

[14] Bagley, p. 73.

[15] The idea of the 'balloon effect' is often used to describe the problem of attacking drugs in one area only to find it emerge in another. See, LeoGrande and Sharpe, p. 2.

[16] Bagley, p. 74.

[17] Ibid., p. 80.

[18] Ibid. This problem reaches its apogee, perhaps, in the presidency of Ernesto Samper, who was funded by and largely beholden to drug money. See, Francisco E. Thoumi, "The Impact of the Illegal Drug Industry on Colombia," in Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book, Tom Farer, ed. (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 134.

[19] William O. Walker III, "A Reprise for 'Nation Building,': Low Intensity Conflict Spreads in the Andes," NACLA Report on the Americas 35, 1 (July/August 2001): 26.

[20] Eduardo Gamarra, "Bolivia," in International Handbook on Drug Control, Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, eds. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 107.

[21] Ibid., p. 108.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Operation Verde Mar was created to eradicate coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru in 1979, Operation Condor was created to interdict the trafficking of coca from the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru in 1985, and Operation Snowcap was created in 1987 and involved U.S. DEA agents in nine Latin American countries in an attempt to assist in eradication and interdiction programs. For a discussion, see, Laura Vasquez, "Peru," in International Handbook on Drug Control, pp. 212-217.

[25] LeoGrande, and Sharpe, p. 2.

[26] Martin Hodgson, "The Coca Leaf War," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56, 3 (May/June 2000): 40.

[27] Von der Walde and Burbano, pp. 26-27.

[28] Walker, p. 27.

[29] Ibid., p. 28.

[30] See, for instance, Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[31] Walker, p. 28.

[32] Elliott Abrams, "U.S. Interests and Resource Needs in Latin America and the Caribbean," United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. April 1987.

[33] LeoGrande and Sharpe, p. 1.

[34] Marc Cooper, "Plan Colombia: Wrong Issue, Wrong Enemy, Wrong Country," The Nation 272, 11 (19 March 2001): 11-18. Of course, the Colombian military is far more direct in their assessment of the initiative, "We don't differentiate between counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations—they're the same thing." (Lt. Col. Jose Leonidas Munoz, commander of the 90th Battalion). Cited in Hodgson, p. 41.

[35] This is most clearly represented in the need for State Department Certification. See, "Drugs, Latin America, and the United States," The Economist (7 February 1998), pp. 35-36.

[36] Michael J. Kryzanek puts the point nicely when arguing that "descriptions of ties between leftist FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels and drug lords have been used by the Bush administration to lend support to the Colombian government's war against the Medellin Cartel. The objective is clearly to paint the rebels as criminals and terrorists with little interest in government reform." Michael J. Kryzanek, Leaders, Leadership, and U.S. Policy in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 143.

[37] Russell Crandall, "Clinton, Bush and Plan Colombia," Survival 44, 1 (Spring 2002): 168.

[38] Consider for instance, the distinction between high and low politics offered by Hocking and Smith. "High politics' is the area of war and peace, security and insecurity in military terms; 'low politics' is the area of technical and social issues which have traditionally been outside the central concerns of governments in the world

arena." See, Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd edition (New York: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 298.

[39] According to the Oxford English Dictionary, threat can be considered in both a narrow and an expansive way. The more limited definition of s.v. 'threat' (II.3) reads, "A denunciation to a person of ill to befall him; esp. a declaration of hostile determination or loss, pain, punishment, or damage to be inflicted in retribution for or conditionally upon some course; a menace." However, 'threat' can also be defined in ways similar to 'danger'. The more expansive definition of s.v. 'threat' (II.2) reads, "painful pressure, oppression, compulsion; vexation, torment; affliction, distress, misery; danger, peril." This might be compared with the definition s.v. 'danger', "To bring into or expose to danger; to endanger, imperil, risk." See, Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (1989), p. 997 and p. 241.

[40] Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: Van Norstrand Reinhold Company, 1971), pp. 198-200.

[41] Viewed this way, it is peculiar that the illicit drug issue has become a 'war' with enemies. It has been successfully securitized. However, other pressing issues having similar deleterious consequences (such as global warming, declining fish stocks, and low water tables in agricultural regions) have not been successfully securitized. All of these issues, including the illicit drug trade, might be examined more closely in order to understand the problems associated with military strategies to solve these 'wider' security threats. See, Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," Millennium 19, 3 (Winter 1990): 461-476; and Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?," International Security 20, 2 (Fall 1995): 35-62.

[42] Alan Gilbert, Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy?: Great-Power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 12.

[43] Alan Gilbert addresses this more 'sophisticated realism' and its interest in the 'common good' at Ibid., p. 12.

[44] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," The American Political Science Review 46, 4 (December 1952): 978.

[45] Juan G. Tokatlian, "National Security and Drugs: Their Impact on Colombian-US Relations," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 30, 1 (Spring 1988): 134.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Cited in Bruce Michael Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War?: US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 30, 1 (Spring 1988): 168-9.

[49] Coletta Youngers, "Cocaine Madness: Counternarcotics and Militarization in the Andes," NACLA Report on the Americas 34, 3 (November/December 2000): 18.

[50] Comment of Rep. Benjamin Gilman, cited at Ibid.

[51] Ibid., p. 17.

[52] Tokatlian, p. 134.

[53] See, for instance, the discussion of nativism in Dale T. Knobel, "America for the Americans" The Nativist Movement in the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996); and Walter Benn Michaels, Our America: Nativism, Modernism and Pluralism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995).

[54] In addition, this tendency to couch foreign policy initiatives in moral language is explored in depth by George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, expanded edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[55] Daniel Lazare, "A Battle Against Reason, Democracy and Drugs: The Drug War Deciphered," NACLA Report on the Americas 35, 1 (July/August 2001): 14.

[56] Tokatlian, p. 134.

[57] Ibid., p. 134-135.

[58] George E. Pozzetta, ed. Nativism, Discrimination, and Images of Immigrants (New York: Garland Publishers, 1991).

[59] As Alan Gilbert notes, "crack offenders receive *ten* times the sentence for sale or possession as 'ordinary' cocaine users. This policy alone has resulted in the disproportionate jailing of young blacks (the government has sentenced approximately

a third of young men between nineteen and thirty-four to some jail time or is currently prosecuting them)." See, Gilbert, p. 200.

[60] Graham Boyd, "The New Drug War is the New Jim Crow," NACLA Report on the Americas 35, 1 (July/August 2001): 19.

[61] Ibid., p. 21.

[62] Tokatlian, p. 135.

[63] LeoGrande and Sharpe, p. 2.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Lazare, p. 14.

[68] Ibid.

[69] See the discussion of 'functional limitations on power' by Harold and Margaret Sprout at supra note 40.

[70] Robert Cox makes this clear when drawing out the environmental constraints on 'emancipatory' or 'critical' international relations theory. He writes, "its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order." Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Neorealism and its Critics, Robert O. Keohane, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 210.

[71] Statement of 33 year old coca farmer Abelando. Cited in Hodgson, p. 45.

[72] The idea of 'ontological security' (as it is being discussed here) is explored by Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 154-155.

[73] See, for instance, David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

Notes for Chapter Seven

[1] Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 194. See, also, pp. 75-77.

[2] Ibid., p. 193.

[3] Barry Buzan uses W.B. Gallie's term in his assessment of security. See, Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 7.

[4] This is an extension of David Campbell's discussion in Writing Security. See, David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 226.

[5] Donnelly, p. 193.

[6] See, for instance, Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (London: Verso Books, 1988); Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983); and David Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

[7] See, for example, Fred T. Hendricks, The Pillars of Apartheid: Land Tenure, Rural Planning, and the Chieftancy (Uppsala, Sweden: Academiae Ubsaliensus, 1990); and David M. Smith, Apartheid in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[8] A recent discussion of the plight of Colombia's indigenous communities is Garry M. Leech, "No Sympathy for Either Side: Indigenous Communities Try to Survive," NACLA Report on the Americas 35, 6 (May/June 2002): 53-54.

[9] Simon Dalby, "Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse," in Critical Security Studies, Keith Krause and

Michael C. Williams, eds. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 3-31.

[10] Ibid., p. 5.

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